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Chapter 1
General Introduction
Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974) initiated the popularity of the human capital the-
ory. Concentrating on schooling and on-the-job training as investments in human
capital, they develop models which elaborate the relationship between investments
in human capital and earnings. Considering costs and returns of education invest-
ments and focusing on skill specification, they suggest a positive correlation between
education, skill levels and earnings because higher education leads to an increased
productivity on the labor market. Spence (1973) criticizes this approach construct-
ing a counter model in which education in general and school-leaving certificates
in particular serve as a signal of workers’ productivity to reduce the asymmetric
information with respect to workers’ abilities and the consequent uncertainty on the
labor market.
Existing literature from a variety of disciplines confirms the relevance of character
skills for future educational attainment and labor market outcomes. Bowles and
Gintis (1976), both economists, and Jencks (1979), as sociologist, started to elab-
orate on the importance of personality traits and behaviors, in addition to family
background and schooling, for the educational attainment and success on the labor
market. Psychologists already started decades ago with the revelation and clas-
sification of separate primary trait factors within the personality sphere. Allport
(1937) as theorist and Cattel (1945) as proponent of multivariate research meth-
ods scrutinized and elaborated one of the first personality classifications. James J.
Heckman, one of the most prominent economists in the world today, has contin-
ued research on the beneficial effect of cognitive and non-cognitive skills on lifetime
success. Heckman and Kautz (2013) discuss the effectiveness of various human de-
velopment strategies preferring the term “skill” rather than “trait” because the latter
emphasizes immutability and permanence while research has shown that cognition
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and character can be shaped and changed to a certain degree over the life cycle.
Character skills are constructs not directly related to cognitive skills which are the
ability to gather and process incoming information and the ability to store and
recall them. Among policymakers there has been growing attention on how charac-
ter and cognitive skills can be shaped, especially in children and adolescents. The
Perry Preschool Program since 1962, the Abecedarian Program in 1972, and Project
STAR between 1985 and 1989 are the most well-known interventions that aimed to
improve cognitive and character skills of young children.1 The Perry Preschool Pro-
gram emphasizes the skill development of three to four year old black children from
low-income households by administering high quality pre-school interventions on
five days per week for two years which targets children’s self-control and sociabil-
ity. The Abecedarian Program in comparison was an even more intensive preschool
intervention. It already started six weeks after birth and lasted until grade three
targeting disadvantaged black children. It included full-day child care on five days
per week with a focus on developing skills in cognition, language, and adaptive be-
haviors. Project STAR was an educational reform experiment intended to determine
the effect of a reduced class size on academic achievement. Students entering the
kindergarten were randomly assigned to three different categories of class sizes and
remained in a class for the next four years. Each of these three projects had sig-
nificant positive effects on educational attainment and labor market outcomes. In
general, these projects were successful in promoting the development of human cap-
ital. Children who attended classes with the smallest size in grades K-3 and children
who received high quality preschool interventions were more likely to graduate from
college and more likely to be employed in adulthood. As reviewed by Heckman and
Kautz (2013) these projects had persistent beneficial effects on character skills while
the initial positive effects on cognitive abilities vanished after children had reached
puberty.2
While research has focused on the empirical evidence for the effect of experimen-
tal (pre-)school interventions and the relationship between various non-experimental
out-of-school activities of youths and their later labor market outcomes, there is still
a lack of evidence on how out-of-school activities are linked to educational attain-
1Detailed information on each of these programs can be found at http://www.highscope.org/
content.asp?contentid=219 for the Perry Preschool Program, at http://abc.fpg.unc.edu/ for
the Abecedarian Program, and in James, Jurich, and Estes (2001).
2An exception is the Abecedarian Program with lasting effects not only on character but also on
cognitive skills. As elaborated by Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, and Masterov (2006), early childhood
is a particularly important period in life for the formation of human capital, especially of cognitive
abilities. Since the Abecedarian Program already started when children were only six weeks old,
the project was able to foster both character and cognitive skills.
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ment and labor market outcomes in a non-experimental setting which complicates
the evaluation of a causal effect on any outcome of interest. In the absence of a ran-
dom treatment assignment the estimation of causal treatment effects suffers from
systematic differences in observed and unobserved characteristics between treatment
and control group that would lead to biased estimates if characteristics which influ-
ence jointly the treatment assignment and the outcome variable are not taken into
account.
With Heckman and coauthors (2006, 2010) leading the way, research documents that
cognitive and character skills are highly malleable during the early years. While cog-
nitive abilities become less malleable as children grow up, character skills are still
malleable and not entirely concluded by the time when children enter adolescence.
This is in line with findings in neuro-scientific research showing that character skills
are located at different areas of the brain and adolescence as a period in which
synaptic reorganizations take place and thus a period in which the brain might be
more sensitive to inputs. Structured leisure activities performed during adolescence
may influence the formation of character skills through this biological channel.3 Fur-
thermore, structured leisure activities may have a direct positive effect by training
and promoting perseverance, self-confidence, a sense of responsibility and motiva-
tion which are beneficial for later success in life. If the activity is performed with
other people in a group, it may improve social skills and, at least for structured
activities, one gets in touch with a positive and productive social environment that
supports the adoption of positive intrinsic values. A less direct effect structured
activities may have is the reduction of time that is spent with deviant risky leisure
activities which might be harmful for later success in the labor market. At last, the
engagement in structured leisure activities may only signalize a certain endowment
of character skills which is beneficial for later success in life.
This dissertation contributes two empirical studies to research on extracurricular ac-
tivities and their contribution to the development of character skills. To account for
the self-selection into the activities of interest, both studies employ a flexible strategy
combining propensity score matching and regression techniques. Both studies bene-
fit from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) that offers the unique advantage
of both a large, representative sample and high quality measures of behavioral out-
comes.
In chapter 2 Aderonke Osikominu and myself analyze the effect of performing sports
3Structured leisure activities are defined as activities that take place in an organized setting
and/or involve goal-directed efforts.
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on a regular basis on the formation of character skills. Three quarters of the youths
on the academic school track that prepares for the university entry play sports at
least once a week. The corresponding number of youths attending the vocational
school track is 50%. The athletic engagement and non-engagement is quite stable
throughout adolescence and young adulthood. More than 70% of the 17 year old
adolescents who play sports at least weekly already played their current sport at
age 13 and 60% are still engaged in sports at least weekly at age 21. Further,
more than 70% of the 17 year old non-athletes are still not engaged in sports at
age 21. Young men favor team sports and especially soccer, young women have
more diverse preferences and play more individual sports. The vast majority of
the athletes play sports in a club or with others. Thus, sports is generally a social
activity. For youths from less advantaged family backgrounds, sports constitutes
often the only quality pastime they engage in while for youths from more advantaged
family backgrounds sports is only one possible quality pastime besides playing music,
singing or being technically active. Parental athletic involvement is highly predictive
of the youth’s athletic involvement and athletes tend to be positively selected in
terms of family background, intelligence, and height. These differences disappear
after matching treatment and comparison observations. In particular, the matched
treatment and comparison units are balanced with respect to the predetermined
human capital measures height and intelligence. This suggests that the matching
strategy effectively balances heterogeneity in skills related to genetic factors and
early childhood environments. We find beneficial effects of athletic involvement on
a broad range of character skills. Especially for youths on the vocational school
track the effects are sizeable. In most cases, the impacts go in the same direction
for young men and women. In addition, athletes show better educational outcomes
than comparable youths who do not play sports. Considering the engagement in
other structured leisure activities in the analysis, it turns out that the beneficial
effects are largely driven by the sizeable effect among youths who do not engage
in any other structured activity. The treatment effect estimates can therefore be
interpreted as estimates of the broader effect of having access to an enriched social
environment rather than the pure effect of physical exercise. The effects are robust to
including family fixed effects. In sum, the results are consistent with the hypothesis
that experiences and informal learning activities during adolescence influence the
development of nonacademic skills.
In chapter 3 I analyze the effect of working part-time while attending full-time
secondary schooling on the formation of character skills and occupational choice
strategies. About 40% of male and female adolescents hold a part-time job while
4
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attending full-time schooling. On average, adolescents who work started with their
first part-time employment at age 14. While supplementing pocket money is the
leading reason for taking the first job for both male and female adolescents, young
women are more likely to start their first job because the work interests them.
Comparing the type of job adolescents hold, between male and female adolescents
differences exist. About 60% of male adolescents hold a delivery job. While young
women also favor delivery jobs, in the female sample there is a more heterogeneous
pattern. In addition to delivery jobs, service and care jobs are further frequently
mentioned types of jobs female adolescents hold. Adolescents who work tend to
be positively selected in terms of family background and regional characteristics.
Parents’ employment history is a good predictor for the employment status of their
school-aged children. Children who have never had a job during full-time school-
ing are more likely to have parents who were non-employed. Adolescents who work
during school have parents who are higher educated, who earn significantly more,
and who exhibit a higher level of trust. Teenagers with siblings and teens who were
recommended by their teacher at the end of grade four to attend the academically
oriented secondary school track are more likely to work while in full-time education.
These differences disappear after matching treatment and comparison observations
signalizing a successful balancing. Adolescents who work spend on average less time
with sleep and media use during the week and on weekend days in comparison to
students who do not work. In addition, they spend more time with learning activi-
ties, less time with sports and more time with relaxing on weekend days. Focusing
on the time use of employed adolescents, female adolescents spend more time on the
job than young males. The drawback of working part-time while still in school is
that adolescents spend less time with academic learning, especially young women
on weekdays. Furthermore, they spend significantly less time sleeping, especially
on weekends. On the other side, the time female and male adolescents spend in
front of a screen is also significantly reduced, especially during the week. Working
part-time while still in school has beneficial effects on locus of control, it reduces the
uncertainty about own interests and talents and reduces the dependency on parents.
The effects are robust to including family fixed effects.
Heckman (1999) emphasizes the importance of investments in cognitive and char-
acter skills for economic and social success and the importance of formal academic
institutions, families and firms as sources of learning. He portrays the current policies
toward skill formation and criticizes the misconception of current policies regarding
education and job training. Focusing only on cognitive skills measured by achieve-
ment or IQ tests, policies ignore the importance of social skills, self discipline and a
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variety of character skills which are known to determine success. For instance, the
PISA studies in 2000 immensely affected the education debate in Germany and led
to political activism (Blossfeld et.al, 2011, p.23). Another example is the G8 reform.
The motivation of this reform was the reduction of the graduation age to accelerate
the labor market access of school students by reducing the academic school track
tenure by one year.4 To leave the overall curriculum unchanged, the reform in-
creased the weekly instructional time. Thus, while trying to keep the investments
in cognitive skills unchanged, the consequences of this reform on the formation of
non-cognitive skills were not at the center of attention. Dahmann and Anger (2014),
as one of the few papers which have focused on this topic, found short-term neg-
ative effects on the emotional stability of students. Admittedly, formal education
institutions play a central role as the main producer of skills required by the modern
economy. However, the learning environment at school offers little opportunities for
young people to foster other skills than cognitive skills and knowledge. The crucial
role of extracurricular and leisure activities as opportunities to form and develop
a variety of abilities except cognitive skills to succeed in the modern economy has
been widely neglected. As mentioned in Heckman (1999), learning is a lifetime affair
and much learning takes place outside of schools. Achievement tests and measures
of cognitive skills as indicators of success are misleading. The narrow focus on cog-
nition ignores the full array of socially and economically valuable character skills.
Considering the job and wage polarization in the Western world between high- and
low-skilled workers, the formation of socially productive skills except cognitive skills
may help to increase the supply of skilled workers and to alleviate the growing eco-
nomic inequality.5 An early environment of children that misses to stimulate and
fails to cultivate skills at early ages leads to a lack of cognitive and non-cognitive
skills and is a powerful predictor of adult failure. The results in chapter 2 and 3
support the hypothesis that structured leisure activities positively affect the devel-
opment of non-cognitive skills.
While in chapter 2 and 3 the effect of structured leisure activities on the formation
on skills, which are important for social and economic success and therefore may help
to alleviate economic inequalities by fostering valuable skills of young children with
a disadvantaged family background is presented, in chapter 4 Bernd Fitzenberger
and myself evaluate a policy which aims to protect especially low-income households
against rent increases.6
4The academic school track, Gymnasium, prepares for tertiary education.
5OECD (2011) for OECD countries and Fitzenberger, Hu¨bler, and Kraft (2011) for Germany
discuss the increasing income inequality and the potential driving forces behind it.
6Bundestag (2000) gives a detailed schedule of the reform content.
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Germany is one of the European countries with the smallest percentage of the popu-
lation who lives in owner-occupied houses or apartments. In 2013 about 53% of the
German population lived in an owner-occupied home. A predominant percentage
of the German population therefore satisfies one of their basic needs by living in a
tenancy instead by home-ownership. This illustrates the importance of a function-
ing tenancy law, socially and economically. In East and South European countries
the percentage of the population who lives in owner-occupied housing is consider-
ably larger with about 75%. Different attitudes to home-ownership play a role as
well as differences in the tax burden regarding home-ownership. For instance, in
the Netherlands, Spain, and Italy home-ownership is publicly subsidized to promote
owner-occupied housing financed by mortgages or housing loans. In contrast, land-
lords in Germany face a high level of regulation regarding rent control and tenant
protection against eviction in comparison to the OECD average.
Until the 1990s, Germany was characterized by fairly liberal rent laws. Because
of housing shortages and a strong rent increase in the 1990s, there was a change
towards more regulation in order to protect sitting tenants. Since then the legal
framework has been adjusted several times in favor of sitting tenants. In chapter 4
we analyze the impact of the Tenancy Law Reform Act implemented in 2001 on the
level of rents as well as on the residency discount. Covering all tenancies starting
on September 1, 2001 or later, the two substantial changes were first, the reduction
of the maximum rent increases for sitting tenants from 30% to 20% over the course
of three years and second, the reduction of the minimum notice period until the
termination of a tenancy by the tenant to three months while the protection of the
tenant against eviction by the landlord remained unchanged. While the target of the
first modification is to protect low-income families against rent increases, especially
in metropolitan areas, the second modification accounts for the growing geographic
mobility of workers. The objective of this chapter is to estimate the effect of the
tenancy law reform in 2001 on the level of actually paid rents and the length of
residency discount over the distribution of rents.
The length of residency discount is a front loaded rent payment schedule, where
landlords would ask for higher rents at the beginning of a tenancy to compensate
for the strong rent control during tenancy. This could result in rental payments that
decrease with the length of residency for sitting tenants relative to rents for new
leases for comparable apartments. Further implications of these considerations are
that for a given apartment rents increase stronger than market rents for comparable
apartments where a new lease starts and therefore landlords have an incentive to
evict sitting tenants in order to realize a rent increase with a new lease. On the
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other side, Hoffmann and Kurz (2002) interpret the residency discount as a kind of
compensation for the diminishing quality of an apartment over time while Schlicht
(1983) portrays the discount as a landlord’s concession trying to keep good tenants,
especially when tenants’ preferences change over time and landlords want to avoid
turnover costs, e.g. forgone rents and search costs for new tenants.
The results can be summarized as follows. Households whose tenancies started after
the reform live in newer and in better equipped rental units. The rent-to-income ratio
is significantly larger than for households living in tenancies that started before the
reform. Although the rental units are 1.14 sqm per person larger after the reform,
the share of tenants who assess the size of their rental unit as being too small,
increases after the reform. This suggests that demand for better equipped housing
increases over time. The annual residence discount is significant and decreases in
absolute value with tenure, which is stronger at the top than at the bottom of the rent
distribution, which is stronger early in a tenancy, and which falls with elapsed tenure.
The reform shows a significant negative effect on rents altogether and the negative
effect becomes stronger over the distribution. Thus, households living in expensive
apartments tend to benefit more from the reform than households living in cheaper
apartments. The annual residency discount increases with the reform during the
first three years of a tenancy, but from the fourth year onwards the annual residency
discount vanishes after the reform. The results are robust to including tenancy mean
fixed effects. The evidence suggests that the reform was successful in curtailing rent
increases especially for expensive apartments. Thus, one may be concerned that the
reform may not have been sufficiently targeted. As a consequence, the inequality
between low-income tenants who tend to pay lower rents and high-income tenants
who are able to live in expensive apartments increases.
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Abstract:
Parents and policymakers alike worry about what activities may provide valuable
learning experiences to youths beyond the domain of schooling. Research on ex-
tracurricular and leisure activities documents sizeable positive associations between
the engagement in structured activities and measures of skills, educational attain-
ment and labor market outcomes. What are the underlying mechanisms? This
chapter first develops a simple model to clarify the potential links between leisure
time use and human capital formation. Then we explore empirically what youths
do in their leisure. We further focus on sports as a popular activity and estimate
its effect on a set of behavioral and economic outcomes. The empirical analysis
exploits data from the German Socio-Economic Panel that offers the unique advan-
tage of both a large, representative sample and high quality behavioral measures.
We employ a flexible strategy combining propensity score matching and regression
techniques to account for self selection into athletic involvement. We assess the
plausibility of no-unmeasured confounding using human capital measures that are
predetermined with respect to athletic involvement. Our results are consistent with
the hypothesis that structured leisure activities like sports contribute to the devel-
opment of nonacademic skills.
Keywords: human capital, nonacademic skills, leisure activities, sports, youth de-
velopment, treatment effect
JEL: I 21, J 13, J 24
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2.1 Introduction
Parents and policymakers alike worry about what activities may provide valuable
learning experiences to youths beyond the domain of schooling. The learning en-
vironment at school is tightly structured and offers little opportunities for young
people to develop initiative and motivation of their own (Larson, 2000). It cen-
ters on knowledge and cognitive skills. Schools may fail to engage students with
weaker academic inclinations.1 Research on extracurricular and out-of-school activ-
ities documents sizeable positive associations between the engagement in structured
leisure activities on the one hand and various behavioral, educational, and labor
market outcomes on the other hand (e.g. Farb and Matjasko, 2012; Postlewaite and
Silverman, 2005).2 While these studies provide valuable descriptions of empirical
regularities they do not shed light on the potential mechanisms linking activities
and outcomes which complicates the evaluation of the causal effect of an activity of
interest. Such evidence would be necessary to inform the public aiming to support
youth development.
In this chapter, we propose to study the effects of leisure activities on skill formation
based on an economic framework in which youths allocate their time between differ-
ent types of activities that may contribute to the production of human capital. A
key implication of our framework is that, with a production technology that depends
on multiple simultaneously determined inputs, the common empirical approach that
focuses on modeling the consequences of exogenously assigning a single input of in-
terest does not allow one to quantify the direct causal effect of this input on human
capital. In fact, the optimal choice of other inputs may respond to a change in the
input of interest, if the production technology exhibits cross effects in the sense that
the level of one input affects the productivity of other inputs. Specifically, consider a
social experiment that randomly assigns young people to a treatment group that has
access to a sports club and a nontreatment group that is denied access to the club.
1In the context of remedial education programs for school dropouts, research by Heckman
and coauthors for the US suggests that character skills (e.g. self-esteem, conscientiousness) rather
than academic skills are the constraining factor explaining the low academic and labor market
performance of these people (Heckman, Humphries, and Mader, 2011; Heckman and Rubinstein,
2001).
2Persico, Postlewaite, and Silverman (2004) provide tentative evidence suggesting that adoles-
cent experiences may contribute to the development economically relevant nonacademic skills. The
authors investigate the causes for the height wage premium, i.e. the fact that taller workers earn
more than otherwise equal shorter persons. They show that the height premium is essentially ex-
plained by differences in height as a teenager that in turn are positively related with participation
in extracurricular activities, in particular high school athletics. Case and Paxson (2008) challenge
this view showing that parental socioeconomic status and cognitive skills as a child predict height
and growth during adolescence.
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A regression of a human capital measure on an indicator for treatment assignment
allows one to recover a gross effect that mixes the direct effect of sports and indirect
effects triggered by a reallocation of other activities, such as studying and playing
music, in response to the randomization into or out of sports. Thus, one cannot use
a simple randomization to quantify the direct causal effect of an activity on skills.
In the extreme, a positive gross effect may be entirely caused by indirect effects.
Based on these theoretical insights we introduce an econometric potential outcome
framework in which the treatment is vector valued. The simultaneously determined
inputs of the production technology constitute the elements of the vector valued
treatment. If the production technology exhibits cross effects, the elements of the
treatment vector depend on each other. We show how one can identify the condi-
tional causal effect of an input of interest under a version of no-unmeasured con-
founding. Specifically, the idea is to compare the observed outputs obtained with the
same allocation of other inputs but a differing use of the input of interest, keeping
constant also background characteristics that affect productivity. Economically this
means that, by appropriately varying the marginal costs of all inputs, one can find
two individuals that have the same background characteristics, the same allocation
of other inputs, but a differing allocation of the input of interest. Thus, hetero-
geneity in the marginal costs of the inputs across individuals provides exogenous
variation in the level of the input of interest keeping everything else constant. In a
second step, we obtain the average direct effect of the input by integrating the con-
ditional causal effects over the distribution of background characteristics and other
inputs. While the assumption of no-unmeasured confounding cannot be tested, we
can test its implications. For instance, we can test whether human capital measures
that are predetermined with respect to the skill input of interest are conditionally
independent of this input.3 In our empirical application, we devise a number of such
specification tests to probe our identifying strategy.
Our approach integrates also behavioral perspectives on the development of skills
over the life cycle and the measurement of different types of skills. Behavioral re-
search distinguishes a multiplicity of different skills that have different developmen-
tal trajectories. Some skills are potentially susceptible to experiences during youth,
whereas others are predetermined with respect to adolescent influences. Motivated
by this observation we focus on measures of skills that continue to be malleable
throughout adolescence as outcomes, while we use measures of skills that are pre-
determined with respect to adolescent experiences to test the plausibility of our
3In a similar vein, Heckman and Hotz (1989) propose to test whether matched treatment and
comparison units differ in their pretreatment outcomes.
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empirical strategy.
Two leading examples of skills that are determined already at an early age are height
and intelligence. In developed countries, height and growth during adolescence are
essentially determined by genes (80%) and the quality of the uterine through early
childhood environment (Case and Paxson, 2008; Silventoinen 2003; Visscher, Med-
land, Ferreira, Morley, Zhu et al., 2006). Thus, height during adolescence evolves
independently of adolescent experiences but is correlated with family background
and skills. Similarly, somebody’s rank in the intelligence distribution is stable after
about age six, with genes accounting for the majority (up to 80%) of the variation
across adolescents and adults in a given cohort (Cunha, Heckman, Lochner and
Masterov, 2006; Neisser et al., 1996; Nisbett et al., 2012).
Other skills continue to be malleable until later ages. Character skills, often assessed
through the Big Five personality inventory, continue to develop long into adulthood
until they reach a maximum level of stability at age 50-70 (Almlund et al., 2011).
Recent neuropsychological research shows that the human brain undergoes signif-
icant changes during adolescence, comparable to those taking place during early
childhood (Best and Miller, 2010; Best, Miller, and Jones, 2009; Blakemore and
Choudhury, 2006; Giedd et al., 1999; Singer, 2006). The restructuring of the brain
comes along with developments in the ability to control thoughts and behavior (i.e.
executive function) as well as abilities involving social cognition (e.g. self-awareness,
perspective taking) and the understanding of social emotions (e.g. fairness).4
Character, social and executive function skills are key drivers of economic success.
Character skills such as conscientiousness (i.e. the tendency to be organized and hard
working) are positively associated with economic outcomes (Almlund et al., 2011).
Executive function skills enable future-oriented thinking, e.g. formulating career
aspirations and expectations, which motivates and controls future attainment (Beal
and Crockett, 2010). Recent theoretical and experimental research in economics
demonstrates the importance of social skills in shaping economic interactions and
their outcomes (Bowles and Polan´ıa-Reyes, 2012; Brown, Falk, and Fehr, 2004; Fehr,
2009).
In the empirical part of the chapter we investigate the leisure time use of youths
as well as the effects of athletic involvement on nonacademic skills and educational
attainment. Our focus on sports is motivated by its popularity across socioeco-
4See also the experimental studies by Fehr, Bernhard, and Rockenbach (2008), Alm˚as, Cappelen,
Sørensen, and Tungodden (2010), and Fehr, Ru¨tzler and Sutter (2011) that examine how social
preferences develop during childhood and adolescence.
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nomic groups and general accessibility. For youths from less advantaged family
backgrounds, sports constitutes often the only quality pastime they engage in.5 The
empirical analysis exploits data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)
that offers the unique advantage of both a large, representative sample and high
quality measures of behavioral outcomes. For instance, we have validated measures
of intelligence, personality, reciprocity and risk aversion. We focus on youths who
are administered a biography questionnaire in the year in which they turn 17, pro-
viding details about their current and past educational and leisure activities as well
as their attitudes on a number of domains such as their work values. We further
add information from the parental surveys. The panel nature of the SOEP allows
us to track the youths and their families over time which we exploit to construct a
detailed history of family background as well as subsequent behavioral and economic
outcomes of the youths.
We take advantage of the richness of the SOEP data to carefully implement our
empirical strategy when we estimate the effect of sports on skill formation assuming
no-unmeasured confounding. In particular, we consider a rich set of conditioning
variables that includes detailed measures of family background and parental behav-
iors as well as the youth’s past academic achievement, and current engagement in
educational and other leisure activities. We assess the plausibility of no-unmeasured
confounding with human capital measures that are predetermined with respect to
athletic status. We exploit that height and intelligence are largely determined by
genetic factors and early childhood environments, which means that they are inde-
pendent of adolescent experiences. Specifically, we show that height and intelligence
are balanced in the matched treatment and comparison samples. To estimate the
treatment effects we combine propensity score matching with a flexible regression
adjustment in the matched sample. This approach allows us to combine the advan-
tages of both methods. The semiparametric matching estimator requires a careful
choice of a suitable comparison group for youths playing sports. Thus, we avoid
comparisons based on extrapolations that are not supported by the data. The re-
gression adjustment yields consistent and efficient treatment effect estimates if the
conditional expectation of the outcome is correctly specified. It can easily be mod-
ified to examine effect heterogeneity and to assess the robustness of results. In
particular, we verify that our results are robust to including family fixed effects.
5A couple of studies investigate the relationship between sports at around age 16-18 and ed-
ucational and labor market outcomes at later ages, e.g. Barron, Ewing, and Waddell (2000) and
Stevenson (2010) for the US as well as Pfeifer and Cornelißen (2010) for Germany. They all doc-
ument sizeable positive relationships between teenage athletic involvement and later educational
and labor market outcomes.
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Our main findings are as follows. Three quarters of the youths on the academic
school track that prepares for university entry play sports at least once a week. The
corresponding number for youths attending the vocational school track is 50%. Ath-
letic engagement and non-engagement largely persists through adolescence and into
young adulthood. While young men favor team sports and especially soccer, young
women have more diverse preferences and play more individual sports. Regardless
of type of sport and gender, the vast majority of the athletes play sports in a club or
with others. Thus, sports is generally a social activity. Our results further suggest
that young people who regularly play sports spend a higher share of their free time
on structured and non-sedentary activities than those who do not. Nevertheless,
undirected and passive leisure pursuits clearly dominate among all youths. Parental
athletic involvement is highly predictive of the youth’s athletic involvement. Ath-
letes tend to be positively selected in terms of family background, intelligence and
height. These differences disappear after matching treatment and comparison ob-
servations. In particular, the matched treatment and comparison units are balanced
with respect to the predetermined human capital measures height and intelligence.
This suggests that our matching strategy effectively balances heterogeneity in skills
related to genetic factors and early childhood environments.
We find beneficial effects of athletic involvement on a broad range of behavioral
outcomes including conscientiousness, reciprocity, and career aspirations and ex-
pectations. The effects are sizeable for youths on the vocational track, attaining
10-30% of a standard deviation, whereas they are small and insignificant for youths
on the academic track. The magnitude of the effects sometimes differs across gen-
der, too. However, the impacts always go in the same direction for young men and
women. Athletes, in particular youths on the vocational track, show better edu-
cational outcomes, than comparable youths who do not play sports. We further
examine treatment effects conditional on the engagement in other structured leisure
activities. It turns out that the sizeable beneficial effects of sports among youths on
the vocational track are largely driven by the sizeable effects among youths who do
not engage in any other structured activities. This pattern is similar for youths on
the academic track. We therefore interpret our treatment effect estimates as esti-
mates of the broader effect of having access to an enriched social environment rather
than the pure effect of physical exercise. In a sensitivity analysis, we verify that the
effects are robust to including family fixed effects. Overall, the effects of athletic
involvement on behavioral outcomes are consistent with the hypothesis that experi-
ences and informal learning activities during adolescence influence the development
of nonacademic skills.
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 lays out the
analytic framework. Section 2.3 describes the data source and the analysis sample.
We present the empirical results in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes. The figures
and tables are contained in Appendix I. Appendix II contains further information
on the variables used and detailed estimation results.
2.2 Analytic Framework
2.2.1 Conceptual Background
To support our argument we sketch a theoretical model of time use and its rela-
tionships with skill formation and labor market outcomes. The framework combines
an allocation-of-time model (Becker, 1965) with the approach of Akerlof and Kran-
ton (2000, 2002) that introduces social incentives to the standard economic model
of utility maximization. Youths may allocate their daily time between studying
at school or working on homework assignments (formal learning) and two types of
leisure activities. We distinguish between structured activities that take place in an
organized setting and/or involve goal-directed effort like playing sports or music and
unstructured activities such as watching TV or meeting with peers. Let 0 ≤ e ≤ 1
and 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 denote the share of time a teenager spends on formal education and
structured leisure activities, respectively.
A teenager’s human capital, H(e, s, x), is a function of the time engaged in for-
mal learning and structured activities as well as an index of family background x
capturing parental investments and inherited human capital. A higher value of x
corresponds to a more advantaged background. We assume that family background
positively affects human capital for a given time allocation, i.e. Hx > 0, where
subscripts on functions denote partial derivatives. Human capital is increasing and
strictly concave as a function of formal education e, i.e. He > 0 and Hee < 0. Fur-
ther, cross effects between formal learning and family background are nonnegative,
i.e. Hex ≥ 0. This captures the idea that youths with a better skill endowment
and/or parental support are more productive at studying. We assume further that
human capital is nondecreasing and concave with respect to s, i.e. Hs ≥ 0 and
Hss ≤ 0. Thus, we rule out that engagement in structured activities destroys hu-
man capital. Engagement in structured activities also does not harm formal learning,
i.e. Hes ≥ 0, and a more advantaged family background does not reduce the effect
of structured activities on human capital formation, i.e. Hsx ≥ 0. Let ω denote the
net present value of future earnings per unit of human capital. Thus, the economic
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reward of studying and engaging in structured activities arises through higher future
earnings ωH(e, s, x).
The teenager trades the future economic reward from formal learning and structured
activities off against the immediate nonmonetary utility gains from being idle, θ(1−
e− s), θ > 0, and engaging in structured activities, I(s, x), as well as the immediate
costs associated with studying, γe, γ > 0, and structured leisure activities, κs,
κ > 0. The term I(s, x) represents the net identity utility associated with spending
share s of leisure in structured activities for somebody with family background x.
We assume that Is > 0 and Iss < 0. The identity utility reflects that people’s
decisions to engage in structured leisure activities may depend on social rather than
economic incentives. In particular, the dependence on family background reflects
that parents are role models for their children and shape the environment in which
the children grow up. We assume that the marginal identity utility of structured
leisure activities is nondecreasing in family background, which is motivated by the
observation that youths from more advantaged family backgrounds engage to a larger
extent in structured leisure activities, i.e. Isx ≥ 0. In sum, the utility function of
the teenager is given by:
(2.1) U(e, s) = ωH(e, s, x) + θ(1− e− s) + I(s, x)− γe− κs ,
and the teenager chooses e and s so as to maximize (1).
The two first order conditions form a system of equations that implicitly determines
the optimal shares of time spent studying e∗ and engaged in structured activities s∗
as a function of the parameters ω, x, θ, γ, κ. Comparative static analysis yields the
following results for which we provide proofs in Appendix II.
Lemma 1.
(i) e∗x ≥ 0 and with strict inequality if Hex > 0.
(ii) s∗x ≥ 0 and with strict inequality if Isx > 0.
Lemma 1 says that, if anything, youths from more advantaged backgrounds engage
more in formal learning and structured leisure activities. In the case in which fam-
ily background positively affects learning ability or marginal identity utility from
structured activities a more advantaged family background decreases the amount
of time allocated to unstructured leisure activities. Having established how e∗ and
s∗ depend on x, we can work out how human capital, H∗ ≡ H(e∗, s∗, x), study-
ing and engagement in structured leisure activities respond to variation in family
background.
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Proposition 1. A change in x affects H∗ , e∗, and s∗ in the same direction if
Hex > 0 and Isx > 0.
Proof: Observe that H∗x = He e
∗
x + Hs s
∗
x + Hx. The result follows from Lemma 1
and the property Hx > 0.
From an empirical point of view, Proposition 1 means that, conditional on engage-
ment in formal learning, one tends to find a positive relationship between the en-
gagement in structured leisure activities and measures of human capital, regardless
of whether structured activities affect skill formation (Hs > 0) or not (Hs = 0), if
heterogeneity in family background is not taken into account.
Lemma 2.
(i) The optimal amount of time allocated to formal learning, e∗, and structured
leisure activities, s∗, depends negatively on their respective unit costs, γ and
κ, i.e. e∗γ < 0 and s
∗
κ < 0.
(ii) If there are positive cross effects between structured leisure activities and
studying on skill formation, i.e. Hes > 0, e
∗ also depends negatively on κ
and s∗ negatively on γ, i.e. then e∗κ < 0 and s
∗
γ < 0. Otherwise e
∗
κ = s
∗
γ = 0.
Proposition 2. If anything, a change in γ or κ changes H∗, e∗, and s∗ in the same
direction.
Proof: Observe that H∗γ = He e
∗
γ + Hs s
∗
γ < 0 and H
∗
κ = He e
∗
κ + Hs s
∗
κ < 0 by
application of Lemma 2.
In particular, if structured leisure activities affect skill formation (Hs > 0) and there
exist cross effects between formal learning and structured activities (Hes > 0), a
change in the unit cost of one of them affects the optimal choices of both. With
positive complementarities between formal learning and structured activities, an
increase in the marginal cost of formal education will decrease not only the optimal
amount of formal learning but also of structured activities. From an empirical point
of view, the potential existence of cross effects makes the use of an instrumental
variables framework unattractive for estimation of the ceteris paribus effect of an
activity of interest on human capital formation. In the presence of cross effects, the
activities are correlated with each other and endogeneity in one of them transmits
to the others. This would require to instrument all activities that contribute to
human capital formation with their respective cost shifters, which is typically not
feasible in practice. Researchers may be tempted to resort to a model that focuses
20
2.2. ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
on a single activity of interest for which they have an instrument and omit the other
activities from the structural equation. Such a strategy is questionable because, if
there are cross effects between the activity of interest and the omitted activities,
the instrument would be correlated with the error term of the structural equation.
The reduced form regression of a human capital variable on the instrument would
be informative to test for the existence of nonzero causal effects. Under the null
hypothesis of a zero effect the instrument is uncorrelated with the error term that
contains the omitted activities.6
Further, cross-effects between different inputs of human capital also limit the evi-
dence generated by (natural) experiments. Suppose a researcher randomizes access
to a single activity of interest. If their exist cross-effects, participants will respond
to the randomization of one activity with an adjustment of the allocation of other
activities. This means that the treatment effect identified under randomization of
a single activity consists of a mixture of the direct effect of the activity on human
capital and indirect effects arising through an adjustment of the other activities.
In the extreme, a positive gross treatment effect in an experiment may be entirely
caused by positive indirect effects rather than a positive direct effect of the activity
of interest.
After these theoretical considerations, let us examine how we can recover the ceteris
paribus effect of athletic involvement on human capital formation empirically. Con-
sider first the case that Hs = 0. Thus, athletic involvement does not itself affect skill
formation but confounding factors may cause a spurious relationship between ath-
letic involvement and human capital measures. For instance, athletic involvement
and skills are positively correlated if family background affects the marginal identity
utility of sports (Isx > 0). Similarly if athletic involvement does contribute to the
accumulation of skills (Hs > 0), its true effect may be misstated when heterogene-
ity in family background is not taken into account. In our empirical analysis, we
therefore take great care to control for family background. Further, if athletic in-
volvement contributes to skill formation (Hs > 0), we need to keep the engagement
in formal learning and other structured activities fixed. Athletic involvement is cor-
related with the other activities whose productivity with respect to skill formation
interacts with athletic involvement. Heterogeneity in the marginal costs associated
with the different activities will provide the necessary exogenous variation in sports
6If the activity of interest does not affect skill formation, i.e. the first derivative of human capital
with respect to the activity of interest is zero, there can be no cross effects with other activities
that affect skills, i.e. the cross derivative of human capital with respect to the activity of interest
and the other activity is zero.
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participation conditional on family background and engagement in other activities.
2.2.2 Econometric Approach
In order to estimate the ceteris paribus effect of playing sports on the formation of
human capital we rely on a version of the potential outcome approach (Neyman,
1923; Roy, 1951; Rubin, 1974) in which the treatment is vector valued. A vector
valued treatment arises naturally in the context of a production technology with
multiple inputs that are determined simultaneously. Specifically, let A denote the
vector of inputs. The different elements of A are random variables that potentially
depend on each other. If the elements of A depend on each other, the production
technology exhibits cross-effects in the sense that the level of one input affects the
productivity of other inputs. In our case, A corresponds to a string of variables
indicating the extent to which somebody engages in different types of educational
and leisure activities. To be concrete suppose that A ≡ (E, S,L), where E is a vector
of dummy variables measuring the engagement in formal education, S a dummy
equal to one if somebody plays sports (the treatment of interest) and L a vector
of dummy variables measuring the engagement in other leisure activities. Denote
by the scalar random variable Y (a) the potential output prevailing under input
setting A = a = (e, s, l). We use the scalar random variable Y to denote the actual
output. It holds that for somebody producing with input setting a we observe Y (a),
while potential outputs associated with alternative input settings a′ 6= a, Y (a′), are
counterfactual.
Our goal is to contrast potential outputs associated with input settings that involve
sports, i.e. S = 1, to potential outputs associated with input settings that do not
involve sports, i.e. S = 0, keeping the other inputs constant. In particular, we are
interested in the average direct effect of sports on those who play sports
(2.2) ∆T ≡
∑
e
∑
l
Pr(E = e,L = l |S = 1)E[Y (e, 1, l)− Y (e, 0, l) |S = 1] ,
the average direct effect on the untreated
(2.3) ∆U ≡
∑
e
∑
l
Pr(E = e,L = l |S = 0)E[Y (e, 1, l)− Y (e, 0, l) |S = 0] ,
and the average direct effect in the total population
(2.4) ∆ ≡ Pr(S = 1)∆T + Pr(S = 0)∆U .
The expectations E[Y (e, 0, l) |S = 1] and E[Y (e, 1, l) |S = 0] are counterfactual.
In order to solve the evaluation problem we rely on the conditional independence
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assumption (CIA):
(2.5)
E[Y (e, s, l) |X = x,E = e, S = 1,L = l]
= E[Y (e, s, l) |X = x,E = e, S = 0,L = l] , s = 0, 1
with X a vector of observed background characteristics. According to the CIA
the potential outcomes (Y (e, 1, l), Y (e, 0, l)) are mean independent of the athletic
status S conditional on the observed covariates X and engagement in other activities
(E,L). Economically the CIA means that, by appropriately varying the marginal
costs of all inputs, A, we can find two individuals that have the same background
characteristics X, the same allocation of inputs E and L, but a differing allocation of
S. Thus, heterogeneity in the marginal costs of the inputs across individuals provides
exogenous variation in the level of input S conditional on background characteristics
X and keeping constant the allocation of E and L. We motivate the empirical
content of the CIA in our application in Section 2.2.3 below. Under the CIA, the
conditional causal effect E[Y (e, 1, l) − Y (e, 0, l) |X = x,E = e,L = l] is identified
from the conditional contrast of the actual outcomes:
(2.6)
E[Y (e, 1, l)− Y (e, 0, l) |X = x,E = e,L = l] =
E[Y |X = x,E = e, S = 1,L = l]− E[Y |X = x,E = e, S = 0,L = l] .
Further, we require that the conditional probability of participating in sports is
strictly greater than zero and smaller than one, which gives rise to the following
common support assumption:
(2.7) 0 < P (x; e, l) < 1 , where P (x; e, l) ≡ Pr(S = 1 |X = x; E = e,L = l) .
Finally, we assume that potential outcomes are independent across individuals, rul-
ing out general equilibrium effects.
Under the common support assumption, the ATT given E = e and L = l is identified
by integrating the conditional causal effect, equ. (2.6), over the distribution of X
given E = e, S = 1 and L = l:
(2.8)
∆T (e, l) ≡∫ · · · ∫ E[Y (e, 1, l)− Y (e, 0, l) |X,E = e, S = 1,L = l]dF (X |E = e, S = 1,L = l)
because F (X |E = e, S = 1,L = l) = P (X; e, l)F (X |E = e,L = l)
Pr(S = 1,E = e,L = l)
. Finally, we
can obtain the grand ATT of activity S by integrating ∆T (e, l) over the distribution
of E and L:
(2.9) ∆T =
∑
j
∑
k
∆T (ej, lk)Pr(E = ej,L = lk |S = 1) ,
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where j and k index the possible settings of E and L, respectively. The grand ATU
of S is obtained analogously.
Collect all conditioning variables in a vector denoted by Z ≡ (X,E,L). The esti-
mation proceeds in two steps. In a first step, we apply kernel matching techniques
and reweight observations so as to align the distribution of Z in the treatment and
comparison samples. With a large number of elements in Z, it is typically easier to
match on a low dimensional balancing score rather than on Z itself, see Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983).7 Here, we match on the index of the estimated propensity score.
We implement a stratified version of kernel matching in order to align treated and
comparison observations exactly by gender and school track. Also we specify sepa-
rate propensity score models for each of the four subsamples defined by gender and
school track.
Then we estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) by means of
the following weighted regression
(2.10) min
{αˆ,βˆ,γˆ,δˆ}
∑
n
gˆn
[
Yn − αˆ− βˆSn − γˆZn − δˆSn(Zn − Z¯)
]2
,
where n = 1, 2, . . . indexes the observations, gˆ is a weight, and Z¯ is the mean of Z
across the treated observations, i.e. Z¯ =
∑
n gˆnSnZn/
∑
n gˆnSn. The coefficient β
corresponds to ∆T , the ATT.
8
For any treated observation i, gˆi equals the sampling weight vi of that observation.
For any comparison observation j, gˆj is given by
∑
i∈{n:Sn=1} viwˆij, where wˆij is the
matching weight that is larger the closer comparison observation j is to treated
observation i in terms of the estimated propensity score. In our case of the local
linear estimator wˆij equals
(0, 1)
[∑
j
(
(Pˆj − Pˆi), 1
)′
K
(
Pˆj − Pˆi
h
) (
(Pˆj − Pˆi), 1
)]−1 (
(Pˆj−Pˆi), 1
)′
K
(
Pˆj − Pˆi
h
)
,
where K() is the Gaussian kernel, Pˆ the fitted balancing score, and h the band-
width.9
7To see that the balancing theorem of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) holds also in our setting
write E[S |Y (e, 1, l), Y (e, 0, l), P (X; e, l)] = E{E[S |Y (e, 1, l), Y (e, 0, l), P (X; e, l),X,E = e,L =
l] |Y (e, 1, l), Y (e, 0, l), P (X; e, l)} and apply the CIA to the inner expectation.
8We obtain the average treatment effect on the nontreated, ∆U , analogously using an indicator
variable for nontreatment status instead of S. The negative of β then corresponds to ∆U .
9We obtain the bandwidth through a crossvalidation procedure suggested in Bergemann, Fitzen-
berger, and Speckesser (2009). We also implemented the Nadaraya-Watson estimator to examine
the sensitivity of our results to the choice of matching estimator. The treatment effect estimates
are nearly the same.
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Estimating the ATT as in (2.10) with an additional regression adjustment allows us
to combine the advantages of both methods, matching and regression. The semipara-
metric matching estimator requires a careful choice of suitable control observations
for each treated observation. Thus, we avoid comparisons based on extrapolations
that are not supported by the data. The regression model yields a consistent and effi-
cient treatment effect estimate if the conditional independence assumption, eq. (2.5),
holds and if eq. (2.10) correctly models the conditional expectation E[Y |X,E, S,L].
Combining matching with an additional regression adjustment has the advantage
that the treatment effect estimate is consistent if either the propensity score (and
thus wij) or the outcome regression model is correctly specified (Robins and Ri-
tov, 1997; Imbens, 2004). Put differently, if the treatment status is random in the
reweighted sample, the estimated treatment effect should be robust to modifications
of the outcome regression model. If the treatment effect estimates obtained with
different regression adjustments coincide we interpret this as supporting evidence
for our matching model. Finally, we use the regression on the reweighted sample to
examine treatment effect heterogeneity.
We obtain standard errors and confidence bands for our estimated treatment effects
through bootstrapping based on 250 resamples. We resample families to account
for correlation across siblings. In each resample, we recompute the propensity score
using a draw from the asymptotic distribution of the coefficients in the propensity
score model. This allows us to take account of the estimation error in the propensity
score.
2.2.3 Specification of the Propensity Scores and Balancing
Tests
Our theoretical framework highlights the importance to control for the youths’ family
background and time use. We consider detailed information on the youths’ involve-
ment in educational and other leisure activities such as television and computer
usage, frequency of reading a book, doing cultural and musical activities, volunteer-
ing and working part-time to improve pocket money. We control for the youths’
migration background, birth order and quarter of birth. As proxies for lagged hu-
man capital and cognitive skills we condition on the teacher’s recommendation for
secondary school type at the end of elementary school as well as an indicator for
whether the youth has ever repeated a grade.
At the level of the family, we control for educational attainment of the parents as well
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as their average past earnings and standard deviation to capture income variations.
We also use information about parental locus of control, measured by the Rotter
scale, and personality traits, measured by the Big-Five model.10 We further take
into account parental leisure activities like sports, cultural activities, volunteering as
well as their television and computer usage. In addition, we control for the number
of years a youth lived with either parent up to the age of 15. We also include
indicators on the quality of the relationship between adolescent and parents, e.g.
importance of parents, frequency of conflicts. As proxies for the neighborhood and
local environment we include indicators for the German federal states, the type of
region in which one grew up (e.g. metropolitan area or countryside) and variables
measuring local labor market conditions. Further, we consider the composition of
the school class, i.e. the share of students with a foreign origin.
We fit the propensity scores separately for each of the subsamples, stratified by gen-
der and school track, and run an extensive specification search. We start with a
comprehensive specification and drop variables that are grossly insignificant. This
procedure leads to satisfactory specifications in most cases. In the few cases in which
the balancing condition fails, we further revise the specification and include addi-
tional interactions until we achieve balance. The final specifications are chosen along
the following criteria: (i) our theoretical knowledge regarding potentially important
drivers of participation and outcomes, (ii) empirical significance, and (iii) balancing
of the covariates in the treatment and control samples.
As a first balancing test, we use the regression test suggested in Smith and Todd
(2005). We regress each covariate used in a given propensity score specification on a
quartic in the estimated propensity score, the treatment dummy and the quartic of
the propensity score interacted with the treatment dummy. If the terms involving the
treatment dummy are jointly insignificant, the treatment and comparison samples
are balanced with respect to the regressor under consideration. As a second balanc-
ing test, we apply our matching procedure to a set of important variables (regardless
of whether they were finally included in a particular propensity score model) and
check whether the means differ across matched treatment and comparison samples.
In the spirit of Heckman and Hotz (1989) we further assess the validity of our match-
ing strategy by testing whether the means of placebo-outcomes are balanced in the
treatment and comparison samples after matching. The placebo-outcomes are hu-
man capital measures that are predetermined with respect to athletic involvement
during late childhood and youth. In particular, we consider measures of height and
10Detailed information on the covariates is provided in Section B of Appendix II.
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intelligence. In developed countries, height and growth during adolescence are es-
sentially determined by genes (80%) and the quality of the uterine through early
childhood environment, see Silventoinen (2003), Visscher, Medland, Ferreira, Mor-
ley, Zhu et al. (2006) and the discussion in Case and Paxson (2008). Thus, height
during adolescence evolves independently of adolescent experiences such as sports
but is correlated with parental socioeconomic background and skills. Similarly, some-
body’s rank in the intelligence distribution is stable after about age 6, with genes
accounting for the majority (up to 80%) of the variation across adolescents and
adults in a given cohort (Cunha, Heckman, Lochner and Masterov, 2006; Neisser et
al., 1996; Nisbett et al., 2012). Consequently, we apply our matching procedure to
measures of height and intelligence. If our matching procedure works well, these pre-
determined human capital measures should be balanced in the matched treatment
and comparison samples.
2.3 Data and Analysis Sample
Our empirical analysis uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study
(SOEP), a representative annual household panel covering more than 11,000 house-
holds in Germany.11 In addition to the standard household and person question-
naires, the SOEP devises since 2000 a specific youth biography questionnaire to all
young people turning 17 in the corresponding year. It includes detailed informa-
tion on family background and childhood, past and current involvement in different
leisure and educational activities, academic performance, career plans as well as at-
titudes about different topics. Our main analysis sample consists of all youths who
completed this questionnaire in the years 2001 to 2011. We add information from
past and current parental questionnaires to construct further variables describing the
family background, such as parental earnings and involvement in leisure activities.
Using the surveys conducted in subsequent years we collect additional information
on behavioral and economic outcomes of the youths until their early twenties.
Our main measures of athletic involvement are based on the following two questions
in the youth biography questionnaire: Do you play a particular sport? and How
often do you play sports? We define as athletes all those who play sports at least on
a weekly basis. We exclude individuals with missing or ambiguous answers on the
two questions as well as disabled adolescents. In some of our analyses, we further
11We use the data distribution 1984-2011, http://dx.doi.org/10.5684/soep.v28. See Wagner
et al. (2007) and Wagner et al. (2008) for further information.
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distinguish between different sport intensities (daily, weekly), sport types (team,
individual) and social contexts (nonprofit club, commercial facility, unorganized).
In most of our analyses, we stratify the sample according to gender and type of
secondary school track. In particular, we distinguish between a vocationally and an
academically oriented school track. Tracking generally takes place at age 9-10 and
depends on academic ability and socioeconomic background, with more advantaged
students in terms of ability and family background attending the academic track.12
We also exclude youths with missing information on school track or attending in-
tegrated school types. Overall our sample consists of 3,343 young people (see table
2.1 in Appendix I).
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Patterns of Athletic Involvement and Leisure Time
Use
In our sample of (almost) 17-year olds, about two thirds of the young men and about
half of the young women engage in sports at least on a weekly basis, see figure 2.1
in Appendix I. 24% of the young men and 11% of the young women exercise even
daily. 36% (21%) of the young men (women) participate in athletic competitions
and 37% (20%) of the young men (women) play a team sport. Among male athletes,
the by far most popular sport is soccer (42.50%) followed by training in a fitness
club (8.27%) and biking (5.08%). The picture is more diverse for female athletes.
The top three sports are dancing (13.35%), horseback riding (10.24%) and volleyball
(9.89%), see table 2.2.
For the vast majority of young athletes sports is a social activity. Table 2.3 provides
a breakdown by sport type and social context. Two thirds of the athletes play
sports in a nonprofit club. In Germany there exists a wide network of such clubs,
covering also rural areas. They rely on small membership fees13 and, importantly,
12The vocationally oriented school track subsumes the two lower tiers of general secondary school-
ing in Germany, Hauptschule and Realschule. They last until grade nine and ten, respectively, and
prepare for vocational training. The academically oriented school track, Gymnasium, lasts until
grade twelve or 13 and prepares for tertiary education. Students on the vocational track with good
marks may move on to the academic track after completing the tenth grade. We classify the movers
also in the vocational track to ensure that the adolescents in each subsample have a comparable
school history.
13The median fee for youths is e3.60 per month, Breuer et al. (2005), table 1. About a quarter
of the clubs charge small admission fees (the median is e10) and the majority offers reduced family
rates.
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volunteer work by the members and their relatives. Thus, they provide important
opportunities for social engagement beyond exercising a particular sport. The local
clubs are part of umbrella associations that set general rules and structures. For
instance, the German Football Association (Deutscher Fussball-Bund) regulates the
organization of youth teams and leagues, provides training for coaches and referees,
and formulates athletic as well as psychosocial goals of youth work.
Figure 2.2 illustrates how the athletic involvement of the 17-year olds evolves with
age. Panel (a) shows how many of the young athletes as of age 17 were already
exercising their main current sport at a given earlier age denoted on the horizontal
axis. 78% of the male athletes and 69% of the female athletes played their current
sport already at age 13. Likewise, panel (b) shows how many of the athletes continue
to be active during young adulthood. According to panel (b), 67% of the male
athletes and 55% of the female athletes continue to exercise at least weekly at age
21. Thus, there is a higher degree of persistence in the athletic involvement over time
for males than for females. Figure 2.3 shows that 70% (80%) of the male (female)
non-athletes as of age 17 continue to be inactive throughout their early 20s. In sum,
these patterns suggest that athletic engagement and non-engagement largely persist
throughout adolescence and into young adulthood.
Figure 2.4 provides an overview over how the 17-year olds in our sample allocate their
free time. They devote about two thirds of their leisure time to sedentary activities
(i.e. reading, listening to music, media use, doing nothing) and more than 80% to un-
structured activities (i.e. sedentary activities plus activities with peers). Students on
the academic track tend to spend more time in structured activities or reading than
those on the vocational track (panels a, b versus c, d). While the general patterns
are similar for youths who play sports at least on a weekly basis (panels a, c) and
those who do not (panels b, d), athletes spend a higher share of their discretionary
time on non-sedentary and structured activities. In particular, young athletes on
the vocational track spend 14% and 34% of their free time on structured activities
and non-sedentary activities, respectively, whereas non-athletes spend only 8% and
29% on such activities. The corresponding numbers for youths on the academic
track are 16% and 34% for athletes versus 12% and 31% for non-athletes. These
differences between athletes and non-athletes are statistically significant. Further,
the clear dominance of passive, undirected leisure pursuits among all groups sug-
gests that overscheduling is no issue. A similar dominance of passive, undirected
leisure activities has also been documented in studies investigating the time use of
teenagers in the US (Wight et al., 2009) and other Western countries (Larson and
Verma, 1999).
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Table 2.4 shows the engagement in other, non-athletic structured leisure activities by
athletic status. We consider all non-athletic structured activities (i.e. playing music
or singing, acting, technical activities, and volunteering) that are performed at least
on a weekly basis. The table reveals interesting differences between youths on the
vocational track and youths on the academic track. Among youths on the vocational
track, athletes are no less likely to engage in other structured leisure activities than
non-athletes. On the contrary, while more than half of the female athletes engage in
an additional structured activity, only a third of the female non-athletes engages in a
non-athletic structured activity. Among youths on the academic track, the pattern
is reversed. Non-athletes show an about 10 percentage point higher probability
to engage in non-athletic structured leisure activities than athletes. Overall, these
patterns are in line with the evidence in figure 2.4. For youths on the academic
track sports seems to be just one of several structured leisure activities. Those
youths who do not play sports engage to a larger extent in non-athletic structured
activities. Among youths on the vocational track, in contrast, a sizeable share of
youths engages in no structured leisure activity (i.e. 20% of the males and 40% of
the females, combining the information in tables 2.1 and 2.4) or in just one activity,
which is sports in the majority of cases. In this sense, sports can be seen as an
entry-level structured activity.
2.4.2 Selectivity of Athletic Involvement
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show descriptive statistics for a subset of the covariates used in
the propensity score estimations and predetermined human capital measures refer-
ring to height and intelligence.14 Most remarkable is the strong positive relationship
between parental athletic involvement and the youths’ own involvement. The cor-
relation is stronger for youths on the vocational school track and girls as well as
between parents and children of the same sex. For instance, athlete girls exhibit a
1.3 to 1.8 times higher share of mothers who play sports than non-athlete girls.
Further, in each school track, athletes tend to be positively selected with respect
to socioeconomic background. In both school tracks, this effect is stronger for girls
than for boys, who exhibit a higher athletic involvement than girls. For instance,
athletes are 4 to 12 percentage points (8-27% of a standard deviation in the full
sample) more likely to have a parent with a tertiary education degree. Athletes are
also more likely to have grown up with both parents. The parents of female athletes
earn (before taxes) between e3,600 and 6,500 more a year than those of non-athletes,
14Descriptive statistics of the remaining covariates can be found in Section B of Appendix II.
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while there are no clear differences in the male samples. Consistent with research
documenting a positive relationship between teen height, socioeconomic background,
and extracurricular engagement (Persico et al. 2004, Case and Paxson, 2008), we find
differences in height of 1 to 2 cm (0.4-0.9 in, 11-20% of a standard deviation) between
athletes and non-athletes. However, the differences in socioeconomic status between
athletes and non-athletes within a given school track tend to be much smaller than
the differences in socio-economic status between youths on different school tracks. In
particular, the parental earnings gap between school tracks is about e20,000 (more
than 60% of a standard deviation).
Consistent with the patterns found for socioeconomic background and height, the
descriptive statistics suggest moderate differences between athletes and non-athletes
with respect to past academic performance and intelligence. While the share of
youths who have ever repeated a grade is about equal in the athlete and non-athlete
groups, a larger share of the athletes was recommended at the end of grade four
to continue on the academic secondary school track (4-13 percentage points, 8-25%
of a standard deviation). Athletes also tend to score higher in the three ability
tests.15 For verbal and numerical ability of male students on the academic track
and numerical ability of female students on the academic track, the differences are
significant at the ten percent level. However, male athletes on the vocational track
score significantly lower in verbal ability than non-athletes. Again, the differences in
intelligence between athletes and non-athletes within a given school track are much
smaller than the differences between youths across school tracks. Finally, regional
conditions do not seem to matter much for athletic engagement. There are no
systematic patterns for whether someone grew up in a city and only a weakly negative
relationship between the regional unemployment rate and athletic involvement.
Similar selectivity patterns emerge, as those apparent in the descriptive statistics,
when we fit the propensity scores. The propensity scores rely on a rich set of
covariates and we specify separate models for each of the four subsamples.16 The
overlap of the propensity score distributions between athlete and non-athlete groups
is all in all satisfactory. We delete only a small fraction of observations that lie
outside the common support region (panel a in table 2.7). We achieve excellent
balancing of the covariates included in the propensity scores as well as excluded
variables. According to panel (b) in table 2.7, for nearly all the covariates included
15The three measures of intelligence have been standardized in the full sample. They are based
on a validated short version of a standard intelligence test used in German speaking countries, see
Amthauer et al. (2001) and Solga et al. (2005).
16See Section B in Appendix II for a complete list of the variables used and Section C for the
estimation results involving the propensity scores.
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in a given propensity score specification the Smith/Todd (2005)-test fails to reject
at the five percent level. This suggests that athletic status does not predict the
covariate under consideration after conditioning on the propensity score. Panels (c)
and (d) in table 2.7 show further that, before matching, between 13% (men, academic
track) and 26% (women, academic track) of the covariates had significantly different
means in the target and comparison groups. Once the matching weights are applied
there are no significant differences anymore.
To further probe our matching strategy we examine the balancing of human capital
measures that are determined at an age before children start playing sports. In
particular, we consider measures of height and intelligence. Table 2.8 shows that
there are indeed significant differences between athletes and non-athletes before
matching, especially for youths on the vocational track. However, in the matched
samples the p-values from a test of equality of means are large in the vast majority of
cases. Only in one case, intelligence for men in the vocational track the p-value after
matching is smaller than 0.05. In fact, male athletes on the vocational track score
actually worse than non-athletes. This evidence lends support to our matching
strategy as there likely remain no unmeasured confounders. From a substantive
point of view the findings suggest that our matching strategy effectively balances
heterogeneity in skills related to genetic and early childhood environments.
2.4.3 Athletic Involvement and Behavioral Outcomes
Tables 2.9 to 2.20 show the sample means and treatment effect estimates for the
behavioral outcome variables that reflect character, social, and executive function
skills. The behavioral variables are derived from a series of factor analyses that are
documented in Section D in Appendix II. All outcome variables are standardized
to allow a comparison of effect sizes across outcomes. The results for youths on
the vocational school track and the academic school track are reported in separate
tables. Each table reports estimates for men and women separately as well as for
the pooled sample. In any case, we match exactly on gender, the estimates differ
only in the regression adjustment that is done separately in the male and female
samples and jointly in the pooled sample.17
We first turn to impact estimates for outcome variables reflecting character skills. In
particular, we focus on the Big Five personality inventory and locus of control. The
Big Five model distinguishes five dimensions of personality: openness to experience,
17The outcome regression model for the pooled sample includes in addition a gender dummy.
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conscientiousness (i.e. the tendency to be organized, responsible and hardworking),
extraversion, agreeableness (i.e. the tendency to act in a cooperative, unselfish man-
ner) and neuroticism (i.e. the tendency to be emotionally instable and prone to
psychological distress), see Almlund et al. (2011) for an overview.18 Locus of control
refers to the extent to which people believe that they can control their life (internal
and external locus of control).19 A growing body of empirical research has started to
document the importance of character skills in predicting economic outcomes such
as educational attainment and earnings. Almlund et al. (2011) survey evidence
showing that, of the Big Five, conscientiousness stands out for its strong positive
association with educational and labor market performance. Agreeableness and an
internal locus of control have also been found to be positively related with economic
outcomes.
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 show the effects of athletic involvement on the Big Five per-
sonality dimensions. Girls score higher in each of the personality traits than boys,
regardless of the school track. For the vocational track we find in most cases a
positive effect of participating in sports on the students’ personality traits, except
for neuroticism. The effects are in four out of five cases larger for male students and
also more often statistically significant. In particular, the average treatment effects
(ATE) for conscientiousness and agreeableness are at 28% and 17% of a standard
deviation and statistically significant, respectively. The pooled impact estimates for
extraversion and openness are at 18-19% of a standard deviation and statistically
significant. For youths on the academic track, we find positive (7-15% of a standard
deviation) and insignificant effects on extraversion and openness.
Table 2.11 and 2.12 display the effects on locus of control. We find in general similar
patterns across gender and school track. Athletic involvement decreases the extent
to which youths believe that events in their life are a consequence of luck or destiny
(external locus of control) and increases the extent to which they believe that events
are a consequence of their own effort (internal locus of control). For youths on the
vocational track, the ATEs are in the order of 15-17% of a standard deviation for
young men and 15-19% for young women (table 2.11). The effects for youths on the
academic track tend to be smaller again and not statistically significant.
Next we turn to impact estimates for outcome variables reflecting social skills and
risk preferences. Panels (a) and (b) of table 2.13 and 2.14 show the estimates for
18The items for the Big Five personality inventory in the SOEP have been developed and vali-
dated by Gerlitz and Schupp (2005). They are included in the questionnaire since 2006.
19The items on locus of control in the SOEP are based on the framework by Rotter (1966), see
Weinhardt and Schupp (2011).
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reciprocity.20 While positive reciprocity measures the inclination to reward fair and
cooperative behavior of another person, negative reciprocity refers to the willingness
to punish somebody who behaves unfair or uncooperative. The treatment effect
estimates for the vocational track samples suggest that athletic involvement reduces
a teenager’s willingness to punish unfair or uncooperative behavior, panel (a) of
table 2.13. The treatment effects for females are almost twice as large than those
for males. For instance, the average treatment effect (ATE) is -24% of a standard
deviation for girls as opposed to -11% for boys. Unlike the results on negative
reciprocity, the effects on positive reciprocity are generally smaller and insignificant,
panel (b) of table 2.13. The patterns for the vocational track samples differ from
those for young people on the academic track, where the treatment effect estimates
are mostly small and insignificant, panels (a) and (b) of table 2.14. Only positive
reciprocity of female students on the academic track increases by 25% of a standard
deviation through playing sports. However, the treatment effects are not significant.
Panel (c) of tables 2.13 and 2.14 show the results on willingness to take risks. We
find stronger and significant effects for youths on the vocational track, see panel (c)
of table 2.13.21 The average treatment effects (ATE) are 22% for boys and 17%
for girls, and statistically significant. The impact estimates for the academic track
samples are again insignificant and close to zero, panel (c) of table 2.14.
What are the economic implications of our findings on social skills and risk pref-
erences? Brown et al. (2004), Dohmen et al. (2009) and Kube et al. (2012) show
that positive reciprocity is important for sustaining employment relationships in
which the employer pays the employee an efficiency wage in order to stipulate a
higher effort. Thus, there is a positive relationship between positive reciprocity and
wages. Similarly, an employer may find it rational to dismiss an employee rather
than to lower the wage in order to avoid a retaliatory response (Bewley, 1998). This
argument suggests a positive relationship between negative reciprocity and nonem-
ployment, which is confirmed empirically by Dohmen et al. (2009) and Kube et al.
(2013). Further empirical research (see e.g. Bonin et al., 2007, and the references
therein) documents a positive association between risk tolerance on the one hand
and educational attainment, choice of occupation and earnings on the other. Thus,
our findings regarding social and risk preferences may contribute to explaining the
positive effects of athletic involvement on educational and labor market outcomes.
20The measures of reciprocity in the SOEP are based on the framework of Perugini et al. (2003).
Dohmen et al. (2009) document that the SOEP survey responses on reciprocity are consistent with
the behavioral patterns generated in experiments.
21Dohmen et al. (2011) validate the SOEP risk measure experimentally. They document that
the SOEP question reliably predicts risk taking behavior in the experiment.
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Next, we discuss the results on job values.22 In the psychological and sociological
literature job values play a prominent role in describing young people’s identity and
career aspirations (see e.g. Rosenberg, 1957, Johnson, Kirkpatrick and Mortimer,
2011). They are a key driver of occupational choices and career attainment at later
ages. Tables 2.15 and 2.16 display the results on five different work values for the
vocational track samples and the academic track samples. Comparing the means
across gender, we see that males score lower than females in all but one (i.e. pay
and promotion) cases. This pattern suggests that young men have on average less
idealistic views about themselves and their future career than young women. For
pay and promotion, in contrast, we observe a clear socioeconomic divide. Youths
attending the vocational track value pay and promotion much higher than those on
the academic track.
The treatment effect estimates for youths on the vocational track are positive and
often significant. Their magnitude ranges between 10 and 30% of a standard devi-
ation, with the effects for males often exceeding those for females. Contrary to the
general pattern, there is no effect of athletic involvement on how important young
men rate work-life balance, while the ATE for females attains 18% and is statisti-
cally significant. Importantly, the effects on how important youths rate high pay
and good promotion opportunities (panel b of table 2.15) are with around 20% of
a standard deviation large and highly significant. Sociological research documents
a positive correlation between values reflecting extrinsic orientations, including pay,
promotion and security, as well as hours worked and earnings (Johnson, Kirkpatrick
and Mortimer, 2011). Unlike for the vocational track samples, the impact estimates
for the academic track samples are often small and insignificant, table 2.16.
At this point it is interesting to compare the effects of athletic involvement on the
youths’ aspirations with those on their expectations about their own future and the
determinants of social success more generally. Tables 2.17 and 2.18 show the results
for their attitudes about the determinants of social success.23 We distinguish be-
tween three major factors of social success. The first one refers to extrinsic factors,
such as gender and family background, the second to positive intrinsic factors, such
as achievement and industriousness, and the third to negative intrinsic factors, such
as being tough and exploiting others. Athletic involvement clearly appears to have
a positive effect on how youths on the vocational track think about moving up in
22The theory and measurement of job values go back to Rosenberg (1957). The questions on
job values in the SOEP include additional items on work-life balance, see Weinhardt and Schupp
(2011).
23The battery of items included in the SOEP is originally due to Sandberger (1983), see Wein-
hardt and Schupp (2011) for further information.
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society. Playing sports makes them belief more strongly that success depends on
positive intrinsic factors rather than extrinsic or negative intrinsic factors. The ef-
fects tend to be larger in absolute value for girls than for boys. In particular, the
ATE for young women is -33% of a standard deviation for extrinsic factors, -27% for
negative intrinsic factors and 14% for positive intrinsic factors. This suggests that
athletic involvement contributes to reinforcing gender differences in beliefs about
success. The patterns for the academic track samples in table 2.18 are less clear cut.
For young women on the academic track, the point estimates tend to be smaller com-
pared with those for the vocational track and statistically insignificant. In contrast
for young men on the academic track, we find sizeable and statistically significant
adverse effects of athletic involvement on extrinsic and negative intrinsic factors.
Tables 2.19 and 2.20 display means and impact estimates for outcomes reflecting fu-
ture expectations. Our expectation measures capture career related as well as family
related aspects. The means of all three variables are lower in the vocational track
samples than in the academic track samples, which suggests that young people from
less advantaged backgrounds have less optimistic expectations. Athletic involvement
has a positive effect on career and family expectations. When significant, the treat-
ment effects attain 19 to 30% of a standard deviation in the vocational track samples
(table 2.19). The patterns for the academic track samples closely match those for
the vocational track samples (table 2.20). For instance, the ATEs on career expec-
tations attain 22-25% of a standard deviation and are statistically significant for
boys. The positive treatment effects on career expectations are consistent with the
positive effects of athletic involvement on career aspirations. Taken together they
support the hypothesis that athletic involvement positively affects educational at-
tainment and labor market outcomes because it raises the teenagers’ self-confidence
and optimism as well as their aspirations.
2.4.4 Athletic Involvement and Economic Outcomes
As a consistency check on the effects on economically relevant behavioral outcomes,
we also investigate the effects of athletic involvement on educational and labor mar-
ket outcomes. In order to make the impact estimates comparable to those on behav-
ioral outcomes, the outcome variables are again standardized. Tables 2.21 and 2.22
show the treatment effects on educational attainment. Consistent with the effects on
behavioral outcomes, the impact estimates in tables 2.21 and 2.22 indicate beneficial
effects of athletic involvement on educational attainment. This is remarkable, since
we carefully condition on past and current educational activities of the youths at
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the time we measure their athletic status. For young men on the vocational track,
athletic involvement reduces the probability to leave school without a degree and
increases the probability to successfully complete the vocational track. We observe
a similar pattern for young women on the vocational track: The probability to con-
tinue to and complete the academic track increases, while the probability to leave
school with a vocational track certificate is reduced. In addition, we find a positive
(but insignificant) effect on the probability to attend university. For the academic
track samples there are no statistically significant effects, but the patterns suggest
again positive effects on educational attainment.
Tables 2.23 and 2.24 show the results for enrolment in vocational training. Panels (a)
and (b) display the effect of participating in sports on the probability of attending
vocational training for at least one and two consecutive years, respectively. Panel
(c) shows the effect on the probability to successfully complete vocational training.
The results for vocational training match those for educational attainment. For the
vocational track samples we find a positive and significant effect for boys and a
negative (and partially significant) effect for girls. For boys the average treatment
effects are sizeable and exceed 20% of a standard deviation. For youths on the
academic track, the effects are generally smaller and insignificant. In sum, the results
in tables 2.21 to 2.24 suggest interesting gender differences in the effects of athletic
involvement on educational and labor market outcomes. While sports increases the
probability that young men successfully complete vocationally oriented education,
it has a positive effect on enrolling in academically oriented education for young
women.
2.4.5 Effect Heterogeneity and Sensitivity Analysis
To examine the heterogeneity of treatment effects we modify the outcome regres-
sion model and include different sets of interactions with the treatment dummy.
The matching step is performed as in the benchmark scenario. First, we investi-
gate heterogeneity of treatment effects according to whether youths engage in other
structured activities besides sports. The results of this exercise are documented in
Section E.1 in Appendix II. In the majority of cases, it turns out that treatment
effects of sports are stronger among youths who do not engage in any other struc-
tured activity (e.g. playing music, volunteering). This pattern holds both for youth
on the vocational and on the academic track. For job values we observe the reverse
pattern: the treatment effect of playing sports is larger among youths who engage
also in other structured activities.
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Second, we calculate treatment effects separately by the type of sport and the setting
in which youths play sports. As for the vast majority of young people playing
sports is a social activity, we investigate whether treatment effects depend on the
particular social context (recall table 2.3). We consider the subcategories team sport,
individual sport, sports in a club and sports with others in an informal setting. In
further analyses, we break treatment effects down by whether or not somebody takes
part in athletic competitions and by the frequency of athletic involvement. We do
not find systematic patterns of treatment effect heterogeneity.24 Taken together the
patterns found in these two analyses are consistent with the idea that playing sports
means being part of a social network. In particular, joining a sports club usually is
not limited to playing sport once or twice a week but it means being part of a social
community whose members share responsibilities and meet also for activities not
directly related to the sport. We therefore interpret our treatment effect estimates
as estimates of the broader effect of having access to an enriched social environment
rather than the pure effect of physical exercise.
As a sensitivity analysis, we extract a subsample of families in which some of the
children play sports while some do not and modify the outcome regression model to
include in addition family fixed effects. With the family fixed effects we can examine
the sensitivity of our results to potential unobserved confounders that are constant
within families. In particular, if the athletic status is random in the reweighted
sample using the matching weights, the estimated treatment effects should not be
sensitive to how we specify the outcome regression model. In the outcome regression,
we pool across gender and school track to obtain a sufficiently large sample of siblings
with mixed athletic involvement. The matching step is performed as before at the
individual level, with exact matching on gender and school track.
Section E.2 in Appendix II shows the results for selected outcome variables for
which we have enough observations. In each table the columns labeled ‘Full Sample’
show, for comparison, the results for the full sample when pooling across gender and
school track. The columns labeled ‘Sibling Sample’ show the estimates obtained
from the sibling subsample without and with family fixed effects, columns ‘ATE’
and ‘ATE (FE)’. Going from the full sample to the sibling subsample we see that
the point estimates are in general very close whereas the standard errors are larger
by a factor of 1.5 to two in the sibling sample. The similarity of the point estimates
in the two samples suggests that the sibling sample is well representative of the full
sample. Next comparing the two treatment effect estimates in the sibling sample,
24The results of these estimations are available on request.
38
2.5. CONCLUSION
we see that the point estimates are again in 14 out of 18 cases very similar while
the standard errors increase somewhat when using family fixed effects. The high
similarity of the treatment effect estimates with and without family fixed effects in
the sibling sample suggests that our matching and regression adjustment suffices
to remove potential confounders that are constant at the family level. Further
refining the adjustment with family fixed effects does not affect the results. This
evidence supports the hypothesis that particular experiences during adolescence,
i.e. playing sports or not, influence the development of skills and attitudes over and
above endowments transmitted through the parents.
2.5 Conclusion
Sports has been singled out as a popular pastime that is positively related with edu-
cational and labor market outcomes at later ages. While existing research supports
the hypothesis that athletic participation may have a positive effect on educational
attainment and labor market outcomes, we know little about the underlying mech-
anisms. We address this question exploring what youths do in their leisure and
whether athletic participation affects behavioral and economic outcomes reflecting
character, social and executive function skills. To set the analytic framework of
our empirical analysis we develop a simple model linking leisure time use and skill
formation of youths. We exploit data from the German Socio-Economic Panel that
offers the unique advantage of both a large, representative sample and high qual-
ity behavioral measures. We employ a flexible strategy involving propensity score
matching and regression to account for selfselection into athletic involvement. We
assess the validity of the empirical strategy with various tests.
Our main findings are as follows. The majority of young people play sports and their
athletic engagement largely persists during adolescence and into young adulthood.
While young men favor team sports and especially soccer, young women have more
diverse preferences and play more individual sports. Regardless of type of sport
and gender, the vast majority of the athletes play sports in a club or with others.
Thus, sports is generally a social activity. Our results further suggest that young
people who regularly play sports spend a higher share of their free time on struc-
tured and non-sedentary activities than those who do not. Nevertheless, undirected
and passive leisure pursuits clearly dominate among all youths. Parental athletic in-
volvement is highly predictive of the youth’s athletic involvement. Athletes tend to
be positively selected in terms of family background, intelligence and height. These
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differences disappear after matching treatment and comparison observations. In
particular, the matched treatment and comparison units are balanced with respect
to the predetermined human capital measures height and intelligence. This sug-
gests that our matching strategy effectively balances heterogeneity in skills related
to genetic factors and early childhood environments.
We find beneficial effects of athletic involvement on a broad range of behavioral
outcomes including character skills and career aspirations and expectations. The
effects are sizeable for youths on the vocational track, attaining 10-30 % of a standard
deviation, whereas they are small and insignificant for youths on the academic track.
The magnitude of the effects sometimes differs across gender, too. However, the
impacts generally point in the same direction for young men and women. Athletes,
in particular youths on the vocational track, show better educational outcomes than
comparable youths who do not play sports. We further examine treatment effects
conditional on the engagement in other structured leisure activities. It turns out
that the sizeable beneficial effects of sports among youths on the vocational track are
largely driven by the sizeable effects among youths who do not engage in any other
structured activities. This pattern is similar for youths on the academic track. We
therefore interpret our treatment effect estimates as estimates of the broader effect
of having access to an enriched social environment rather than the pure effect of
physical exercise. Overall our results lend support to the hypothesis that structured
leisure activities such as sports positively affect the development of nonacademic
skills.
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Figures
Figure 2.1: Athletic Involvement of 17-Year Olds
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Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: Proportions based on weighted samples.
Figure 2.2: Athletic Involvement of Athletes During Childhood and Young Adult-
hood
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Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: Panel (a) shows the cumulative share of
athletes as of age 17 who play their current main sport already at younger ages. Panel (b) shows
the share of athletes as of age 17 who play sports at least once a week at later ages. In 2002, 2004,
2006, and 2010, the person questionnaire does not include the question about athletic involvement
and its frequency. We impute the information based on the athletic involvement in the adjacent
years. Proportions calculated using SOEP sample weights.
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Figure 2.3: Athletic Involvement of Non-Athletes During Young Adulthood
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Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: The figure shows the share of non-athletes
as of age 17 who do not play sports at all or less than weekly at later ages. In 2002, 2004, 2006,
and 2010, the person questionnaire does not include the question about athletic involvement and
its frequency. We impute the information based on the athletic involvement in the adjacent years.
Proportions calculated using SOEP sample weights.
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Figure 2.4: Leisure Time Use of 17-Year Olds
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(c) Athletes, academic track
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Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: The percentages are derived from a set of
questions about how the young people allocate their leisure time. We impute the share of time
spent on each activity according to its frequency, i.e. a daily activity is weighted by 30.44, a weekly
activity by 4.35, and a monthly activity by 1. Then we average across all youths. The category
media use comprises watching television/video, playing computer games and using the internet.
The activity volunteering includes also attending church/being involved in a religious community.
The activities spending time with steady/best friend, clique, and in youth clubs are combined to
the category peer activities. The category arts comprises the activities performing arts, playing
music, and singing. The category technical activities summarizes crafting, programming and related
activities. Calculations use SOEP sample weights.
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Tables
Table 2.1: Sample Sizes
Vocational school track Academic school track
Men Women Men Women
Athlete Athlete Athlete Athlete
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Observations
1,104 977 593 669
654 450 405 572 455 138 455 214
Unweighted proportion (%)
59.24 40.76 41.45 58.55 76.73 23.27 68.01 31.99
Weighted proportion (%)
61.68 38.32 39.45 60.55 80.04 19.96 69.97 30.03
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: Weighted proportions calculated with SOEP
sample weights.
Table 2.2: Most Popular Sports by Gender
Men Women
Rank Sport type % Sport type %
1. Soccer 42.50 Dancing 13.35
2. Fitness, Bodybuilding 8.27 Horseback Riding 10.24
3. Bike Riding 5.08 Volleyball 9.89
4. Basketball 4.33 Walking, Jogging 7.24
5. Handball 3.97 Soccer 7.04
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: Percentages calculated using SOEP sample
weights.
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Table 2.3: Type of Sport and Social Context
Team sport Individual sport Total
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
At nonprofit sports club 577.01 81.27 405.26 50.16 1,023.61 65.20
At commercial sports facility 19.03 2.68 101.43 12.55 124.11 7.91
At another organization 4.69 0.66 5.17 0.64 9.82 0.63
With others, not organized 99.92 14.07 138.25 17.11 242.71 15.46
Alone 9.34 1.32 157.89 19.54 169.75 10.81
Total 710 100.00 808 100.00 1,570 100.00
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: Calculations use SOEP sample weights. The
column labeled ‘Total’ includes in addition observations with unclear or missing type of sport.
Table 2.4: Engagement in Other Structured Leisure Activities Besides Sports
Men Women
Athlete Athlete
Yes No p-Value Yes No p-Value
Vocational track
Any other activity 0.535 0.514 0.503 0.516 0.365 0.000
(0.499) (0.500) (0.500) (0.482)
Number of other act. 0.767 0.837 0.222 0.736 0.613 0.047
(0.895) (0.973) (0.895) (0.978)
Academic track
Any other activity 0.652 0.772 0.012 0.623 0.525 0.018
(0.477) (0.421) (0.485) (0.501)
Number of other act. 1.038 1.402 0.001 0.993 0.874 0.176
(0.999) (1.130) (1.023) (1.069)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Rows
labeled ‘Any other activity’ show the share of youths who do at least one structured activity except
sports on a weekly basis. Rows labeled ‘Number of other act.’ show the number of structured
activities excluding sports that are performed on a weekly basis. Columns labeled ‘p-Value’ show
the p-value from a t-test of equality of means.
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Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics for Key Covariates – Vocational Track
Men Women
Athlete Athlete
Obs. Yes No p-Value Obs. Yes No p-Value
Height (cm) 963 178.7 177.5 0.014 859 167.5 165.6 0.000
(7.646) (6.826) (6.431) (6.342)
Verbal ability 519 -0.327 -0.153 0.034 425 -0.317 -0.430 0.191
(0.868) (1.001) (0.827) (0.922)
Numerical ability 519 -0.039 -0.183 0.092 425 -0.289 -0.271 0.861
(0.946) (0.990) (0.968) (1.062)
Figural ability 519 -0.191 -0.321 0.134 425 -0.068 -0.117 0.598
(0.977) (0.983) (0.932) (0.939)
Ever repeated grade 1,104 0.324 0.338 0.648 977 0.211 0.240 0.284
(0.468) (0.473) (0.408) (0.427)
Acad. track recomm. 1,073 0.135 0.099 0.085 951 0.212 0.109 0.000
(0.342) (0.299) (0.409) (0.312)
Migrant background 1,104 0.284 0.213 0.009 977 0.276 0.320 0.135
(0.451) (0.410) (0.447) (0.467)
Parent with tert. educat. 1,104 0.138 0.102 0.081 976 0.134 0.097 0.073
(0.345) (0.303) (0.341) (0.296)
Parental earnings
(10,000 e)
1,033 3.595 3.586 0.951 915 3.585 3.469 0.490
(2.316) (2.570) (2.301) (2.633)
Grew up with both
parents
1,104 0.687 0.639 0.100 977 0.715 0.668 0.121
(0.464) (0.481) (0.452) (0.471)
Father athlete 756 0.449 0.384 0.078 652 0.440 0.382 0.143
(0.498) (0.487) (0.497) (0.486)
Mother athlete 908 0.482 0.463 0.564 800 0.567 0.320 0.000
(0.500) (0.499) (0.496) (0.467)
Grew up in city 1,100 0.638 0.645 0.821 970 0.571 0.700 0.000
(0.481) (0.479) (0.496) (0.459)
Local unemployment (%) 1,011 10.99 11.60 0.038 906 11.03 11.22 0.557
(4.504) (4.638) (4.469) (4.912)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: Columns labeled ‘Obs.’ show the number
of observations. Columns labeled ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ show the means and standard deviations (in
parentheses). Columns labeled ‘p-Value’ show the p-value from a t-test of equality of means.
Calculations use the SOEP sample weights. The cognitive ability measures are only available for
cohorts from 2006 onwards. A detailed description of all covariates and additional descriptive
statistics are provided in Section B of Appendix II.
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Table 2.6: Descriptive Statistics for Key Covariates – Academic Track
Men Women
Athlete Athlete
Obs. Yes No p-Value Obs. Yes No p-Value
Height (cm) 531 180.0 180.2 0.838 593 168.1 167.1 0.073
(7.319) (7.588) (6.061) (6.460)
Verbal ability 290 0.767 0.498 0.022 315 0.637 0.580 0.577
(0.873) (0.757) (0.796) (0.941)
Numerical ability 290 0.616 0.414 0.039 315 0.294 0.092 0.087
(0.697) (0.736) (0.902) (1.097)
Figural ability 290 0.404 0.206 0.127 315 0.506 0.566 0.557
(0.903) (1.060) (0.849) (0.775)
Ever repeated grade 593 0.117 0.130 0.702 669 0.061 0.042 0.327
(0.322) (0.337) (0.240) (0.201)
Acad. track recomm. 585 0.834 0.794 0.308 662 0.861 0.739 0.000
(0.373) (0.406) (0.346) (0.440)
Migrant background 593 0.178 0.151 0.494 669 0.193 0.230 0.279
(0.383) (0.359) (0.395) (0.422)
Parent with tert. educat. 593 0.577 0.535 0.412 669 0.493 0.378 0.006
(0.495) (0.501) (0.501) (0.486)
Parental earnings
(10,000 e)
564 5.559 5.974 0.260 640 5.293 4.962 0.255
(3.562) (3.374) (3.447) (3.261)
Grew up with both
parents
593 0.750 0.848 0.023 669 0.766 0.749 0.641
(0.433) (0.360) (0.424) (0.435)
Father athlete 418 0.570 0.563 0.906 458 0.592 0.493 0.049
(0.496) (0.499) (0.492) (0.502)
Mother athlete 464 0.747 0.583 0.002 547 0.642 0.490 0.001
(0.435) (0.495) (0.480) (0.501)
Grew up in city 590 0.722 0.715 0.878 661 0.712 0.645 0.089
(0.449) (0.453) (0.453) (0.480)
Local unemployment (%) 529 11.16 11.54 0.447 610 11.21 12.78 0.000
(4.500) (4.966) (4.751) (5.598)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: Columns labeled ‘Obs.’ show the number
of observations. Columns labeled ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ show the means and standard deviations (in
parentheses). Columns labeled ‘p-Value’ show the p-value from a t-test of equality of means.
Calculations use the SOEP sample weights. The cognitive ability measures are only available for
cohorts from 2006 onwards. A detailed description of all covariates and additional descriptive
statistics are provided in Section B of Appendix II.
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Table 2.7: Summary of Common Support and Balancing Tests on Variables Included
in the Propensity Score
Vocational track Academic track
Men Women Men Women
(a) Percent within common support region
Athlete obs. 99.2 97.1 96.8 95.9
Non-athlete obs. 99.3 96.2 100.0 100.0
(b) Smith/Todd (2005)-test
p-Value≤ 0.05 2 1 2 1
p-Value≤ 0.10 3 1 3 3
(c) t-Tests of equality of means
Unmatched 9 7 7 12
ATT-weights 0 0 0 0
ATU-weights 0 0 0 0
(d) Total number of covariates
49 40 52 47
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Panel (a) shows the percentage of observations
that are within the common support region. It is defined as the interval between the minimum
propensity score of athletes and the maximum propensity score of non-athletes. Panel (b) shows
the number of covariates for which the null of no influence of the athletic status on a given covariate
conditional on a polynomial of the propensity score is rejected. The rows in panel (c) show the
number of covariates with p-values ≤ 0.05 in a t-test of equality of means in the athlete and
non-athlete samples before and after matching. Panel (d) shows the total number of covariates
considered in the propensity score model. See Section 2.2 for further details on the balancing tests
and Section C of Appendix II for the additional results.
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Table 2.8: Summary of Balancing Tests on Excluded Variables
Men Women
Before ATT- ATU- Before ATT- ATU-
weights weights weights weights
(a) Vocational track
Height 0.042 0.358 0.376 0.001 0.328 0.143
Intelligence 0.000 0.178 0.010 0.570 0.914 0.978
(b) Academic track
Height 0.862 0.712 0.658 0.403 0.932 0.790
Intelligence 0.061 0.515 0.255 0.413 0.093 0.496
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: The table shows the p-values from Hotelling
tests of equality of means between the treated and comparison samples. The test for height includes
two variables (height and missing dummy), that for intelligence four variables (verbal, figural, and
numerical ability and missing dummy). Calculations are based on the complete samples. Missing
values in a covariate are imputed with the sample mean and a missing dummy is set to one. See
Section 2.2 for further details on the balancing tests and Section C of Appendix II for additional
results. All calculations use SOEP sample weights.
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Table 2.9: Big Five Personality – Vocational Track
Obs. Mean Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE
(a) Conscientiousness
Men 960 −0.035 0.229∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗
(0.994) (0.092) (0.081) (0.081) (0.078)
Women 812 0.178 0.120 0.107 0.116 0.112
(0.949) (0.096) (0.084) (0.088) (0.081)
Pooled 1,772 0.061 0.129∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗
(0.980) (0.065) (0.058) (0.059) (0.055)
(b) Extraversion
Men 960 −0.094 0.110 0.097 0.115 0.104
(1.020) (0.116) (0.083) (0.081) (0.079)
Women 812 0.084 0.161 0.165∗ 0.141 0.151
(0.990) (0.102) (0.099) (0.110) (0.100)
Pooled 1,772 −0.014 0.091 0.162∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
(1.010) (0.075) (0.065) (0.070) (0.063)
(c) Openness
Men 960 −0.148 0.076 0.140 0.119 0.131
(1.025) (0.108) (0.089) (0.091) (0.087)
Women 812 0.084 0.142 0.162∗ 0.129 0.143
(0.992) (0.101) (0.095) (0.100) (0.093)
Pooled 1,772 −0.044 0.055 0.173∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
(1.017) (0.072) (0.068) (0.070) (0.065)
(d) Agreeableness
Men 960 −0.162 0.087 0.214∗∗ 0.108 0.171∗
(1.006) (0.092) (0.093) (0.089) (0.088)
Women 812 0.208 −0.022 −0.024 −0.154 −0.099
(1.010) (0.117) (0.100) (0.100) (0.095)
Pooled 1,772 0.004 −0.039 0.159∗∗ −0.010 0.077
(1.024) (0.072) (0.068) (0.065) (0.063)
(e) Neuroticism
Men 960 −0.228 −0.091 −0.019 0.018 −0.004
(0.928) (0.095) (0.082) (0.083) (0.079)
Women 812 0.255 −0.024 0.007 −0.014 −0.005
(1.030) (0.103) (0.098) (0.104) (0.096)
Pooled 1,772 −0.010 −0.156∗∗ −0.042 −0.061 −0.051
(1.004) (0.071) (0.065) (0.070) (0.063)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Standard deviations (mean) and standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors of the treatment effects are bootstrapped with 250 replications and
clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level,
respectively.
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Table 2.10: Big Five Personality – Academic Track
Obs. Mean Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE
(a) Conscientiousness
Men 533 −0.304 −0.001 −0.154 −0.135 −0.149
(0.968) (0.152) (0.127) (0.134) (0.120)
Women 586 0.061 0.063 0.066 0.094 0.075
(1.051) (0.134) (0.144) (0.139) (0.137)
Pooled 1,119 −0.121 −0.010 0.029 0.030 0.029
(1.027) (0.101) (0.099) (0.091) (0.092)
(b) Extraversion
Men 533 −0.026 0.293∗ 0.112 0.152 0.122
(0.973) (0.154) (0.164) (0.150) (0.153)
Women 586 0.074 0.155 0.140 0.092 0.125
(0.990) (0.126) (0.132) (0.135) (0.127)
Pooled 1,119 0.024 0.200∗∗ 0.176∗ 0.144 0.167∗
(0.982) (0.097) (0.094) (0.095) (0.088)
(c) Openness
Men 533 −0.016 0.177 0.087 0.004 0.067
(0.939) (0.135) (0.146) (0.144) (0.136)
Women 586 0.185 0.121 0.103 0.057 0.089
(0.954) (0.113) (0.120) (0.113) (0.111)
Pooled 1,119 0.085 0.119 0.114 0.105 0.112
(0.951) (0.086) (0.089) (0.085) (0.082)
(d) Agreeableness
Men 533 −0.126 0.077 −0.045 −0.158 −0.072
(0.928) (0.130) (0.157) (0.154) (0.148)
Women 586 0.107 0.080 0.096 0.061 0.085
(0.964) (0.116) (0.114) (0.119) (0.110)
Pooled 1,119 −0.009 0.049 0.069 −0.009 0.047
(0.953) (0.085) (0.096) (0.092) (0.089)
(e) Neuroticism
Men 533 −0.197 −0.233 −0.133 −0.064 −0.117
(0.983) (0.144) (0.166) (0.150) (0.153)
Women 586 0.206 0.122 0.092 0.120 0.101
(0.969) (0.120) (0.134) (0.136) (0.129)
Pooled 1,119 0.006 −0.082 −0.026 0.024 −0.012
(0.996) (0.093) (0.099) (0.094) (0.092)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Standard deviations (mean) and standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors of the treatment effects are bootstrapped with 250 replications and
clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level,
respectively.
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Table 2.11: Locus of Control – Vocational Track
Obs. Mean Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE
(a) External locus of control
Men 952 0.124 −0.281∗∗ −0.092 −0.227∗∗ −0.146∗
(1.081) (0.123) (0.088) (0.091) (0.085)
Women 800 0.130 −0.231∗∗ −0.235∗∗ −0.149 −0.186∗
(0.983) (0.100) (0.101) (0.106) (0.096)
Pooled 1,752 0.126 −0.249∗∗∗ −0.126∗ −0.197∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗
(1.038) (0.080) (0.067) (0.072) (0.064)
(b) Internal locus of control
Men 952 0.065 0.154 0.175∗ 0.154 0.167∗
(1.084) (0.117) (0.100) (0.103) (0.097)
Women 800 0.059 0.161∗ 0.222∗∗ 0.100 0.153∗
(0.977) (0.093) (0.091) (0.100) (0.090)
Pooled 1,752 0.062 0.151∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.088 0.142∗∗
(1.038) (0.077) (0.070) (0.071) (0.065)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Standard deviations (mean) and standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors of the treatment effects are bootstrapped with 250 replications and
clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level,
respectively.
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Table 2.12: Locus of Control – Academic Track
Obs. Mean Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE
(a) External locus of control
Men 529 −0.364 −0.315∗∗ −0.108 −0.115 −0.109
(0.894) (0.135) (0.165) (0.156) (0.156)
Women 585 −0.183 −0.170∗ −0.108 −0.097 −0.105
(0.832) (0.101) (0.097) (0.098) (0.092)
Pooled 1,114 −0.273 −0.255∗∗∗ −0.083 −0.059 −0.076
(0.868) (0.082) (0.080) (0.073) (0.072)
(b) Internal locus of control
Men 529 −0.134 0.157 0.165 0.225 0.179
(0.911) (0.119) (0.147) (0.147) (0.138)
Women 585 −0.140 −0.153 −0.057 −0.026 −0.047
(0.924) (0.121) (0.112) (0.114) (0.106)
Pooled 1,114 −0.137 −0.019 0.010 0.103 0.036
(0.917) (0.086) (0.092) (0.088) (0.086)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Standard deviations (mean) and standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors of the treatment effects are bootstrapped with 250 replications and
clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level,
respectively.
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Table 2.13: Social Skills and Risk Preferences – Vocational Track
Obs. Mean Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE
(a) Negative reciprocity
Men 730 0.260 −0.145 −0.072 −0.163 −0.110
(0.981) (0.106) (0.100) (0.104) (0.097)
Women 609 −0.133 −0.233 −0.257∗∗ −0.228 −0.240∗
(1.065) (0.164) (0.121) (0.141) (0.125)
Pooled 1,339 0.078 −0.101 −0.136∗ −0.150∗ −0.143∗
(1.040) (0.101) (0.080) (0.084) (0.076)
(b) Positive reciprocity
Men 730 −0.081 0.003 0.063 0.037 0.052
(1.038) (0.112) (0.099) (0.106) (0.096)
Women 609 0.144 −0.003 −0.064 −0.023 −0.040
(0.942) (0.133) (0.109) (0.113) (0.104)
Pooled 1,339 0.023 −0.044 0.056 0.009 0.033
(1.000) (0.090) (0.072) (0.081) (0.070)
(c) Willingness to take risks
Men 1,000 0.142 0.157∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗
(1.011) (0.094) (0.080) (0.091) (0.080)
Women 863 −0.162 0.191∗ 0.192∗∗ 0.155 0.171∗
(1.027) (0.102) (0.093) (0.101) (0.093)
Pooled 1,863 0.003 0.230∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗
(1.029) (0.068) (0.063) (0.072) (0.063)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Standard deviations (mean) and standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors of the treatment effects are bootstrapped with 250 replications and
clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level,
respectively.
60
2.7. APPENDIX I
Table 2.14: Social Skills and Risk Preferences – Academic Track
Obs. Mean Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE
(a) Negative reciprocity
Men 394 0.023 −0.248∗ 0.028 0.017 0.025
(0.869) (0.142) (0.172) (0.161) (0.163)
Women 448 −0.280 0.043 0.090 0.120 0.099
(0.905) (0.135) (0.162) (0.169) (0.157)
Pooled 842 −0.137 −0.018 0.085 0.023 0.067
(0.901) (0.096) (0.102) (0.104) (0.096)
(b) Positive reciprocity
Men 394 −0.055 0.002 −0.171 0.051 −0.121
(1.023) (0.145) (0.179) (0.171) (0.168)
Women 448 −0.046 0.300∗ 0.269 0.198 0.246
(1.017) (0.160) (0.172) (0.165) (0.160)
Pooled 842 −0.050 0.179 0.106 0.173 0.125
(1.019) (0.111) (0.117) (0.108) (0.108)
(0.897) (0.101) (0.103) (0.108) (0.098)
(c) Willingness to take risks
Men 551 0.065 0.025 −0.035 0.070 −0.011
(1.009) (0.150) (0.162) (0.162) (0.154)
Women 597 −0.060 0.038 0.034 −0.002 0.022
(0.825) (0.093) (0.106) (0.100) (0.098)
Pooled 1,148 0.003 0.049 0.028 0.051 0.035
(0.924) (0.084) (0.096) (0.088) (0.087)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Standard deviations (mean) and standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors of the treatment effects are bootstrapped with 250 replications and
clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level,
respectively.
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Table 2.15: Job Values – Vocational Track
Obs. Mean Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE
(a) Interaction, recognition
Men 1,075 −0.189 0.337∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗
(1.032) (0.084) (0.081) (0.082) (0.077)
Women 932 0.340 0.019 0.107 0.118 0.113
(0.959) (0.089) (0.077) (0.084) (0.076)
Pooled 2,007 0.049 0.066 0.255∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(1.034) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.057)
(b) Pay, promotion
Men 1,075 0.102 0.281∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗
(0.994) (0.083) (0.079) (0.080) (0.075)
Women 932 0.044 0.111 0.163∗ 0.156∗ 0.159∗∗
(1.015) (0.086) (0.084) (0.082) (0.078)
Pooled 2,007 0.075 0.207∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗
(1.004) (0.059) (0.063) (0.063) (0.059)
(c) Personal development
Men 1,075 −0.113 0.216∗∗ 0.224∗∗ 0.211∗∗ 0.219∗∗
(1.081) (0.098) (0.100) (0.096) (0.093)
Women 932 0.135 0.146∗ 0.113 0.159∗∗ 0.140∗
(0.965) (0.082) (0.072) (0.078) (0.072)
Pooled 2,007 −0.001 0.120∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
(1.038) (0.064) (0.071) (0.066) (0.064)
(d) Security, safety
Men 1,075 −0.071 0.267∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗
(1.048) (0.087) (0.076) (0.085) (0.074)
Women 932 0.136 −0.002 0.069 0.130∗ 0.105
(0.934) (0.082) (0.075) (0.078) (0.072)
Pooled 2,007 0.022 0.092 0.159∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(1.003) (0.059) (0.060) (0.058) (0.054)
(e) Work-life balance
Men 1,075 −0.023 0.027 0.031 0.021 0.027
(1.039) (0.084) (0.091) (0.091) (0.085)
Women 932 −0.008 0.127 0.146 0.197∗∗ 0.176∗∗
(0.997) (0.087) (0.090) (0.092) (0.086)
Pooled 2,007 −0.017 0.066 0.056 0.116∗ 0.085
(1.020) (0.059) (0.065) (0.063) (0.058)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Standard deviations (mean) and standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors of the treatment effects are bootstrapped with 250 replications and
clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level,
respectively.
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Table 2.16: Job Values – Academic Track
Obs. Mean Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE
(a) Interaction, recognition
Men 577 −0.248 0.153 0.043 0.053 0.045
(0.946) (0.115) (0.137) (0.149) (0.133)
Women 646 0.034 0.229∗∗ 0.109 0.176∗ 0.131
(0.927) (0.109) (0.110) (0.100) (0.103)
Pooled 1,223 −0.105 0.152∗ 0.128 0.161∗∗ 0.137∗
(0.947) (0.080) (0.083) (0.080) (0.076)
(b) Pay, promotion
Men 577 −0.113 0.152 0.075 0.172 0.098
(0.983) (0.127) (0.143) (0.145) (0.136)
Women 646 −0.196 0.063 0.096 0.058 0.083
(0.987) (0.126) (0.115) (0.108) (0.108)
Pooled 1,223 −0.155 0.111 0.138 0.107 0.130
(0.986) (0.091) (0.090) (0.085) (0.083)
(c) Personal development
Men 577 −0.125 −0.010 −0.032 0.009 −0.022
(0.964) (0.121) (0.124) (0.144) (0.121)
Women 646 0.140 0.051 −0.001 −0.003 −0.002
(0.888) (0.106) (0.111) (0.115) (0.107)
Pooled 1,223 0.010 −0.015 −0.020 0.004 −0.013
(0.935) (0.081) (0.077) (0.079) (0.072)
(d) Security, safety
Men 577 −0.155 0.173 0.034 0.116 0.053
(1.027) (0.143) (0.128) (0.140) (0.122)
Women 646 0.039 0.062 0.059 0.087 0.068
(0.976) (0.109) (0.119) (0.109) (0.109)
Pooled 1,223 −0.057 0.077 0.063 0.137∗ 0.084
(1.006) (0.087) (0.085) (0.083) (0.078)
(e) Work-Life balance
Men 577 0.034 0.063 0.072 0.119 0.083
(0.949) (0.119) (0.153) (0.162) (0.148)
Women 646 0.038 0.064 0.065 0.127 0.085
(0.950) (0.103) (0.113) (0.109) (0.105)
Pooled 1,223 0.036 0.062 0.107 0.106 0.107
(0.950) (0.078) (0.094) (0.089) (0.086)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Standard deviations (mean) and standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors of the treatment effects are bootstrapped with 250 replications and
clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level,
respectively.
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Table 2.17: Attitudes about Social Success – Vocational Track
Obs. Mean Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE
(a) Extrinsic factors (“family background”)
Men 1,042 0.050 −0.132 −0.089 −0.167∗ −0.121
(1.003) (0.087) (0.092) (0.097) (0.091)
Women 912 −0.161 −0.337∗∗∗ −0.349∗∗∗ −0.317∗∗∗ −0.330∗∗∗
(1.035) (0.090) (0.089) (0.099) (0.090)
Pooled 1,954 −0.047 −0.169∗∗∗ −0.158∗∗ −0.252∗∗∗ −0.204∗∗∗
(1.023) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.060)
(b) Positive intrinsic factors (“achievement”)
Men 1,042 −0.030 0.075 0.172∗∗ 0.111 0.147∗∗
(1.014) (0.084) (0.075) (0.076) (0.072)
Women 912 −0.060 0.260∗∗∗ 0.097 0.167∗ 0.138
(1.049) (0.097) (0.088) (0.098) (0.089)
Pooled 1,954 −0.044 0.159∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.134∗∗ 0.143∗∗
(1.030) (0.069) (0.059) (0.063) (0.056)
(c) Negative intrinsic factors (“toughness”)
Men 1,042 0.057 −0.161∗∗ −0.066 −0.151∗ −0.100
(0.986) (0.082) (0.084) (0.089) (0.083)
Women 912 −0.254 −0.362∗∗∗ −0.329∗∗∗ −0.233∗∗ −0.273∗∗∗
(0.941) (0.078) (0.085) (0.094) (0.086)
Pooled 1,954 −0.086 −0.172∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗
(0.978) (0.059) (0.058) (0.062) (0.056)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Standard deviations (mean) and standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors of the treatment effects are bootstrapped with 250 replications and
clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level,
respectively.
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Table 2.18: Attitudes about Social Success – Academic Track
Obs. Mean Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE
(a) Extrinsic factors (“family background”)
Men 570 0.143 0.135 0.283∗∗ 0.312∗∗ 0.290∗∗
(0.978) (0.128) (0.138) (0.123) (0.127)
Women 644 0.026 −0.154 −0.031 −0.040 −0.034
(0.916) (0.110) (0.098) (0.112) (0.095)
Pooled 1,214 0.083 −0.016 0.122 0.130 0.124∗
(0.948) (0.085) (0.080) (0.079) (0.073)
(b) Positive intrinsic factors (“achievement”)
Men 570 −0.033 −0.050 0.054 −0.007 0.039
(0.962) (0.129) (0.136) (0.136) (0.128)
Women 644 0.181 −0.070 −0.086 −0.104 −0.092
(0.919) (0.115) (0.109) (0.108) (0.101)
Pooled 1,214 0.077 −0.089 −0.008 −0.024 −0.013
(0.946) (0.087) (0.088) (0.082) (0.079)
(c) Negative intrinsic factors (“toughness”)
Men 570 0.314 0.259∗ 0.346∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗
(1.049) (0.145) (0.143) (0.126) (0.131)
Women 644 0.034 −0.127 −0.022 −0.054 −0.032
(0.961) (0.123) (0.106) (0.112) (0.100)
Pooled 1,214 0.170 0.072 0.169∗∗ 0.148∗ 0.163∗∗
(1.015) (0.095) (0.081) (0.080) (0.073)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Standard deviations (mean) and standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors of the treatment effects are bootstrapped with 250 replications and
clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level,
respectively.
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Table 2.19: Beliefs about the Future – Vocational Track
Obs. Mean Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE
(a) Successful career
Men 1,028 0.004 0.316∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗
(1.060) (0.094) (0.091) (0.089) (0.088)
Women 896 −0.043 0.164∗ 0.114 0.154∗ 0.137
(1.034) (0.088) (0.088) (0.093) (0.086)
Pooled 1,924 −0.017 0.247∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗
(1.049) (0.065) (0.065) (0.064) (0.061)
(b) Fulfilling career
Men 1,028 −0.130 0.139 0.098 0.051 0.079
(0.999) (0.086) (0.087) (0.083) (0.082)
Women 896 −0.174 0.302∗∗∗ 0.087 0.101 0.095
(1.047) (0.097) (0.093) (0.091) (0.088)
Pooled 1,924 −0.150 0.213∗∗∗ 0.099 0.119∗ 0.109∗
(1.021) (0.064) (0.063) (0.062) (0.059)
(c) Fulfilling family life
Men 1,028 −0.190 0.221∗∗ 0.196∗∗ 0.183∗∗ 0.191∗∗
(1.008) (0.088) (0.089) (0.086) (0.085)
Women 896 0.072 0.186∗ 0.141 0.228∗∗ 0.192∗∗
(1.050) (0.102) (0.091) (0.100) (0.093)
Pooled 1,924 −0.072 0.142∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗
(1.035) (0.067) (0.068) (0.066) (0.062)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Standard deviations (mean) and standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors of the treatment effects are bootstrapped with 250 replications and
clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level,
respectively.
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Table 2.20: Beliefs about the Future – Academic Track
Obs. Mean Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE
(a) Successful career
Men 546 0.160 0.164 0.266∗∗ 0.073 0.220∗
(0.878) (0.150) (0.131) (0.137) (0.126)
Women 630 −0.018 0.237∗∗ 0.100 0.091 0.097
(0.841) (0.094) (0.100) (0.110) (0.098)
Pooled 1,176 0.068 0.228∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗ 0.117 0.173∗∗
(0.864) (0.082) (0.085) (0.076) (0.076)
(b) Fulfilling career
Men 546 0.257 0.145 0.243∗∗ 0.281∗∗ 0.252∗∗
(0.885) (0.111) (0.122) (0.130) (0.118)
Women 630 0.331 0.325∗∗∗ 0.026 0.070 0.040
(0.896) (0.106) (0.115) (0.115) (0.108)
Pooled 1,176 0.295 0.236∗∗∗ 0.118 0.181∗∗ 0.136∗
(0.891) (0.077) (0.079) (0.080) (0.073)
(c) Fulfilling family life
Men 546 0.122 0.181 0.179 0.062 0.151
(0.938) (0.124) (0.128) (0.141) (0.123)
Women 630 0.176 0.175∗ 0.083 −0.007 0.054
(0.892) (0.104) (0.120) (0.120) (0.114)
Pooled 1,176 0.150 0.167∗∗ 0.188∗∗ 0.039 0.145∗
(0.914) (0.079) (0.092) (0.089) (0.086)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Standard deviations (mean) and standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors of the treatment effects are bootstrapped with 250 replications and
clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level,
respectively.
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Table 2.21: Educational Attainment – Vocational Track
Obs. Mean Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE
(a) No school degree
Men 594 0.071 −0.292∗∗ −0.128 −0.293∗ −0.196
(1.288) (0.139) (0.136) (0.153) (0.138)
Women 506 −0.047 −0.093 0.000 −0.012 −0.007
(0.745) (0.078) (0.026) (0.071) (0.048)
Pooled 1,100 0.018 −0.162∗∗ −0.077 −0.133∗ −0.105
(1.081) (0.077) (0.081) (0.073) (0.072)
(b) School degree from vocational track
Men 594 0.411 −0.025 0.094 0.067 0.083
(0.768) (0.079) (0.093) (0.085) (0.087)
Women 506 0.436 −0.368∗∗∗ −0.289∗∗∗ −0.259∗∗∗ −0.271∗∗∗
(0.745) (0.089) (0.097) (0.097) (0.089)
Pooled 1,100 0.422 −0.173∗∗∗ −0.017 −0.121∗∗ −0.069
(0.758) (0.056) (0.068) (0.061) (0.059)
(c) School degree from academic track
Men 594 −0.429 0.089 −0.066 −0.003 −0.040
(0.737) (0.075) (0.085) (0.076) (0.078)
Women 506 −0.429 0.391∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
(0.737) (0.088) (0.098) (0.096) (0.089)
Pooled 1,100 −0.429 0.209∗∗∗ 0.034 0.151∗∗∗ 0.092∗
(0.736) (0.054) (0.063) (0.058) (0.056)
(d) Ever attended university
Men 813 −0.261 0.081 0.048 0.020 0.037
(0.760) (0.068) (0.077) (0.067) (0.070)
Women 705 −0.322 0.105 0.112 0.090 0.099
(0.678) (0.063) (0.074) (0.077) (0.071)
Pooled 1,518 −0.289 0.101∗∗ 0.040 0.062∗ 0.051
(0.725) (0.047) (0.054) (0.049) (0.047)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Standard deviations (mean) and standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors of the treatment effects are bootstrapped with 250 replications and
clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level,
respectively.
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Table 2.22: Educational Attainment – Academic Track
Obs. Mean Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE
(a) School degree from vocational track
Men 235 −1.059 0.211∗ −0.004 −0.192 −0.044
(0.708) (0.114) (0.227) (0.244) (0.209)
Women 306 −1.144 −0.069 −0.109 −0.029 −0.079
(0.604) (0.105) (0.109) (0.128) (0.110)
Pooled 541 −1.106 0.044 −0.002 −0.023 −0.008
(0.653) (0.085) (0.080) (0.077) (0.074)
(b) School degree from academic track
Men 235 1.090 −0.213∗ 0.004 0.194 0.045
(0.713) (0.115) (0.229) (0.246) (0.210)
Women 306 1.175 0.069 0.110 0.029 0.080
(0.608) (0.105) (0.110) (0.129) (0.111)
Pooled 541 1.137 −0.044 0.002 0.023 0.008
(0.658) (0.086) (0.081) (0.078) (0.074)
(c) Ever attended university
Men 395 0.673 −0.047 −0.105 0.090 −0.061
(1.210) (0.187) (0.221) (0.221) (0.211)
Women 492 0.543 0.203 0.104 0.186 0.133
(1.202) (0.153) (0.144) (0.157) (0.137)
Pooled 887 0.601 0.129 0.052 0.139 0.078
(1.207) (0.118) (0.103) (0.109) (0.097)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Standard deviations (mean) and standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors of the treatment effects are bootstrapped with 250 replications and
clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level,
respectively.
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Table 2.23: Enrolment in Vocational Training – Vocational Track
Obs. Mean Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE
(a) At least one year of vocational training
Men 813 0.323 0.151∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(0.863) (0.088) (0.080) (0.079) (0.077)
Women 705 0.370 −0.195∗∗ −0.042 −0.183∗∗ −0.127∗
(0.831) (0.087) (0.083) (0.081) (0.076)
Pooled 1,518 0.344 −0.014 0.126∗∗ −0.043 0.042
(0.849) (0.060) (0.059) (0.055) (0.052)
(b) At least two consecutive years of vocational training
Men 813 0.294 0.143 0.237∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.977) (0.093) (0.091) (0.089) (0.087)
Women 705 0.282 −0.251∗∗ −0.104 −0.306∗∗∗ −0.225∗∗
(0.980) (0.100) (0.103) (0.115) (0.104)
Pooled 1,518 0.289 −0.028 0.092 −0.097 −0.001
(0.978) (0.067) (0.069) (0.077) (0.068)
(c) Vocational training successfully completed
Men 813 0.177 0.158∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗
(1.073) (0.093) (0.090) (0.092) (0.088)
Women 705 0.177 −0.010 −0.002 −0.085 −0.051
(1.073) (0.107) (0.111) (0.113) (0.107)
Pooled 1,518 0.177 0.078 0.167∗∗ 0.036 0.102
(1.073) (0.070) (0.070) (0.078) (0.069)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Standard deviations (mean) and standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors of the treatment effects are bootstrapped with 250 replications and
clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level,
respectively.
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Table 2.24: Enrolment in Vocational Training – Academic Track
Obs. Mean Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE
(a) At least one year of vocational training
Men 395 −0.692 0.017 0.080 0.084 0.081
(0.920) (0.147) (0.167) (0.171) (0.164)
Women 492 −0.663 −0.209∗ −0.155 −0.192 −0.168
(0.934) (0.125) (0.112) (0.126) (0.110)
Pooled 887 −0.676 −0.127 −0.048 −0.043 −0.047
(0.927) (0.097) (0.081) (0.089) (0.076)
(b) At least two subsequent years of vocational training
Men 395 −0.619 0.061 0.087 0.064 0.082
(0.731) (0.098) (0.154) (0.156) (0.147)
Women 492 −0.519 −0.259∗∗ −0.232∗∗ −0.211∗ −0.224∗∗
(0.813) (0.114) (0.103) (0.122) (0.104)
Pooled 887 −0.564 −0.153∗ −0.089 −0.092 −0.090
(0.778) (0.083) (0.073) (0.081) (0.069)
(c) Vocational training successfully completed
Men 395 −0.402 0.048 −0.055 −0.056 −0.055
(0.652) (0.082) (0.134) (0.127) (0.125)
Women 492 −0.310 −0.100 −0.065 0.007 −0.039
(0.766) (0.095) (0.129) (0.152) (0.131)
Pooled 887 −0.351 −0.059 −0.062 0.016 −0.039
(0.718) (0.066) (0.082) (0.095) (0.080)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Standard deviations (mean) and standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors of the treatment effects are bootstrapped with 250 replications and
clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level,
respectively.
71
2.8 Appendix II
A Proofs for Section 2.2.1
The teenager’s utility function is given by:
(1) U = ωH(e, s, x) + θ(1− e− s) + I(s, x)− γe− κs ,
with arguments as defined in Section 2.1 in the main text. Maximization of (1) with
respect to e and s yields the following first order conditions:
(2)
∂U(e, s)
∂e
= ωHe(e, s, x)− θ − γ = 0 ≡ F (e, s;ω, x, θ, γ)
and
(3)
∂U(e, s)
∂s
= ωHs(e, s, x)− θ + Is(s, x)− κ = 0 ≡ G(e, s;ω, x, θ, κ) .
Conditions (2) and (3) form a system of equations that implicitly determines the
optimal shares of time spent studying e∗ and engaged in structured activities s∗. We
can apply Cramer’s rule to differentiate the system with respect to the parameters
ω, x, θ, γ, κ. Denoting by sgn(r), r ∈ R, the sign function we obtain the following
comparative static results:
Proof of Lemma 1
(4) sgn
(
∂e∗
∂x
)
= −sgn (FxGs − FsGx) = 1
if Hex > 0, Hes ≥ 0, and ωHsx + Isx ≥ 0,
(5) sgn
(
∂s∗
∂x
)
= −sgn (FeGx − FxGe) = 1
if ωHsx + Isx > 0 and Hex ≥ 0 or if ωHsx + Isx = 0 and Hes > 0 and Hex > 0,
Proof of Lemma 2
(6) sgn
(
∂e∗
∂γ
)
= −sgn (FγGs) = −1 ,
(7) sgn
(
∂s∗
∂γ
)
= sgn (FγGe) = −1 if Hes > 0, else 0 ,
(8) sgn
(
∂e∗
∂κ
)
= sgn (FsGκ) = −1 if Hes > 0, else 0 ,
(9) sgn
(
∂s∗
∂κ
)
= −sgn (FeGκ) = −1 .
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B Information on Covariates Used
B.1 List of Covariates
Table B1: Variable Definitions
Name Definition
track = 1 if youth have attended Hauptschule (Hauptschule
offers Lower Secondary Education, Level 2 according to
ISCED)
p educ = 1 if at least one parent has a higher education en-
trance qualification
p acadqual = 1 if at least one parent has an academic degree
p mincy10 Parents’ income averaged over past years
p sincy10 Standard deviation of parents’ income of past years
p height Average of father’s and mother’s body height
p miss = 1 if information on at least one parents covariate is
missing
f agey Father’s age when youth is 17 years old
f ageyed Interaction between f agey and p educ
m agey Mother’s age when youth is 17 years old
f height Father’s body height when youth is 17 years old
m height Mother’s body height when youth is 17 years old
f lstv10 = 1 if father watched TV on a daily basis in each of the
past years
m lstv10 = 1 if mother watched TV on a daily basis in each of
the past years
f lspc10 = 1 if father used computer/internet on a daily basis in
each of the past years
m lspc10 = 1 if mother used computer/internet on a daily basis
in each of the past years
f lscomit10 = 1 if father worked voluntarily on a weekly basis in at
least one of the past years
m lscomit10 = 1 if mother worked voluntarily on a weekly basis in
at least one of the past years
f lsculture10 = 1 if father engaged in musical/artistic activities on a
weekly basis in at least one of the past years
f lssport10 = 1 if father engaged in physical activities on a weekly
basis in at least one of the past years
f lssport10 often = 1 if father engaged in physical activities on a weekly
basis in at least 50% of the past years
m lssport10 = 1 if mother engaged in physical activities on a weekly
basis in at least one of the past years
m lssport10 often = 1 if mother engaged in physical activities on a weekly
basis in at least 50% of the past years
<continued on next page>
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Table B1: Variable Definitions <continued>
Name Definition
f loc1 Father’s external locus of control
f loc2 Father’s internal locus of control
f ffm2 Father’s extraversion
f ffm3 Father’s openness
f ffm4 Father’s agreeableness
f ffm5 Father’s neuroticism
m ffm1 Mother’s conscientiousness
m ffm2 Mother’s extraversion
m ffm3 Mother’s openness
m ffm4 Mother’s agreeableness
m ffm5 Mother’s neuroticism
f rec2 Father’s positive reciprocity
m rec1 Mother’s negative reciprocity
m rec2 Mother’s positive reciprocity
f trust1 Father’s general trust
f trust2 Father’s past trusting behavior
f trust12 Interaction between f trust1 and f trust2
f trust22 Squared value of f trust2
m trust1 Mother’s general trust
f nob Father’s number of past observations
m nob Mother’s number of past observations
f miss = 1 if information on at least one father covariate is
missing
m miss = 1 if information on at least one mother covariate is
missing
chldhdgu = 1 if youth grew up with both parents
f imp = 1 if father is (very) important
m imp = 1 if mother is (very) important
f arg = 1 if arguing with father (very) often
m arg = 1 if arguing with mother (very) often
f sps Father’s supportive parenting scale that measures the
quality of the child-father relationship
m sps Mother’s supportive parenting scale that measures the
quality of the child-mother relationship
fy miss = 1 if information on at least one father-youth covariate
(f imp, f arg, f sps) is missing
my miss = 1 if information on at least one mother-youth covari-
ate (m imp, m arg, m sps) is missing
east = 1 if living in East Germany
chldhdp1 = 1 if youth grew up in a big city
chldhdpa = 1 if youth grew up in a city and not in the countryside
migration = 1 if youth has a direct/indirect migration background
<continued on next page>
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2.8. APPENDIX II
Table B1: Variable Definitions <continued>
Name Definition
fclass1 = 1 if in the current or last school at least one quarter of
students were either foreigners or not born in Germany
lstv = 1 if watching TV on a daily basis
lsread = 1 if reading on a daily basis
lsno = 1 if daydreaming/being idle on a daily basis
lssocial = 1 if volunteering at least once a week
lsculture = 1 if engaged in dancing/acting at least once a week
or ever involved in school theater/dance group
lsmusic = 1 if musically active at least once a week or ever
involved in school orchestra/chorus
lstech = 1 if engaged in technical related activi-
ties/programming at least once a week
gradm Grade in mathematics based on the 1-6 scale in last
report card
gradg Grade in German based on the 1-6 scale in last report
card
gradf Grade in first foreign language based on the 1-6 scale in
last report card
gradrep = 1 if ever stayed back a grade at school
schoolrec = 1 if elementary school recommended youth for aca-
demic school track
sgschool = 1 if youth attended secondary school in the year
he/she turned 17
qob2 = 1 if born in the second quarter
y miss = 1 if information on at least one youth’s leisure or
school covariate is missing
d0102 = 1 if youth biography questionnaire completed in 2001
or 2002
d0103 = 1 if youth biography questionnaire completed in 2001,
2002 or 2003
d0103m Interaction between d0103 and migration
d2003 = 1 if youth biography questionnaire completed in 2003
d0304 = 1 if youth biography questionnaire completed in 2003
or 2004
d0405 = 1 if youth biography questionnaire completed in 2004
or 2005
d0406 = 1 if youth biography questionnaire completed in 2004,
2005 or 2006
d0506 = 1 if youth biography questionnaire completed in 2005
or 2006
d0607 = 1 if youth biography questionnaire completed in 2006
or 2007
<continued on next page>
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Table B1: Variable Definitions <continued>
Name Definition
d2008 = 1 if youth biography questionnaire completed in 2008
d0709 = 1 if youth biography questionnaire completed in 2007,
2008 or 2009
d2009 = 1 if youth biography questionnaire completed in 2009
d2010 = 1 if youth biography questionnaire completed in 2010
mn alq A three-year moving average of the unemployment
rate measured at Raumordnungsregion (aggregated dis-
tricts) level
mn youth A five-year moving average of the percentage of people
aged between 6 and 18 measured at Raumordnungsre-
gion level
mn foreigner A five-year moving average of the percentage of foreign
people measured at Raumordnungsregion level
mn popden A five-year moving average of the population den-
sity (1,000 inh./km2) measured at Raumordnungsregion
level
inkar miss = 1 if information on at least one of the regional charac-
teristics measured at Raumordnungsregion level is miss-
ing
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C Propensity Scores and Matching Diagnostics
C.1 Probit Estimates of Propensity Scores
Table C1: Propensity Scores – Vocational Track
Men Women
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
track −0.297∗∗ (0.117) −0.319∗∗ (0.125)
p educ 0.075 (0.194) −0.270 (0.206)
p acadqual 0.464∗ (0.272)
p mincy10 −0.009∗∗ (0.004) 0.009∗∗ (0.004)
p sincy10 0.016∗∗ (0.008) −0.022∗∗ (0.009)
p height 0.003 (0.002)
p miss −0.234 (0.226) 0.492 (0.331)
f agey 0.004 (0.008)
m agey −0.013 (0.009)
f height −0.001 (0.002)
m height 0.001 (0.002)
f lstv10 −0.218 (0.149)
f lspc10 0.080 (0.137)
f lscomit10 0.067 (0.149)
m lscomit10 −0.208 (0.157)
f lsculture10 −0.498∗∗ (0.209)
f lssport10 0.184 (0.136)
m lssport10 0.542∗∗∗ (0.130)
f loc1 0.065 (0.075)
f ffm4 0.019 (0.075) 0.169∗∗ (0.083)
f ffm5 −0.094 (0.071) 0.204∗∗ (0.085)
m ffm1 −0.086 (0.086)
m ffm2 0.039 (0.068) −0.047 (0.063)
m ffm4 −0.004 (0.080)
m ffm5 0.067 (0.058) 0.063 (0.066)
m rec2 0.125∗∗ (0.058)
f trust1 0.097 (0.068)
m nob −0.008 (0.014) 0.022∗ (0.012)
f nob 0.031∗∗ (0.015) −0.026∗∗ (0.013)
f miss 0.455∗ (0.247) −0.140 (0.198)
m miss −0.552∗∗ (0.240) 0.110 (0.165)
chldhdgu 0.168 (0.144)
f imp 0.393∗ (0.213)
m arg −0.077 (0.136) −0.301∗∗ (0.133)
f sps −0.094 (0.083)
m sps 0.084 (0.066)
fy miss 0.385 (0.257)
<continued on next page>
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Table C1: Propensity Scores – Vocational Track <continued>
Men Women
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
my miss −0.273 (0.317)
east −0.174 (0.145) −0.353∗∗ (0.170)
chldhdpa −0.299∗∗ (0.121)
migration 0.332∗∗∗ (0.129) −0.184 (0.135)
fclass1 −0.082 (0.117)
lstv −0.266∗∗ (0.133)
lsread 0.317∗∗ (0.148) 0.223∗ (0.128)
lssocial −0.114 (0.151) −0.182 (0.167)
lsculture 0.239∗∗ (0.117)
lsmusic −0.377∗∗∗ (0.119) −0.093 (0.118)
lstech 0.275∗∗ (0.114) 0.312 (0.213)
gradm −0.103∗∗ (0.052)
gradg −0.017 (0.066)
gradf 0.072 (0.052)
gradrep −0.178 (0.136)
schoolrec 0.206 (0.157) 0.413∗∗∗ (0.157)
sgschool 0.220∗∗ (0.111) 0.661∗∗∗ (0.121)
y miss 0.351∗ (0.184) 0.019 (0.185)
d0102 0.415 (0.262)
d0103 −0.265 (0.193)
d0304 0.417 (0.258)
d0406 −0.549∗∗∗ (0.185)
d0506 0.230 (0.261)
d0709 −0.553∗∗∗ (0.187) 0.321 (0.248)
mn youth −0.130∗∗ (0.052)
mn popden −0.275∗∗∗ (0.094)
inkar miss −1.440∗∗ (0.732)
Intercept 0.708 (0.494) 0.644 (0.844)
N 1104 977
Log-Likelihood -2103448 -1668861
Pseudo R2 0.110 0.169
K 49 40
χ2K 104.551 169.166
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at
the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively. Calculations use SOEP sample weights.
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Table C2: Propensity Scores – Academic Track
Men Women
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
p educ 0.666∗∗ (0.338)
p mincy10 −0.013∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.004∗ (0.002)
p sincy10 0.022∗∗∗ (0.008)
p miss 0.235 (0.494) 0.451∗∗ (0.225)
f agey 0.009 (0.006) −0.014∗∗ (0.006)
f ageyed −0.003 (0.007)
f lspc10 0.233 (0.191) 0.528∗∗∗ (0.176)
m lstv10 −0.469∗∗ (0.205) −0.324∗∗ (0.153)
m lspc10 −0.165 (0.201)
f lscomit10 0.533∗∗∗ (0.199)
f lsculture10 −0.361 (0.227)
f lssport10 often 0.306 (0.210)
m lssport10 often 0.531∗∗∗ (0.182) 0.227 (0.155)
f loc2 −0.274∗∗ (0.110)
f ffm2 0.174 (0.123) 0.375∗∗∗ (0.122)
f ffm3 −0.149 (0.140) −0.148 (0.129)
f ffm4 −0.251∗∗ (0.106)
f ffm5 −0.299∗∗∗ (0.101) −0.097 (0.092)
m ffm1 0.156 (0.103) −0.098 (0.104)
m ffm2 0.217∗ (0.126)
m ffm3 −0.438∗∗∗ (0.131)
m ffm4 0.144 (0.111)
f rec2 −0.078 (0.092)
m rec1 0.132 (0.085)
m rec2 −0.152∗ (0.083) 0.061 (0.084)
f trust1 −0.203∗∗ (0.089)
f trust12 0.071 (0.056)
f trust2 0.280∗∗∗ (0.101) −0.023 (0.119)
f trust22 0.170∗∗ (0.078)
m trust1 0.151∗ (0.085)
m nob 0.024∗ (0.015)
f nob 0.038∗∗∗ (0.013)
f miss 0.894∗∗ (0.359)
m miss −0.613∗ (0.361)
chldhdgu −0.407 (0.249) 0.464∗∗ (0.205)
f imp −0.339 (0.291)
m imp −0.513 (0.508)
f arg −0.409 (0.253) −0.255 (0.211)
m arg 0.260 (0.207) 0.202 (0.174)
f sps −0.159 (0.145) 0.146∗ (0.083)
m sps 0.212∗ (0.120)
<continued on next page>
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Table C2: Propensity Scores – Academic Track <continued>
Men Women
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
east −0.938∗∗∗ (0.301)
chldhdp1 −0.644∗∗∗ (0.210)
chldhdpa 0.308∗∗ (0.149)
migration 0.132 (0.238) −0.295 (0.232)
fclass1 0.195 (0.235)
lstv −0.181 (0.181) −0.208 (0.156)
lspc 0.407∗∗ (0.195)
lsread 0.189 (0.167)
lsno −0.216 (0.165) −0.090 (0.143)
lsculture −0.255 (0.171) 0.407∗∗∗ (0.142)
lsmusic −0.324∗∗ (0.158) −0.339∗∗ (0.157)
gradm 0.116 (0.072) 0.031 (0.069)
gradg 0.200∗∗ (0.101)
gradf −0.117 (0.085) −0.109 (0.093)
gradrep 0.288 (0.298)
schoolrec 0.396∗∗ (0.178)
y miss 0.237 (0.275) −0.031 (0.188)
qob2 −0.238 (0.159)
d0102 0.143 (0.573)
d0103 −0.049 (0.378)
d2003 0.731 (0.633)
d0103m −0.323 (0.377)
d0405 0.458 (0.598)
d0406 0.185 (0.367)
d0607 0.510 (0.590)
d2008 0.452 (0.627)
d0709 −0.124 (0.356)
d2009 −0.008 (0.614)
d2010 −0.253 (0.604)
mn alq 0.065∗∗ (0.026) −0.033∗∗ (0.015)
mn foreigner −0.042∗ (0.023)
inkar miss 0.248 (0.632) −0.496 (0.383)
Intercept 1.498 (0.953) −0.206 (0.629)
N 593 669
Log-Likelihood -621247 -807314
Pseudo R2 0.227 0.204
K 52 47
χ2K 129.377 133.320
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at
the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively. Calculations use SOEP sample weights.
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C.2 Common Support
Figure C1: Index of Propensity Scores Before Trimming – Vocational Track
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Figure C2: Index of Propensity Scores After Trimming – Vocational Track
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Figure C3: Index of Propensity Scores Before Trimming – Academic Track
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Figure C4: Index of Propensity Scores After Trimming – Academic Track
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C.3 Additional Results on Balancing of Included Covariates
Table C3: t-Tests of Equality of Means on Included Covariates
Vocational track Academic track
Men Women Men Women
(a) Covariates in propensity score model
Unmatched 9 7 7 12
ATT-weights 0 0 0 0
ATU-weights 0 0 0 0
Total number of covariates 49 40 52 47
(b) Covariates in outcome regression model
Unmatched 22 20 11 20
ATT-weights 0 0 2 2
ATU-weights 1 4 0 0
Total number of covariates 112 112 112 112
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: Table shows the number of covariates with
p-values ≤ 0.05 and ≤ 0.10 in a t-test of equality of means in the athlete and non-athlete samples
before and after matching. Panel (a) shows it for covariates used for estimating the propensity
score and panel (b) for covariates used in the outcome regressions. Calculations use SOEP sample
weights.
98
2.8. APPENDIX II
Table C4: Hotelling Tests on Covariates in Propensity Score
Men Women
Before ATT- ATU- Before ATT- ATU-
weights weights weights weights
(a) Vocational track
Youth’s characteristics 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.999
Parent-youth relationship 0.276 0.994 0.917 0.592 0.979 0.771
Parental characteristics 0.005 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Regional characteristics 0.290 0.686 0.748 0.001 0.998 0.995
Year dummies 0.006 0.917 0.841 0.731 0.996 0.986
(b) Academic track
Youth’s characteristics 0.126 0.811 1.000 0.000 0.999 0.999
Parent-youth relationship 0.161 0.870 0.999 0.063 0.914 0.997
Parental characteristics 0.000 0.989 1.000 0.000 0.998 1.000
Regional characteristics 0.014 0.489 0.978 0.002 0.909 0.891
Year dummies 0.272 0.765 0.992 0.226 0.847 0.983
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: The table shows the p-values from Hotelling
tests of equality of means between the treated and comparison samples. Covariates of the propen-
sity score models are separated into five different categories depending on the source of the covari-
ates. Calculations use SOEP sample weights.
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Table C5: Hotelling Tests on Covariates in Outcome Regression
Men Women
Before ATT- ATU- Before ATT- ATU-
weights weights weights weights
(a) Vocational track
Youth’s characteristics 0.000 0.996 0.954 0.000 0.991 0.987
Parent-youth relationship 0.329 0.996 0.953 0.224 0.855 0.365
Parental characteristics. 0.009 0.582 0.781 0.000 0.698 0.420
Regional characteristics 0.032 0.998 0.986 0.000 0.895 0.966
Year dummies 0.002 0.764 0.070 0.012 0.247 0.268
(b) Academic track
Youth’s characteristics 0.065 0.932 0.954 0.000 0.919 0.999
Parent-youth relationship 0.310 0.900 0.999 0.043 0.984 0.947
Parental characteristics 0.013 0.018 0.974 0.001 0.850 0.993
Regional characteristics 0.404 0.785 0.931 0.000 0.963 0.943
Year dummies 0.102 0.499 0.593 0.074 0.486 0.290
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: Table shows the p-values from Hotelling
tests of equality of means between the treated and comparison samples. Covariates of the out-
come regression models are separated into five different categories depending on the source of the
covariates. Calculations use SOEP sample weights.
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C.4 Additional Results on Balancing of Excluded Variables
Table C6: t-Tests of Equality of Means on Excluded Variables
Men Women
Before ATT- ATU- Before ATT- ATU-
weights weights weights weights
(a) Vocational track
Height 0.012 0.249 0.531 0.001 0.140 0.049
Missing height 0.681 0.558 0.283 0.613 0.506 0.449
Verbal intelligence 0.251 0.296 0.117 0.372 0.781 0.750
Numerical intelligence 0.110 0.457 0.455 0.991 0.474 0.943
Figural intelligence 0.059 0.415 0.290 0.378 0.919 0.763
Missing intelligence 0.000 0.190 0.095 0.352 0.687 0.730
(b) Academic track
Height 0.934 0.622 0.364 0.224 0.847 0.884
Missing height 0.624 0.648 0.893 0.880 0.721 0.569
Verbal intelligence 0.367 0.569 0.321 0.787 0.074 0.674
Numerical intelligence 0.765 0.421 0.758 0.109 0.124 0.199
Figural intelligence 0.341 0.907 0.271 0.567 0.009 0.649
Missing intelligence 0.076 0.224 0.219 0.815 0.186 0.309
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: Table shows p-values from a t-test of equality
of means in the athlete and non-athlete samples before and after matching. The covariate cate-
gories of interest are height and intelligence and measured by two and four covariates, respectively.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights.
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D Factor Analyses for Behavioral Outcome Variables
Table D1: Locus of Control
Item External
locus
Internal
locus
KMO
(1) Control over my own destiny −.343 0.664 0.662
(2) In comparison do not have what i deserve 0.590 0.024 0.805
(3) Success in life is due to fate 0.483 −.031 0.807
(4) Others have often controlled my life 0.686 −.015 0.784
(5) One has to work hard to be successful 0.008 0.744 0.545
(6) Doubt myself when faced by difficulties 0.601 0.017 0.786
(7) Opportunities depend on soc. circumstance 0.602 0.172 0.785
(8) Talents you have at birth are very important 0.256 0.605 0.658
(9) I have little control over my life 0.698 −.236 0.765
(10) Social, political activity makes a difference 0.106 0.084 0.488
Overall 0.748
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: The first column shows all items/variables
used in the factor analysis. They are measured on a seven-point Likert scale from don’t agree at all
to agree completely. The next columns provide factor loadings between all items and factors, labeled
in the corresponding column heading. The column labeled ‘KMO’ shows the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
measure of sampling adequacy for each item and overall.
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Table D2: Big Five Personality Traits
Item Conscien- Extra- Openness Agree- Neuro- KMO
tiousness version ableness ticism
(1) Work carefully 0.852 0.064 0.050 0.089 0.012 0.699
(2) Communicative 0.201 0.795 0.192 0.093 0.026 0.779
(3) Abrasive towards others (-) 0.141 −.038 −.275 0.747 −.106 0.620
(4) Introduce new ideas 0.233 0.328 0.658 −.155 −.015 0.807
(5) Often worry 0.027 −.026 0.199 0.067 0.739 0.590
(6) Can forgive others −.004 0.146 0.310 0.607 0.089 0.805
(7) Am lazy (-) 0.703 0.073 −.212 0.100 −.096 0.726
(8) Am outgoing/ sociable 0.057 0.745 0.280 0.180 −.049 0.784
(9) Importance of esthetics 0.073 0.100 0.564 0.129 0.142 0.816
(10) Am nervous −.045 −.187 0.017 0.009 0.750 0.669
(11) Carryout duties efficiently 0.798 0.043 0.198 0.119 −.034 0.739
(12) Reserved (-) −.073 0.792 −.061 −.165 −.197 0.724
(13) Considerate, friendly 0.265 0.042 0.254 0.683 0.020 0.775
(14) Lively imagination −.064 0.180 0.708 0.106 0.007 0.789
(15) Be relaxed, no stress (-) −.127 −.024 −.397 −.233 0.624 0.781
Overall 0.749
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: The first column shows all items/variables
used in the factor analysis. (-) identifies reverse coded items. They are measured on a seven-point
Likert scale from don’t agree at all to agree completely. The next columns provide factor loadings
between all items and factors, labeled in the corresponding column heading. The column labeled
‘KMO’ shows the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy for each item and overall.
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Table D3: Reciprocity
Item Negative
reciprocity
Positive
reciprocity
KMO
(1) If someone does me a favor, I am prepared to
return it
−.086 0.746 0.659
(2) If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take revenge
as soon as possible, no matter what the cost
0.890 0.032 0.676
(3) If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I
will do the same to him/her
0.891 −.017 0.674
(4) I go out of my way to help somebody who has
been kind to me before
0.046 0.816 0.603
(5) If somebody offends me, I will offend him/her
back
0.825 −.018 0.798
(6) I am ready to undergo personal costs to help
somebody who helped me before
0.027 0.738 0.654
Overall 0.685
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: The first column shows all items/variables
used in the factor analysis. They are measured on a seven-point Likert scale from don’t agree at all
to agree completely. The next columns provide factor loadings between all items and factors, labeled
in the corresponding column heading. The column labeled ‘KMO’ shows the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
measure of sampling adequacy for each item and overall.
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Table D4: Job Values
Item Interaction,
recogni-
tion
Pay, pro-
motion
Personal
develop-
ment
Security,
safety
Work-life
balance
KMO
(1) Secure job, career 0.016 0.346 0.010 0.754 −.135 0.777
(2) High income −.145 0.701 −.044 0.145 0.317 0.658
(3) Good promotion possibilities 0.129 0.784 0.107 0.134 −.02 0.724
(4) Job with recognition 0.340 0.611 0.156 0.020 0.099 0.800
(5) Job which allows for spare
time
−.036 0.187 0.008 −.069 0.858 0.630
(6) Interesting job, career 0.033 0.017 0.817 0.147 0.091
(7) Job which allows for indepen-
dent working
0.172 0.113 0.783 −.047 −.038 0.736
(8) Interaction important 0.680 0.078 0.262 0.010 −.022 0.802
(9) Job important for society 0.812 0.112 0.016 0.081 0.032 0.758
(10) Job with good health, safety
conditions
0.218 −.008 0.117 0.713 0.230 0.786
(11) Job allows for family com-
mitments
0.192 −.108 0.097 0.455 0.636 0.727
(12) Job where one can help oth-
ers
0.789 −.014 0.079 0.149 0.029 0.758
Overall 0.747
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: The first column shows all items/variables
used in the factor analysis. They are measured on a four-point Likert scale from not important at all
to very important. The next columns provide factor loadings between all items and factors, labeled
in the corresponding column heading. The column labeled ‘KMO’ shows the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
measure of sampling adequacy for each item and overall.
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Table D5: Attitudes about Social Success
Item Extrinsic
factors
Positive
intrinsic
factors
Negative
intrinsic
factors
KMO
(1) Working hard −.149 0.589 −.269 0.772
(2) Exploiting others 0.175 −.021 0.836 0.786
(3) Intelligence 0.155 0.645 0.081 0.778
(4) Family background 0.755 −.014 0.212 0.819
(5) Specialized training 0.050 0.680 0.050 0.748
(6) Money 0.704 −.005 0.333 0.829
(7) School grades 0.235 0.551 −.217 0.776
(8) Tough, ruthless 0.211 0.000 0.821 0.785
(9) Connections 0.480 0.224 0.476 0.869
(10) Politically active 0.566 0.028 0.165 0.888
(11) Being male 0.554 0.082 0.132 0.903
(12) Initiative −.09 0.693 0.137 0.745
Overall 0.812
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: The first column shows all items/variables
used in the factor analysis. They are measured on a four-point Likert scale from don’t agree at all to
agree completely. The next columns provide factor loadings between all items and factors, labeled
in the corresponding column heading. The column labeled ‘KMO’ shows the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
measure of sampling adequacy for each item and overall.
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Table D6: Beliefs about the Future
Item Successful
career
Fulfilling
family
life
Fulfilling
career
KMO
(1) Training, university slot 0.754 0.070 0.031 0.869
(2) Success. training, university 0.760 0.104 0.059 0.857
(3) Finding employment 0.845 0.080 0.051 0.801
(4) Job success 0.839 0.102 0.139 0.790
(5) No long-term unemployment 0.572 0.023 −.186 0.880
(6) Being self-employed 0.099 0.059 0.785 0.661
(7) Working abroad 0.061 0.060 0.791 0.640
(8) Marriage 0.148 0.847 0.030 0.796
(9) A child 0.067 0.895 0.018 0.712
(10) Several children 0.030 0.876 0.073 0.740
Overall 0.790
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: The first column shows all items/variables
used in the factor analysis. They are measured on an eleven-point Likert scale from 0% probability
to 100% probability. The next columns provide factor loadings between all items and factors, labeled
in the corresponding column heading. The column labeled ‘KMO’ shows the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
measure of sampling adequacy for each item and overall.
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E Effect Heterogeneity and Sensitivity Analysis
E.1 Heterogeneity of Effects by Engagement in Other Activities
Table E1: Effects by Engagement in Other Activities – Big Five Personality
Vocational Track Academic Track
Other activities No Yes Diff. No Yes Diff.
Conscientiousness 0.211∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ −0.067 0.130 −0.016 0.146
(0.079) (0.083) (0.115) (0.160) (0.102) (0.183)
Extraversion 0.191∗∗ 0.195∗∗ −0.004 0.324∗∗ 0.100 0.224
(0.087) (0.090) (0.121) (0.160) (0.106) (0.181)
Openness 0.111 0.246∗∗∗ −0.135 0.195 0.082 0.113
(0.088) (0.090) (0.117) (0.131) (0.096) (0.149)
Agreeableness 0.044 0.098 −0.053 0.110 0.010 0.099
(0.091) (0.083) (0.123) (0.145) (0.108) (0.178)
Neuroticism −0.210∗∗ 0.120 −0.331∗∗∗ −0.063 −0.011 −0.052
(0.085) (0.086) (0.114) (0.155) (0.111) (0.189)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Table shows average treatment effects (ATE). Columns
labeled ‘Yes’ (‘No’) show the effects of sports for youths who (do not) engage in at least one other
structured activity. Columns labeled ‘Diff.’ show the difference in both effects. Standard errors in
parentheses are bootstrapped with 250 replications and clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗
denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
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Table E2: Effects by Engagement in Other Activities – Locus of Control
Vocational Track Academic Track
Other activities No Yes Diff. No Yes Diff.
External locus −0.238∗∗ −0.087 −0.151 −0.146 −0.036 −0.109
(0.094) (0.095) (0.139) (0.122) (0.092) (0.156)
Internal locus 0.259∗∗∗ 0.037 0.221∗ 0.296∗∗ −0.104 0.400∗∗
(0.097) (0.083) (0.126) (0.149) (0.096) (0.175)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Table shows average treatment effects (ATE). Columns
labeled ‘Yes’ (‘No’) show the effects of sports for youths who (do not) engage in at least one other
structured activity. Columns labeled ‘Diff.’ show the difference in both effects. Standard errors in
parentheses are bootstrapped with 250 replications and clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗
denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
Table E3: Effects by Engagement in Other Activities – Social and Risk Preferences
Vocational Track Academic Track
Other activities No Yes Diff. No Yes Diff.
Negative reciprocity
−0.248∗∗ −0.038 −0.210 0.227 −0.026 0.253
(0.097) (0.109) (0.135) (0.194) (0.115) (0.233)
Positive reciprocity
−0.171∗ 0.293∗∗∗ −0.465∗∗∗ 0.264 0.066 0.198
(0.094) (0.103) (0.141) (0.229) (0.113) (0.261)
Willingness to take
risks
0.250∗∗∗ 0.169∗ 0.082 0.083 0.004 0.079
(0.081) (0.094) (0.122) (0.132) (0.099) (0.146)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Table shows average treatment effects (ATE). Columns
labeled ‘Yes’ (‘No’) show the effects of sports for youths who (do not) engage in at least one other
structured activity. Columns labeled ‘Diff.’ show the difference in both effects. Standard errors in
parentheses are bootstrapped with 250 replications and clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗
denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
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Table E4: Effects by Engagement in Other Activities – Job Values
Vocational Track Academic Track
Other activities No Yes Diff. No Yes Diff.
Interaction,
recognition
0.113 0.346∗∗∗ −0.233∗∗ 0.000 0.180∗ −0.180
(0.078) (0.082) (0.112) (0.129) (0.096) (0.163)
Pay, promotion 0.082 0.357∗∗∗ −0.275∗∗ −0.058 0.225∗∗ −0.283
(0.079) (0.084) (0.114) (0.144) (0.104) (0.182)
Personal develop-
ment
0.153∗ 0.224∗∗ −0.071 0.034 −0.061 0.095
(0.086) (0.090) (0.123) (0.117) (0.094) (0.155)
Security, safety 0.076 0.292∗∗∗ −0.216∗∗ −0.136 0.180∗ −0.316∗∗
(0.070) (0.084) (0.110) (0.121) (0.103) (0.158)
Work-life balance −0.017 0.193∗∗ −0.210∗ 0.058 0.119 −0.061
(0.083) (0.082) (0.117) (0.149) (0.101) (0.172)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Table shows average treatment effects (ATE). Columns
labeled ‘Yes’ (‘No’) show the effects of sports for youths who (do not) engage in at least one other
structured activity. Columns labeled ‘Diff.’ show the difference in both effects. Standard errors in
parentheses are bootstrapped with 250 replications and clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗
denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
Table E5: Effects by Engagement in Other Activities – Attitudes about Social Suc-
cess
Vocational Track Academic Track
Other activities No Yes Diff. No Yes Diff.
Extrinsic factors −0.227∗∗ −0.167∗∗ −0.060 0.189 0.095 0.095
(0.088) (0.079) (0.117) (0.121) (0.097) (0.156)
Positive intrinsic f. 0.234∗∗∗ 0.055 0.178 0.145 −0.079 0.224
(0.079) (0.078) (0.111) (0.150) (0.098) (0.183)
Negative intrinsic f. −0.246∗∗∗ −0.119 −0.127 0.259∗∗ 0.120 0.139
(0.080) (0.076) (0.108) (0.125) (0.096) (0.161)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Table shows average treatment effects (ATE). Columns
labeled ‘Yes’ (‘No’) show the effects of sports for youths who (do not) engage in at least one other
structured activity. Columns labeled ‘Diff.’ show the difference in both effects. Standard errors in
parentheses are bootstrapped with 250 replications and clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗
denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
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Table E6: Effects by Engagement in Other Activities – Beliefs about the Future
Vocational Track Academic Track
Other activities No Yes Diff. No Yes Diff.
(a) Successful career 0.308∗∗∗ 0.149∗ 0.159 0.238∗ 0.137 0.101
(0.084) (0.090) (0.126) (0.134) (0.087) (0.159)
(b) Fulfilling career 0.105 0.105 0.000 0.175 0.105 0.071
(0.080) (0.090) (0.119) (0.134) (0.097) (0.175)
(c) Fulfilling family
life
0.229∗∗∗ 0.168∗ 0.062 −0.021 0.220∗∗ −0.241
(0.083) (0.093) (0.124) (0.152) (0.097) (0.175)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Table includes average treatment effects. Columns labeled
‘Yes’ (‘No’) show the effects of sports for youths who (do not) engage in at least one other structured
activity. Columns labeled ‘Diff.’ show the difference in both effects. Standard errors in parentheses
are bootstrapped with 250 replications and clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote
significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
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E.2 Effect Estimates with Family Fixed Effects
Table E7: Family Fixed Effects – Big Five Personality
Full Sample Sibling Sample
Obs. ATE Obs. ATE ATE (FE)
Conscientiousness 2,891 0.171∗∗∗ 684 0.160∗ 0.112
(0.047) (0.092) (0.118)
Extraversion 2,891 0.185∗∗∗ 684 0.080 −0.003
(0.055) (0.093) (0.127)
Openness 2,891 0.156∗∗∗ 684 0.154∗ 0.048
(0.052) (0.089) (0.125)
Agreeableness 2,891 0.060 684 0.037 0.002
(0.050) (0.096) (0.127)
Neuroticism 2,891 −0.052 684 −0.022 0.019
(0.052) (0.098) (0.137)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped with
250 replications and clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-,
5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
Table E8: Family Fixed Effects – Locus of Control
Full Sample Sibling Sample
Obs. ATE Obs. ATE ATE (FE)
External locus of control 2,866 −0.146∗∗∗ 679 0.002 0.027
(0.052) (0.098) (0.149)
Internal locus of control 2,866 0.113∗∗ 679 0.125 0.140
(0.057) (0.097) (0.155)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped with
250 replications and clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-,
5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
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Table E9: Family Fixed Effects – Social Skills and Risk Preferences
Full Sample Sibling Sample
Obs. ATE Obs. ATE ATE (FE)
Negative reciprocity 2,181 −0.075 542 −0.064 −0.071
(0.062) (0.128) (0.244)
Positive reciprocity 2,181 0.072 542 0.129 0.068
(0.059) (0.117) (0.254)
Willingness to take risks 3,011 0.152∗∗∗ 704 0.200∗ 0.158
(0.055) (0.102) (0.137)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped with
250 replications and clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-,
5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
Table E10: Family Fixed Effects – Job Values
Full Sample Sibling Sample
Obs. ATE Obs. ATE ATE (FE)
Interaction, recognition 3,230 0.199∗∗∗ 717 0.227∗∗ 0.157
(0.046) (0.089) (0.121)
Pay, promotion 3,230 0.186∗∗∗ 717 0.230∗∗ 0.219
(0.049) (0.090) (0.137)
Personal development 3,230 0.134∗∗∗ 717 0.060 0.038
(0.050) (0.099) (0.125)
Security, safety 3,230 0.153∗∗∗ 717 0.158∗ 0.237∗
(0.046) (0.093) (0.133)
Work-Life balance 3,230 0.089∗ 717 0.035 0.093
(0.050) (0.088) (0.130)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped with
250 replications and clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-,
5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
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Table E11: Family Fixed Effects – Social Success
Full Sample Sibling Sample
Obs. ATE Obs. ATE ATE (FE)
Extrinsic factors 3,168 −0.109∗∗ 708 −0.055 −0.108
(0.048) (0.095) (0.138)
Positive intrinsic factors 3,168 0.095∗∗ 708 0.012 −0.125
(0.048) (0.104) (0.136)
Negative intrinsic factors 3,168 −0.080∗ 708 −0.029 −0.084
(0.042) (0.086) (0.121)
Source: SOEP V28 and authors’ calculations. Note: All outcome variables are standardized.
Calculations use SOEP sample weights. Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped with
250 replications and clustered at the family level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-,
5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
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Abstract:
A growing body of research suggests that, even after controlling for cognitive abil-
ities, personality predicts economic success in later life. The learning environment
at school focuses on knowledge and cognitive skills. The transmission of charac-
ter skills, however, is not at the center of attention. Leisure activities as informal
learning activities outside of school may affect the formation of skills. By provid-
ing valuable opportunities, working part-time while attending full-time secondary
schooling can be seen as a stepping stone toward independence and adulthood. The
channel of the positive influence, however has not been identified empirically. I sug-
gest that employment during adolescence promotes the formation of character skills
that are known to have a positive effect on labor market outcomes and educational
achievement. Employing a flexible strategy combining propensity score matching
and regression techniques to account for self-selection, I find beneficial effects on
character skills. Further, it improves the knowledge on which skills and talents
school students have and reduces the importance of parents’ advice with respect to
their child’s future career. The results are robust to several model specifications and
varying samples and robust to including family-fixed effects.
Keywords: human capital, teenage employment, non-cognitive skills, time use,
treatment effect
JEL: I 21, J 13, J 24
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3.1. INTRODUCTION
3.1 Introduction
For adolescents and young adults in Germany working part-time while attending full-
time education is a common leisure activity. Between 2002 and 2010 the proportion
of people who had a paid job during adolescence and young adulthood remained
quite stable at around 33%.1 In 2010 young people spent on average eight hours
per week with activities related to their part-time job.2 A frequently mentioned
concern of working during adolescence is that working part-time after school may
crowd out homework time and therefore may lead to worse grades and a lower
educational attainment. On the other side, taking one’s first real job is seen as a
stepping stone toward independence and adulthood (Rauscher, Wegman, Wooding,
Davis, & Junkin, 2013). Working part-time while in school may promote a sense
of responsibility, confidence, and interpersonal skills at an early stage of life and
therefore may lead to better labor market outcomes in adulthood.
Part of the existing literature confirms a positive relationship between high school
employment and economic success in adulthood. Using different empirical strate-
gies to take account of the endogeneity of high school employment, Ruhm (1997),
Light (2001) and Hotz, Xu, Tienda, and Ahituv (2002) find positive and meaningful
effects on earnings in later life. Using geographic characteristics such as the local
unemployment rate and indicators for various geographic regions as instruments for
the endogenous decision to work, Ruhm finds beneficial effects on earnings. For in-
stance, working 20 hours per week during high school’s senior year increases earnings
by 22% and leads to a 9% higher hourly wage six to nine years later. Light finds
similar results using various ability measures, family structure, and the existence of
high school employment programs as instruments. Hotz et al. discuss the important
role of how the dynamic form of selection is accounted in the model specification
and confirm partially the positive relationship between high school employment and
later earnings.
Another strand of literature documents a negative relationship between after-school
employment and various measures of economic success. Using time-diary data of 15-
18 year old high school students, Kalenkoski and Pabilonia (2012) find a substantial
negative effect of teenage employment on the amount of time students spend on
homework on school and non-school days. This is in line with the allocation of
1See Shell Jugendstudie in 2002, 2006, and 2010 for more detailed information.
2In 2010 the Shell Jugendstudie consist of secondary school students, apprentices, and college
students aged between 12 and 25. While college students work 11 hours, trainees work 8.6 hours
per week.
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time model by Becker (1965) and the zero-sum model by Coleman (1961) in which
a greater involvement in one activity reduces the amount of time people are able
to spend on other activities. Distinguishing between working on school days and
during summer vacation, Oettinger (1999) confirms a crowding out effect of teenage
employment. While working during the preceding summer break does not have
any effects on the grade point average (gpa), working on school days initially has
a small positive effect on high school performance that becomes negative if the
weekly working hours exceed a critical value. Lillydahl (1990), McNeal (1995),
Ruhm (1997), and DeSimone (2006) support the inverted U-shaped relationship
between work intensity and various measures of high school performance.
While the channel of the negative effect is conceptually straightforward, the channel
of the positive effect of working a moderate amount of time during adolescence on
educational attainment and earnings in adulthood is less clear. This article sheds
more light on this topic by elaborating the influence of adolescent employment on
character skills which are confirmed by the existing literature having a positive
effect on educational attainment and various labor market outcomes. I assume that
working a moderate amount of time during adolescence fosters a broad range of
important skills such as responsibility, self-efficacy and good work ethic. Further,
I assume that adolescent employment reduces the uncertainty about the world of
work, helps adolescents to recognize their talents and interests, makes them more
independent of their parents, and may signalize future employers their preference to
work and their willingness to reduce their engagement in other leisure activities.
Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, and Masterov (2006) and Cunha, Heckman, and Schen-
nach (2010) present a multistage model of the evolution of cognitive and character
skills of children with a focus on parental investments. Their findings suggest that
especially for the formation of cognitive skills early investments made by parents
matter and that an adverse endowment of cognitive abilities at an early stage of life
cannot be easily compensated by later parents’ investments. Del Boca, Monfardini,
and Nicoletti (2012) confirm empirically this pattern for maternal investments. Us-
ing the amount of time mothers’ spent actively with their children during childhood
and adolescence as a proxy for maternal investments, they find that investments
during childhood are more effective for the formation of children’s cognitive abilities
than during adolescence. In addition to maternal investments, they consider chil-
dren’s own investments measured by the amount of time invested in activities which
are assumed to be beneficial for the formation of cognitive abilities such as doing
homework, reading, and performing arts or sports. While maternal investments be-
come less relevant with increasing age of children, children’s own investments grow in
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importance for the formation of cognitive skills. This pattern, however, can also be
driven by character skills. Besides cognitive skills also non-cognitive abilities can be
affected by leisure activities. Achievement test results used as measures of cognitive
abilities do not only cover cognitive but also some character skills (Borghans, Duck-
worth, Heckman, & ter Weel, 2008 and Borghans, Goldsteyn, Heckman, & Meijers,
2009). Further, Cunha et al. (2006, 2010) find that the formation of character skills
is more malleable and not entirely concluded by the time children enter adolescence
than in comparison to cognitive skills.
The newer neuroscientific research shows that character skills are reflected in the
brain’s functional architecture and have therefore also a biological basis. Schmidtke
and Heller (2004) document that neuroticism, a measure of emotional instability,
is related with increasing activity in the right posterior hemisphere. DeYoung et
al.(2010) examine the relationship between the Big Five personality traits, five di-
mensions used to describe human personality, and the volume of different brain
regions. While agreeableness varies with the volume of brain regions that process
information about the intention and mental states of other individuals, conscien-
tiousness is related to the volume of regions which are involved in planning and the
voluntary control of behavior. As mentioned in Blakemore and Choudhoury (2006),
adolescence represents a period of synaptic reorganizations and is therefore a period
in which the brain is more sensitive to input. Teenage employment, as an exam-
ple of input that may affect the development of the brain could then, through this
biological channel, influence the development of character skills.
A growing body of research suggests that character skills predict economic success
in later life, even after controlling for cognitive abilities. Heckman and Rubinstein
(2001) and Heckman, Humphries, and Kautz (2014) show that although high school
dropouts who pass the GED are smarter than other dropouts and broadly as smart
as high school graduates without any college experience, especially males do not
experience any wage premium in comparison to dropouts.3 Therefore, the GED can
be interpreted as a signal of deficits in character skills that led them drop out of
high school and lead to adverse labor market outcomes of male GED graduates.
In the Western world the employment of adolescents is legally regulated. In Ger-
many the legal situation to what extent school-aged children are allowed to work
is governed by the Youth Employment Protection Act (Jugendarbeitsschutzgesetz,
JArbSchG). In general, it is forbidden by law to employ school students younger
3The GED (General Educational Development) is a battery of achievement tests for high school
dropouts giving them the opportunity to earn a high school equivalency diploma.
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than 13 years of age. From age 13 onwards, however, part-time employment is al-
lowed subject to some restrictions. 13- and 14-year-old minors may work up to two
hours on school days but not during school hours and not after 6 pm. Further,
only physically modest jobs such as baby-sitting, tutoring, and brochure delivery
are allowed. At age 15 and older working time on school days is extended to 8 pm.
Summer jobs as further employment opportunities are henceforth allowed, but only
if they do not exceed 20 full-time employment days per year. After reaching age
18 school students do not face any restrictions concerning working on school days.
During school vacations, however, working is still restricted for them to 50 full-time
employment days per year. Depending on the type of occupation, many exceptions
from these general legal rules exist.
I make use of two different data sets, the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)
provided by the DIW and the Time Budget Survey (TBS) provided by the Fed-
eral Statistical Office. SOEP is an annual household panel survey covering more
than 11,000 households and is representative for Germany. It includes detailed in-
formation on family background, involvement in different leisure activities, school
performance, future education and career plans as well as various measures of char-
acter skills. The TBS covers the years 2001/02 and has detailed information on
time use measured in five and ten minute intervals, respectively. Additionally, it
provides information on family background, which part-time job adolescents do and
how much time per week they spend working. For the analysis both samples are
restricted to youths who attended a secondary school in the year in which they
completed the questionnaire.
Assuming that the acquisition of character skills is a cumulative process, depending
on past and contemporaneous inputs as well as on the innate skill endowment, I
use Todd and Wolpin’s (2003) cumulative model specification. I employ a flexible
strategy combining propensity score matching and regression techniques to account
for self-selection into teenage employment.
My main findings are as follows. First, I find a positive selection into teenage em-
ployment. Adolescents who work part-time during full-time schooling have on aver-
age higher-educated parents and live in financially well-endowed households. Their
parents were less non-employed and more likely to be self-employed in the past
in comparison to parents of adolescents who never worked while attending school.
Teenagers with a migration background or who live in regions with high unemploy-
ment rates are less likely to hold jobs. On average, adolescents who work start with
their first part-time job at age 14. While supplementing pocket money is the leading
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reason for taking the first job for both male and female adolescents, young women
are more likely to start their first job because the work interest them. Comparing
the type of job adolescents hold, between male and female adolescents differences
exist. About 60% of male adolescents hold a delivery job. While young women
also favor delivery jobs, in the female sample there is a more heterogeneous pattern.
In addition to delivery jobs, service and care jobs are further frequently mentioned
types of jobs female adolescents hold. The effect of working part-time after school on
time invested in other activities is ambivalent. It reduces time spent with academic
learning, an activity assumed to be academically productive, especially for young
women on weekdays, and it reduces significantly screen time, an activity assumed
to be academically unproductive.
The estimation results imply that holding a paid job while still in school reduces the
uncertainty about own interests and talents and reduces the dependency on parents.
Especially for female teenagers this result is noticeable. Further, it has beneficial
effects on the internal locus of control, a character skill that is correlated with self-
esteem. These results are robust across several model specifications and varying
samples and robust to including family-fixed effects.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data
and the analysis sample. Section 3 lays out the econometric approach and gives
detailed account of the propensity score model. The empirical results are presented
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains the tables and figures.
3.2 Data and Analysis Sample
I make use of two data sets to analyze the effect of working part-time while in full-
time education on character skills and occupational choice strategies. The first data
set I use is the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) that is a representative
annual household panel covering more than 11,000 households in Germany.4 In
addition to the standard household and person questionnaire, the SOEP conducts
since 2000 a specific youth biography questionnaire targeting all youths turning 17
in the corresponding year.5 It includes detailed information on family background
and childhood, involvement in different leisure activities, school performance, future
education and career plans as well as attitudes about different topics. Further, I
4I use the data distribution 1984-2012, http://dx.doi.org/10.5684/soep.v29. See Wagner
et al. (2007), Wagner et al. (2008) and Schupp (2009) for further information.
5In 2001, 18- and 19-year-old first time respondents were also considered in the questionnaire.
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add past parental questionnaires to construct further variables describing the family
background such as parental earning and employment history. The final sample
is restricted to youths who attend a secondary school in the year in which they
complete the questionnaire.6 All adolescents who have had a part-time job during
secondary school are defined as treated.
Table 3.1 in the Appendix shows the sample size and the number of teenagers in the
treatment and control group in the SOEP sample separated by gender. Table 3.2
provides information on the age at which they started to work and why they decided
to work. In both samples about 38.5% of teenagers have had at least one job dur-
ing full-time schooling. On average, male teenagers were nearly two months older
than female teenagers when they started their first part-time job. Most teenagers
started to work to supplement their pocket money. 84.7% (80.3%) of male (female)
adolescents who have ever had a job did their first job to become at least partially
financially independent from their parents. Nevertheless, teens find value in em-
ployment far beyond financial necessity, especially young women. 15.7% (11.8%) of
female (male) teenagers mention interest as main reason. The difference of 3.9%-
points is significant at the 10% significance level.
Despite the wealth of valuable information, the SOEP lacks detailed information on
in-school work experience. It neither provides information on the type of job adoles-
cents hold nor, as a consequence thereof, information on job characteristics. Previous
research suggests that the type of job and its intensity may matter. Rauscher et al.
(2013) study how beneficial a part-time job for the human capital accumulation of
adolescents can be and find that not only the activity of work but also the quality
of work matters. Thus, if jobs for teenagers differ in their characteristics such as
the variety of required skills or the degree of autonomy, the effect of adolescent em-
ployment on character skills is likely to depend on the type of job. Greenberger and
Steinberg (1986) discuss the importance of meaningful jobs for teenagers in more
detail.
The Time Budget Survey (TBS), in contrast, provides more detailed information on
adolescent employment. The TBS is a representative survey provided by the Federal
Statistical Office conducted in 1991/92 and 2001/02.7 For the analysis I concentrate
on wave 2001/02 to get a sample that is more comparable to the SOEP sample. For
the analysis the TBS sample is restricted to teenagers aged between 13 and 18 who
6Secondary school includes Hauptschule, Realschule, Gymnasium, and Gesamtschule.
7See https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/SocietyState/
IncomeConsumptionLivingConditions/TimeUse/Current_Information_ZBE.html for more
information.
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attend secondary school in the year in which the survey was conducted. It provides
information on work intensity measured by the number of hours worked per week
and the type of job.8 Due to different questions, the treatment definition in the TBS
sample differs somewhat from the treatment definition in the SOEP sample. In the
TBS all adolescents who have a paid job at the time of the survey are counted as
treated.
Besides the quality of work, the effect of working part-time while in full-time ed-
ucation may also be at least partially driven by an employment-induced reduction
or increase in time adolescents spend with other, for the development of skills rele-
vant, leisure activities. In this case, it would be useful to know how working after
school affects the amount of time that is spent with other leisure activities. While
the SOEP offers only a crude measure of the intensity of various leisure activities,
the TBS provides detailed information on how time is allocated to more than 200
kinds of activities of all household members aged ten and older on three days, two
weekdays and one weekend day, measured in 10 minute intervals.9,10
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the sample size, the share of employed adolescents and the
type of job they have. Overall, 25% of male and 21.4% of female adolescents are em-
ployed during full-time schooling. For both males and females, delivery jobs are the
most common type of job. Among employed male teenagers 57.5% hold a delivery
job while any other category is mentioned by less than 7%. A more heterogeneous
picture with respect to the type of job emerges for female adolescents. Although
delivery jobs are also the most frequent type of job (21.1%), other jobs such as
waitressing (15.6%), babysitting (14.3%), and tutoring (12.2%) are also mentioned
frequently. These patterns are in line with existing research. Kooreman (2009) con-
firms a gender-specific occupational segregation for adolescents. Using a sample of
Dutch school students, he finds that the selection in a particular part-time job de-
pends strongly on students’ gender. Despite equal education, female students tend
to work in lower-paying occupations such as baby-sitting or working in a supermar-
ket while male students choose better-paid jobs such as delivering newspapers. In
addition, panel (b) of table 3.4 shows the number of hours adolescents work per week.
While male teenagers work 4.24 hours per week on average, females work 4.87 hours
per week. The evidence so far supports the implementation of a gender-specific anal-
8Information on the type of job is captured by the StaBuA 1992 Job Classification at the two
digit level. For each two digit category I take the most likely job (type), listed on the four digit
level, teenagers can do and present it in table 3.4.
9The SOEP measures the frequency of leisure activities by the categories daily, weekly, monthly,
less often, and seldom
10See Ehling, Holz, and Kahle (2001) for further information on the TBS wave 2001/02.
123
ysis to control indirectly for heterogeneous job effects assuming that within gender
occupation characteristics are more homogeneous than between gender.
3.3 Analytic Framework
3.3.1 Conceptual Background
For estimating the production function of character skills, I assume that adolescents’
competencies are an outcome of a cumulative process of skill acquisition. Past
and contemporaneous inputs in combination with adolescents’ individual genetic
endowment are assumed as determinants of the production process.11
The production function is given by:
Yij = f(Xij, Tij, µ
f
j , µ
c
ij)
where Yij is character skill Y of adolescent i in family j measured at age 17. Yij
is explained by Xij, a vector that includes inputs by the family, school and the
adolescent himself and assumed to be relevant for the development of character
skills and Tij, a dummy variable indicating whether an adolescent works during full-
time schooling.12 The adolescent’s individual pretreatment skill endowment consists
of a family-specific part µfj that is constant across siblings and a child-specific part
µcij. Both are not observed by the researcher. Estimating the contribution of teenage
employment on the development of skills, however, would lead to misleading results if
we do not consider the pretreatment endowment of character skills in the production
process. Because of the non-random nature of teenage employment, teenagers may
self-select into employment depending on their already existing abilities. Further,
the pretreatment skill endowment may have a direct effect on the acquisition of
further skills as well as on school and family inputs.
Because the actual pretreatment endowment is unobserved, I use variables which
are related to the unobserved pretreatment skill endowment as proxies. Due to
11Todd and Wolpin (2003) give a theoretical overview of modeling production functions for
abilities depending on various data limitations. While they concentrate on the specification of the
production function of cognitive skills, this chapter focuses on the production process of character
skills.
12To increase the sample size, I include Big Five personality traits and locus of control observed
in the person questionnaire at an older age if for each character skill no information is available
at age 17. Further, reciprocity is only observed at an older age. To control for different age when
character skills are measured, age dummy variables are included in the final analysis.
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the richness of information contained in the SOEP, I am able to use a bundle of
variables as proxies. Character skills of parents are the first proxies. Empirical
research documents a substantial intergenerational transmission of abilities. Black,
Devereux, and Salvanes (2009) for Norway and Bjo¨rklund, Eriksson, and Ja¨ntti
(2010) for Sweden find a positive relation in cognitive abilities of parents and their
offspring. Using the SOEP, Anger and Heineck (2010) confirm the positive relation in
cognitive abilities of parents and their offspring even after controlling for educational
attainment and family background.13 These results stress the importance of parental
investment for the accumulation of cognitive abilities of children. A growing body of
research extends the analysis to character skills and confirms their intergenerational
transmission, however at a lower level.14
Further proxies for the pretreatment skill endowment are birth order, the school
recommendation at the end of grade four given by the class teacher, and whether
adolescents grew up with both parents. Price (2008) and Black, Devereux, and
Salvanes (2009) show that birth order affects children’s cognitive skills negatively.
Later-born children tend to exhibit lower cognitive abilities than their older siblings.
Black et al. challenge the hypothesis that biological factors play a role in explaining
skill deficits since later-born siblings have on average better birth characteristics.
However, first- and later-born children experience a different childhood. First, first-
borns may benefit from having the exclusive attention of their parents. Second,
parents may not be able to invest the same amount of time in later-born children
as they invested in firstborns at the same age. Third, firstborns may benefit from
having younger siblings to teach and being responsible for them. On the other side,
children’s development of character skills may benefit from interactions with older
siblings (Dai and Heckman, 2013). Lehmann, Nuevo-Chiquero, and Vidal-Ferna´ndez
(2013) and Buckles and Kolka (2014) find that mother’s early investment decreases
with birth order. Lehmann et al. notice that not only cognitive but also charac-
ter skills are affected by birth order such as a lower self-reported sense of general
self-worth and self-competence at age 8.
School recommendation at the end of grade four given by the class teacher, as a
further proxy, depends in most federal states on the school performance in the basic
13They extend the analysis by distinguishing between cognitive skills based on past learning and
cognitive skills which are related to innate abilities. Using scores of a verbal fluency test as a proxy
of crystallized intelligence which is related to knowledge and skills acquired in the past and scores
of a cognitive speed test as a proxy of fluid intelligence which is related to innate abilities, they
find a stronger transmission of cognitive skills based on past learning.
14See Anger (2012), Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2009) and Gro¨nqvist, Ockert, and
Vlachos (2010).
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subjects math, German and a third subject as well as on the child’s learning behav-
ior and work attitude.15 Academic performance depends not only on cognitive but
also on character skills. Blickle (1996) points out the importance of Big Five’s con-
scientiousness and openness to experience for successful learning strategies. John,
Caspi, Robins, Moffitt, and Stouthamer-Loeber (1994) find positive correlations be-
tween character skills and teachers’ report of adolescents’ academic performance.
Heaven, Mak, Barry, and Ciarrochi (2002) pay attention to adolescents’ personality
and their attitudes to school finding high values of conscientiousness and introversion
as significant predictors of school attitudes. Comparing the school recommendation
given by the class teacher and the school preference of parents across different social
classes, Dombrowski and Solga (2009) conclude that children with the same read-
ing competencies and basic cognitive skills, an indicator for learning potentials, but
with higher educated parents are more likely to attend the academic school track16
than children from lower social classes with less educated parents. They suggest
that inequalities in the family’s cultural capital, human capital that is related to
attitudes and knowledge needed to succeed in the current educational system, will
not be compensated in the elementary school and become more important in the
explanation of the acquisition of further competencies. Thus, the given school rec-
ommendation is a good proxy for the endowment of cognitive and character skills in
the pretreatment period.
The fourth and last proxy of the pretreatment endowment of character skills is
family structure during childhood. Possible reasons for a positive effect of living
together as married couple on children’s character are a lower probability of living
with economic hardship, more family routines and father involvement as well as
less maternal psychological distress and parenting stress than in comparison to their
single counterparts. Bachman, Coley, and Carrano (2012) find for adolescents in
low-income families with two parents a better emotional and behavioral function-
ing, measured by mother’s report on children’s behavior problems such as anxiety,
depression, aggression, and rule breaking actions, than for adolescents living with a
single parent. Carlson and Corcoran (2001) confirm these results. However, after
including measures on maternal mental health and family income, family structure
becomes insignificant in the explanation of behavioral problems of children.
15In Germany the school recommendation given by the class teacher is not in each federal state
mandatory anymore. Nonetheless most parents are guided by the teacher’s recommendation in
transferring their child to one of the different secondary school types. See Stubbe, Bos, and Euen
(2012) for a detailed discussion.
16The academic school track, Gymnasium, lasts until grade twelve or 13 and prepares for uni-
versity entry.
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As a sensitivity test I include family fixed effects to control for omitted variables
that are constant within a family.
3.3.2 Econometric Approach
To estimate the effect of working part-time while attending secondary school on a set
of character skills and occupational choice strategies, I apply the potential outcome
approach (Neyman, 1923; Roy, 1951; Rubin, 1974). The treatment effect for each
individual i is defined as
∆i = Y
1
i − Y 0i ,
where Y 1i is the potential outcome if individual i is treated and Y
0
i if not. For each
individual i the observed outcome is given by:
Yi = Y
1
i · Ti + Y 0i · (1− Ti)
= Y 0i + Ti · (Y 1i − Y 0i ) ,
where the expression in parentheses in the second line corresponds to the individual-
level treatment effect. Because either Y 0i or Y
1
i can be observed, individual-level
treatment effects cannot be identified. Therefore, the interest lies in identifying the
population average treatment effect on the treated ∆T ,
∆T = E[Y
1 − Y 0|T = 1] = E[Y 1|T = 1]− E[Y 0|T = 1].
In experiments in which treatments are randomly assigned and treated and non-
treated individuals do not differ systematically in (un-)observed characteristics, the
average potential non-treatment outcome of the treated E[Y 0|T = 1] can be replaced
by the observed average non-treatment outcome of the non-treated E[Y 0|T = 0] and
treatment effects can easily be estimated by calculating the mean difference in the
outcome of interest between treatment and non-treatment/control group. In obser-
vational studies, however, the assumption of a random treatment assignment cannot
be maintained anymore. Treated and non-treated individuals may differ in charac-
teristics which simultaneously affect the treatment assignment and the potential
outcomes. Thus, individuals in both groups would differ in their outcomes even
in the absence of a treatment and calculating the treatment effect as the differ-
ence in means of the observed outcomes would then lead to biased results. Under
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the conditional independence assumption (CIA) however, treatment assignment and
potential outcomes become independent after conditioning on all covariates that in-
fluence simultaneously the assignment into treatment and potential outcomes. For
the analysis I use conditional mean independence as a weaker assumption that can
be formulated as follows:
E[Y j|Z, T = 1] = E[Y j|Z, T = 0] = E[Y j|Z] , j ∈ {0, 1} ;
with Z including for the development of character skills relevant inputs by the family,
school and the adolescents himself as well as proxies for the pretreatment endowment
of character skills that affect the potential outcome Y j and treatment status T . The
overlap assumption, as second assumption, is defined as
0 < Pr(T = 1|Z) < 1
with Pr(T=1|Z) as the probability of treatment assignment given Z. This assump-
tion ensures that there is a sufficient overlap in the characteristics of treated and
non-treated individuals to find adequate matches.
Finally I assume that potential outcomes are independent of the treatment status
of other individuals, ruling out general equilibrium effects.
3.3.3 Specification of Propensity Scores and Balancing
Tests
The propensity score is estimated separately by gender. For each propensity score
model I use two strategies to optimize the model specification. On the one hand,
to increase the common support region, I make the propensity score distribution
of treated and non-treated individuals as similar as possible. For instance, I com-
pare individuals with a given treatment status and extreme values of the propensity
score with individuals with the opposite treatment status and slightly less extreme
propensity score values. Then, for this sub-sample, I identify all covariates in the
propensity score model in which treated and non-treated individuals differ signifi-
cantly. If these covariates are highly insignificant in the explanation of the treatment
assignment, I omit them. This procedure makes the propensity score distribution of
treated and non-treated adolescents more similar without deleting relevant covari-
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ates.17 As elaborated in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) in nonrandomized experi-
ments a direct comparison of an outcome variable between treated and non-treated
individuals would lead to misleading results because both treatment groups may dif-
fer systematically in their characteristics. These systematic differences could then
lead to differences in the outcome variable even in the absence of the treatment.
The balancing property of the propensity score states that
E[Z|T,Pr(Z)] = E[Z|Pr(Z)]
Given the propensity score Pr(Z), observed characteristics Z are independent of the
assignment into treatment. To test a weaker version of the balancing condition, I use
a balancing test suggested by Smith and Todd (2005) that tests that on average both
treated and non-treated individuals do not differ in their observed characteristics.
For each propensity score covariate, I estimate the following regression:
Zk = γ0 + γ1 P̂r(Z) + γ2 P̂r(Z)
2 + γ3 P̂r(Z)
3 + γ4 P̂r(Z)
4 + γ5T + γ6T P̂r(Z)
+γ7T P̂r(Z)
2 + γ8T P̂r(Z)
3 + γ9T P̂r(Z)
4 + ν,
with Zk as the k-th covariate of the propensity score model, P̂r(Z) as the propensity
score estimated with covariates Z, T as a dummy variable indicating the treatment
status, and ν as an idiosyncratic error term. Regressing each propensity score covari-
ate Zk on polynomials of the propensity score up to the fourth degree, the treatment
dummy, and interactions between treatment dummy and the before-mentioned poly-
nomials, I test whether all coefficients of covariates in which the treatment dummy is
included are jointly significant. If yes, then even after conditioning on the propensity
score, the treatment status predicts values of the covariate and indicates an unsuc-
cessful balancing of the covariate. If a covariate does not satisfy the Smith/Todd
balancing test, I either drop it if this covariate is highly insignificant in the propen-
sity score model or I modify it to fulfill the balancing test criterion if the covariate
has a significant effect on treatment assignment.18
All variables in Z that are used to explain the probability of working while attending
full-time schooling and are assumed to be relevant for the acquisition of character
17I only remove covariates if the p-value of their coefficients in the estimated propensity score
model is larger than 0.3.
18In the latter case, I create interaction terms between the covariate and a further covariate.
The motivation of this procedure is to control successfully for heterogeneous influences of the
corresponding covariate on the probability of being treated that otherwise would lead to a rejection
of the Smith/Todd test if not considered.
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skills can be categorized into five groups. The first group of covariates includes
parents’ characteristics such as their educational attainment and past earnings as
well as their employment history and age. Further, parents’ character skills measured
by Big Five personality traits, locus of control and their reciprocal behavior are
included. The second group of covariates consists of variables that measure the
quality of the parent-child relationship reported by adolescents such as whether
adolescents argue or fight with parents on a regular basis, how important parents
are, and how often various situations occur which are summarized into a factor that
explains the quality of supportive parenting. The third group of covariates includes
children’s characteristics, for instance their migration background, quarter of birth,
birth order, the school recommendation at the end of the fourth grade given by the
class teacher, and the frequency of performing various leisure activities measured
at age 17. Regional characteristics such as place of childhood, past unemployment
rates, and the accessibility of various amenities in the neighborhood are categorized
into the fourth group of covariates. The fifth group consists of annual dummies.
Table 3.5 gives an overview on some balancing tests and key figures of the propensity
score models. For about 95% of all covariates in a given propensity score specification
the Smith/Todd-test fails to reject at the 10% significance level, see panel (a). A
test for equality of means for each covariate between treatment and control group
shows a perfect balancing of means after matching, see panel (b). Panel (d) shows
the share of observations within the common support regions that is defined as the
region between the smallest estimated propensity score of the treated sample and the
largest estimated propensity score of the non-treated sample. Observations outside
of the common support region are excluded from further analysis. Table 3.6 shows
results of Hotelling T 2 tests of the joint null hypothesis of equal means between
treatment and non-treatment group of all of the variables included in the before
mentioned covariate groups. In sum, after matching I find a perfect balancing of
means between treatment and comparison group within each covariate category.
The SOEP offers a richness of information to approximate relevant factors which
influence both treatment assignment and outcomes of interest. Further, various
balancing tests conducted before and after matching show that both treatment and
non-treatment group are balanced in observed characteristics. Both encourage the
plausibility of the non-testable conditional mean independence assumption.
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3.3.4 Estimation of Treatment Effects
The estimation follows Fuchs and Osikominu (2015) and proceeds in two steps. First,
I estimate for male and female adolescents propensity scores separately. I implement
matching on propensity scores and calculate matching weights as follows using the
example of the average treatment effect on treated, ∆T .
19 The sample consists of
nT treated and nU non-treated adolescents.
Using propensity score matching, for each treated adolescent a comparable “statis-
tical twin” is calculated as weighted average over all non-treated adolescents. Using
a Gaussian kernel, each non-treated adolescent j receives weight wlj depending on
his similarity to treated adolescent l with respect to the estimated propensity score.
wlj =
K[P̂r(Zj)− P̂r(Zl)]
nU∑
j=1
K[P̂r(Zj)− P̂r(Zl)]
withK denoting the Gaussian Kernel, P̂r(Zj) and P̂r(Zl) as the estimated propensity
score of non-treated adolescent j and treated adolescent l, respectively.20 Because
all observations in the analysis are in addition weighted by survey weights v offered
by SOEP, the sum of the weights over all non-treated individuals used to generate a
“statistical twin” for treated individual l does not equal to one but equals the survey
weight of treated individual l,
nU∑
j
wlj = vl. This procedure is repeated for each
treated adolescent. Thus, for each non-treated adolescent I get as many weights
as treated adolescents exist and sum then, at the end, up. More formally, each
observation is weighted as follows for the estimation of ∆T .
gj =
nT∑
l
wlj,
where gj is the matching weight for non-treated adolescent j and
gl = vl
19Potential outcomes are estimated by a local constant and a local linear Gaussian kernel re-
gression. Treatment effects presented in this chapter are based on matching weights of the local
constant weighted regression due to slightly better balancing test results.
20Instead of the conditional probability I use an index function to avoid compressions near zero
and one.
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where gl denotes the matching weight for treated adolescent l that is equal to his
survey weight.21
In a second step, I run for each outcome variable an ordinary least squares regression
in which individuals are weighted by the before-mentioned weights g. For ∆T , for
instance, we have the following minimization problem
min
{βˆ0,βˆT ,γˆ,δˆ}
n∑
i
gi
[
Yi − βˆ0 − βˆT Ti −
∑
k
{
γˆk Zik − δˆk Ti(Zik − ZkT )
}]2
,
where i = 1, 2, . . . n indexes observations, βT corresponds to the treatment effect of
interest, here ∆T , ZkT identifies the average of Zk over the treated subsample, and
gi represents the matching weight of individual i.
22
The combination of propensity score matching and regression techniques is known as
doubly robust estimation and has several advantages. First, because propensity score
outliers get smaller weights, this method avoids comparisons based on extrapolations
not supported by the data. Second, the estimated treatment effects are consistent
if at least one of both propensity score and outcome regression model is correctly
specified (Robins and Ritov, 1997 and Imbens, 2004). Therefore, the estimated
treatment effect is robust to misspecifications of one of both models.
I obtain standard errors and confidence bands for the estimated treatment effects
through bootstrapping based on 500 resamples. I resample families to account for
correlation across siblings. In each resample, I recomputed the propensity score
using a draw from the asymptotic distribution of the coefficients in the propensity
score model. This allows me to take account of the estimation error in the propensity
score.
21The procedure to calculate weights for estimating the average treatment effect on untreated,
∆U , is identical, however, treated adolescents are used to create statistical twins for each non-
treated adolescent. The final matching weights are gl =
nU∑
j
wlj and gj = vj for treated and
non-treated adolescents, respectively.
22The analogous procedure is conducted to estimate ∆U , the average treatment effect on the
untreated.
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3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.7 in the Appendix shows a positive selection into teenage employment in the
SOEP sample. For both gender, adolescents who work part-time during full-time
schooling have on average higher-educated parents. 27.5% of employed male and
28.8% of employed female teenagers have at least one parent with a general qual-
ification for university entrance (Abitur). For teenagers who never had a job the
percentage of educated parents is significantly smaller.23 In addition to their higher
education, parents of employed male and female adolescents earn on average e 2,500
per year more than parents of teenagers with no work experience.24 Further, parents
of employed teenagers were less non-employed and more likely to be self-employed in
the past.25 Beside economic factors, parents of employed and non-employed adoles-
cents differ also in their personality. Especially in measures of trust and past trusting
behavior, parents of school students with work experience show a significantly higher
tendency to trust others.26 Not only their parents, but also teenagers differ with
respect to their characteristics. For both male and female adolescents, employed
teens are more likely to have a teacher’s recommendation given at the end of grade
four to continue on the academically oriented school track and they are more likely
to attend this school track at age 17. Further, they are less likely migrants and
more engaged in their leisure time at age 17. For instance, employed teenagers are
more likely to do sports on a daily basis and they have been more active in formal
extracurricular activities. 46.3% of male and 53.8% of female school students who
have a job are active as class or student body president or are involved in the school
newspaper. In the sample of non-employed teenagers the fraction of students who
23With the exception of parents’ tertiary education – a dummy variable that takes on the value
one if at least one parent has a university degree – of male teenagers where no significant difference
can be found.
24The variable Parental Earnings is the average of past annual earnings up to ten years. In
the final analysis I include not only the mean but also the standard deviation to control for past
income fluctuations.
25For father’s past self-employment status, however, the pattern is less clear. The parents’
employment status variables show the percentage of years parents were self- or non-employed,
respectively.
26Both measures of trust are standardized variables created by a factor analysis using three
items for each trust variable. While general trust measures the individual expectation of the
trustworthiness of other people, past trusting behavior is an indicator of how intensive one has
supported and cooperated with friends. See Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter (2000)
and Naef and Schupp (2009) for a more detailed discussion of trust measured by surveys and
experiments.
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performs such activities is significantly smaller. Besides these rather formal types of
additional school activities, adolescents who work part-time are more active in less
formal types of extracurricular activities. 66.6% (75.6%) of male (female) employed
adolescents are involved in school theater or dance groups, and school orchestra or
sports groups at school. Again, for non-employed adolescents the fraction is signif-
icantly smaller. Besides family and individual characteristics, regional conditions
can also affect the employment status of teenagers. For both males and females, I
find significantly higher unemployment rates in regions in which teenagers who have
never worked live.27 In addition, teenagers with no work experience are more likely
to live in East Germany and they rather grew in large cities.
A similar pattern can be found in the TBS sample. Table 3.8 shows that parents
of employed adolescents are on average higher educated and more likely to be self-
employed. Further, adolescents with work experience are more likely to live in
financially well-off households. They are on average 1 to 1.6 years older than their
non-employed counterparts, more likely to attend an academically oriented school
track and less likely to live in East Germany.
In sum, adolescents who have a job during full-time schooling have a more advan-
taged family background. Their parents are higher educated and earn more, they
invest more time with meaningful leisure activities, and they are more likely to live
in economically strong regions. A first interpretation of these findings is, that adoles-
cents work besides full-time schooling not because the households in which they live
are under economic pressure and in need for further sources of income, but rather
to supplement their pocket money and/or of personal interest in the job.
The existing literature suggests a positive selection into early employment. Youths
from families with low socio-economic status (SES) face disadvantages in finding
suitable jobs while attending full-time schooling. Because of the relationship between
ethnicity and SES, the US literature identifies significant ethnicity differences in
adolescents’ high school employment status. Hirschman and Voloshin (2007) find
that black high school students face disadvantages in finding suitable jobs. Either
they do not hold a job or the job is time-consuming and affects negatively the
academic learning time and grades. In addition, black students are less likely to
perform white-collar work. Instead, if they hold a job, they have low-paid blue-collar
jobs which offer in most cases a lower quality of human capital input compared to
white-collar jobs. The authors conclude that social networks, spatial mismatch, and
27The local unemployment rate is measured at the level of regional spatial planning units (Rau-
mordnungsregionen) which are aggregates of counties (Kreise). Overall, Germany consists of 96
Raumordnungsregionen.
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employer preferences may matter for this finding. Hotz, Xu, Tienda, and Ahituv
(2002) and Kalenkoski and Pabilonia (2012) confirm these ethnical differences in
student employment.
The TBS gives a detailed overview of the daily time allocation. For each respondent
time use on three days, two weekdays and one weekend day, is measured in ten
minute intervals. I summarized the initial 230 activity categories to 19 thematically
different groups. Tables 3.9 and 3.10 compare time allocation of teenagers with and
without a job on weekdays and weekend days, respectively.28 On a normal weekday,
see table 3.9, male (female) teenagers who hold a job spend 23.1 (40.4) minutes less
with sleeping than their non-employed counterparts. Further, employed adolescents
spend about 20 minutes less with media.29 In contrast, they spend more time in
transit and volunteer activities.30 On a normal weekend day, see table 3.10, employed
teenagers spend again significantly less time with sleeping, 26 minutes less for male
and 50.5 minutes less for female students. While the amount of time spend with
media does not differ between employed and non-employed teenagers on a weekend
day, employed teenagers spend on average ten minutes more with academic learning
and 15 to 20 minutes more with relaxing. In addition, females who work spend
significantly less time with sports.
In sum, employed and non-employed school students differ only in few activity cate-
gories. On each day, students who work sleep on average between 20 and 50 minutes
less. Further, they spend significantly less time with media and more time in transit
on weekdays. On weekends, they spend more time with academic learning and with
relaxing.
Tables 3.11 and 3.12 show how working part-time affects the time allocation of em-
ployed teenagers on weekdays and weekend days, respectively. On average, male
(female) school students work 162.7 (184.4) minutes on a working weekday, see ta-
ble 3.11. On working weekdays, male students spend 35 minutes less with peers, 40
minutes less with being idle, 20 minutes less with sports activities, and 45 minutes
28The definition of being employed while attending full-time schooling is not consistent with the
observed time use. Although some adolescents indicate that they do not hold a job, time allocated
to employment specific activities can be found in their time diaries. For instance, male adolescents
who negated the question, spent on average 13 minutes on a weekday with job specific activities.
These 13 minutes split to 4.3 minutes spend with an internship, 3.3 minutes spend with an unpaid
activity that is related to employment of other people, 2.2 minutes spend with own secondary
employment, 2 minutes spend with activities related to own main employment, 0.7 minutes spend
with breaks during working time, and 0.5 minutes spend with job search.
29The category Media Use includes activities such as watching TV and video, playing pc games,
chatting and surfing the internet.
30Transit time is the daily travelling time you spend by foot, driving cars or in public transport.
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less in front of a screen. Female students reduce significantly time spend with learn-
ing activities by 27 minutes, on housework by 35 minutes, on sports activities by
22 minutes, and in front of a screen by 32 minutes. Thus, working part-time while
in full-time education reduces the amount of time adolescents spend with activities
which are suggested to be harmful for the development of skills such as media use.
However, it also reduces time adolescents invest in activities which are suggested to
be beneficial such as academic learning and sports activities.31
On a weekend day, see table 3.12, male and female adolescents work on average 167.7
and 200.8 minutes, respectively. Irrespective of gender, work reduces substantially
sleeping time, especially of female adolescents, and time for relaxing. Further, it
reduces time spend in front of a screen by about 22 minutes for males and females.
In sum the effect of working part-time on time spend with other activities varies
by gender and depends on whether it is a week- or weekend day. On weekdays,
especially screen time and time spend with relaxing is reduced. Further, time spend
on homework is significantly reduced, however only for females. On a weekend
day, only a minor reduction of time spend on homework is detectable. In addition,
adolescents sleep significantly less on weekend days on which they work. Working
part-time has therefore a negative effect on activities which are suggested to be
harmful for the development of human capital as well as on activities which are
assumed to be beneficial for the development of skills.
3.4.2 Early Employment and Character Skills
Tables 3.13 to 3.15 show the sample means and treatment effects for behavioral
outcome variables. The behavioral variables, derived from a series of factor analyses,
are standardized to allow a comparison of effect sizes across outcomes. The results
for male and female adolescents are reported separately.
Table 3.13 shows estimated effects of teenage employment on both locus of control
factors.32 The psychological concept of locus of control can be attributed to Rotter
(1966) and measures the individuals’ perception of how much control over their life
31See Cardoso, Fontainha, and Monfardini (2010), Felfe, Lechner, and Steinmayr (2011), and
Del Boca et al. (2012) for a more detailed discussion about which leisure activities are related to
the acquisition of human capital and which activities are portrayed as harmful.
32Both factors are extracted by a factor analysis based on 10 items. The construction of both
factors is identical with Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2008). Further, both measures of
locus of control and all other outcome variables are standardized. The estimated coefficients,
therefore, can be interpreted as percentage change in terms of the outcome variable’s standard
deviation.
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they possess. While external-oriented individuals are convinced that events in their
life are results of luck and faith or other not controllable factors, internal-oriented
individuals believe that they can determine and affect events in their life by own
efforts and actions. Strauser, Ketz, and Keim (2002) find that people with a higher
internal locus of control tend to persevere through tough times and to pursue a goal
more successfully. Contrary to initial research, this chapter assumes a non-perfect
reverse connection between internal and external locus of control. Thus, I construct
two factors representing both underlying dimensions.
On average male, and female adolescents exhibit a similar external and internal lo-
cus of control, see column “Mean”. Comparing sample means of treated and control
units suggests that treated teenagers are less externally and more internally ori-
ented. Especially for male teenagers this pattern is obvious, see column “Raw Diff”.
Focusing on the treatment effect estimates, I do not find any significant effects of
teenage employment on the external locus of control. While male adolescents face
a small reduction in their external-oriented perception, for females an effect is less
detectable. The effect of teenage employment on the internal locus of control, in
contrast, is more substantial. Considering the ATE, employment during full-time
schooling leads to an 18% of a standard deviation increase in the internal-oriented
perception for male and a 14.7% increase for female adolescents. The effects are
statistically significant.
Locus of control has already been proven empirically as being a crucial determinant
of economic success. For instance, Coleman and DeLeire (2003), Cebi (2007), and
Ba´ron and Cobb-Clark (2010) find that a one standard deviation higher internal
locus of control leads to a 1.4%-4.6% higher probability of high school graduation,
partially, even after controlling for cognitive abilities.33 Further, Osborne-Groves
(2005), Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006), Cebi (2007), Flossmann, Piatek, and
Wichert (2007), Judge and Hurst (2007), and Drago (2011) find significant effects
on earnings in later life.34 Osborne-Groves, for instance, find that a one standard
deviation higher internal locus of control increases hourly wage by 5%-7%, after
controlling for cognitive abilities.
As mentioned in Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz (2011) locus of control,
self-esteem, and Big Five’s emotional stability measure a common construct termed
33The significance of the effect of internal locus of control on educational attainment, however,
change differently after including proxies for cognitive abilities. While Cebi find no significant
effects anymore, Coleman and DeLeire identify significant effects only after including these proxies.
34Instead of locus of control, Drago observes the relationship between earnings and self-esteem,
a personality trait that is positively related to internal locus of control.
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“core self-evaluations”. They argue that a positive self-evaluation indicates in general
a positive and proactive view of oneself and the relationship to the world. My
findings indicate that working while attending full-time schooling affects positively
the internal part of locus of control. However, to go one step further, I include Big
Five personality traits in my analysis to study how they are affected by an early
employment.
The objective of the Big Five model is to capture the basic structure of an indi-
vidual’s personality. Costa and McCrae (1985) and McCrae and Costa Jr. (1987)
verify that the basic dimensions of personality can be represented by five latent fac-
tors, namely extraversion, conscientiousness, openness (sometimes termed as intel-
lect), agreeableness, and neuroticism. Extroverted people tend to be communicative
and sociable while conscientious people are industrious and tend to work efficiently.
Openness measures the individual’s valuation of artistic experiences and whether
they possess an active imagination. Agreeable people tend to treat other people
kindly and with respect and have a forgiving nature while people with neurotic ten-
dencies are emotionally less stable. For instance, they get nervous easily and are
less able to handle stressful moments. Table 3.14 gives an overview of the results.35
Female adolescents are on average more extraverted, more conscientious, more open
to new experiences, more agreeable but less emotionally stable than males. The
effect of working after school differs between male and female teenagers. While male
teenagers become more extraverted by working during full-time schooling, females
experience only a slight and insignificant increase. Regarding the ATE, extraversion
of young men is increased by 21.1% and of young women by 10.1% of a standard
deviation. Panel (b) and (d) show that in-school work experience does not shape
conscientiousness and agreeableness considerably. While males suffer a reduction of
8.6% in conscientiousness, females experience an increase of 6.3%. The estimated
effects on agreeableness are similar. Panel (c) shows that especially openness of
young women is affected by teenage employment while male teenagers experience
only a minor positive effect. The effect on neuroticism, see panel (e), is especially
for male teenagers in line with results for the internal locus of control. As already
mentioned, the internal locus of control and the Big Five’s emotional stability are
positively correlated and indicates a construct termed “core-self-evaluations”. For
male teenagers I find a significant reduction in emotional instability of 14.7% of a
standard deviation, for females an insignificant increase of 9.9%. Thus, especially
for young men I find a meaningful and positive effect of teenage employment on two
35In the German SOEP a short 15-item version of the Big Five Inventory was assessed. The Big
Five personality traits are extracted by a factor analysis and enter the model standardized.
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indicators of individual’s core self-evaluation that signalizes a positive and proactive
view of oneself and the relationship to the world.36
What are the economic implications of these results? Salgado (1997), Hogan and
Holand (2003), De Graaf and van Eijck (2004), and Nyhus and Pons (2005) find
empirical relevance of Big Five measures for economic success. Especially conscien-
tiousness, emotional stability, and openness are confirmed to be consistent predictors
of educational and labor market success. However, their findings vary by gender.
For instance, Nyhus and Pons find that a one standard deviation increase in emo-
tional stability is related to a 8.5% higher hourly wage for women and a 0.2% higher
hourly wage for men. De Graaf and van Eijck show that especially men profit from
higher levels of openness with respect to educational attainment while women rather
benefit from being more emotionally stable.37
Table 3.15 shows the effect of teenage employment on reciprocal behaviors.38 Reci-
procity describes how people react to kind and positive or impolite and negative
interpersonal behavior of other people. While negative reciprocity corresponds to
the willingness to punish uncooperative behavior of other people, a positive recipro-
cal behavior is related to rewarding cooperative and kind behavior. Gouldner (1960),
as the classical reference, elaborates the meaning of reciprocity for the stability of
social systems. Perugini, Gallucci, Presaghi, and Ercolani (2003) develop a further
measure that, in addition to reciprocal behavior, identifies the belief in reciprocity
defined as “Beliefs in the efficacy and widespread use of reciprocity-based behaviors
and expectations of other’s reciprocal behaviour (...) important (...) in predicting
reciprocating behaviours ...”(Perugini et al., 2003, p.254). They find that recipro-
cal behavior is more pronounced the stronger the belief in its efficacy is. Further,
they confirm that negative and positive reciprocity are not only “two sides of the
same mechanism”(Perugini et al., 2003, p.256) but indicate two different personality
dimensions.
Young men tend to be more negatively reciprocal. The estimated effects of teenage
employment are most of the time small and insignificant. The strongest effect can be
36For young women I only identify a positive effect on the internal locus of control. The effect
on emotional stability, is statistically non-significantly negative.
37De Graaf and van Eijck use mean values of item responses as proxies for Big Five personality
traits, where items are scaled between 1 and 7. For instance, they find that a one unit higher
self-rated openness is related to 0.6 additional years of schooling for male and 0.2 additional years
for female respondents.
38Due to lack of information on reciprocal behavior in the youth biography questionnaire, I
construct both factors by using six items obtained from the person questionnaire in 2005 and 2010,
respectively. Both factors are then extracted by a factor analysis. In addition, I control for the
individuals’ age when they completed the corresponding questionnaire.
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found on positive reciprocity of male teenagers and amounts to 12.8% of a standard
deviation.
Brown, Falk, and Fehr (2004), Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2009), Dur,
Non, and Roelfsema (2010), and Kube, Mare´chal, and Puppe (2012, 2013) find sub-
stantial relationships between reciprocal behavior and employment patterns. Using
contemporaneous measures of reciprocity, Dur et al. find that positively reciprocal
people are more sensitive to promotion instead of monetary incentives. Dohmen et
al. identify that people with a high positive reciprocal behavior receive higher wages.
Monthly earnings are increased by 0.9%-1.2% if positive reciprocity is increased by
one unit.39 In addition, they work harder and are less likely to be unemployed.
Brown et al. confirm the latter finding. Further, they find that an increase in
negative reciprocal behavior leads to a higher probability of unemployment.
3.4.3 Early Employment and Occupational Choice Strate-
gies
Employment during full-time schooling may not only affect adolescents’ character
skills but may also provide valuable insights for adolescents into their interests and
talents as well as offer them information on the world of work. The youth biogra-
phy questionnaire includes questions about career and job plans, e.g. how adoles-
cents would search for a future occupation and how well they are already informed
about a future occupation. Table 3.16 shows how in-school work experience affects
adolescents’ occupational choice strategies.40 I distinguish between three different
strategies. Passive strategies imply that adolescents are either still unsure of their
talents and what would be the “right” occupation or they do not have the goal to
find the one true occupation and take things as they come. Working part-time while
attending full-time schooling reduces the approval to these statements. Considering
the ATE, I find a similar effect for male and female teenagers. The importance of
these passive strategies is reduced by 12.1% and 12.9% of a standard deviation for
male and female teenagers, respectively. Panel (b) shows the effect on active strate-
gies. The second factor means that adolescents have already made a lot of efforts
and thoughts to decide which occupation could be the best for them. For male
and female teenagers I find a significant increase of 13.5% and 18.4% of a standard
39In their paper positive reciprocity is measured as the mean value of three items concerning
positively reciprocal behavior scaled from 1 to 7.
40Four statements about the importance of various strategies to choose an occupation each
measured on a four-point Likert scale from Apply completely to Don’t apply at all are used to
extract three factors.
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deviation in the agreement to these strategies. Panel (c) shows how the importance
of parental-dominated strategies to find a future occupation is affected by an early
employment. This factor illustrates the importance of parents’ advice for making
this decision. Again, the effect is quite similar for both genders. Male and female
teenagers experience a reduction of 9.6% and 11.1% of a standard deviation in the
importance of parents’ advice. In sum, teenage employment reduces the importance
of both passive and parental-dominated strategies and increases at the same time
the importance of active strategies. For both genders the pattern of results is quite
similar, for females however more sizable. The results confirm the hypothesis that
working while attending secondary school provides adolescents with valuable infor-
mation on their aptitudes and interests. It helps them to reduce uncertainties and
makes them more independent from their parents.
Further, I test whether secondary school employment actually helps teenagers to de-
cide what careers they want. Two questions deal with (i) whether they already know
the occupation they would like to do and (ii) to which degree they stay informed
about the desired occupation.41 For the analysis I create two dummy variables to
measure the level of information adolescents already have concerning their future
occupation.42 The first variable takes on the value one if they already know the
occupation they would like to have and stay at least well informed, see panel (a)
of table 3.17. The second variable is equal to one if they already know their future
occupation and stay at least very well informed, see panel (b). For both measures
of the level of information I find stronger effects for male teenagers. Considering
the ATE, teenage employment increases the probability of being informed to some
degree (or at least the subjective belief of being well informed) by 16.5% (4.7%) of
a standard deviation for males (females). The results are robust when using “very
well informed/ with certainty” as an alternative outcome of interest.
In sum, working part-time while attending full-time schooling reduces less active
and strengthens more active ways to find out which occupation would suit teenagers.
Especially for female adolescents this pattern is statistically significant. Consider-
ing the effect on the (subjective) level of information, however, we see that male
teenagers profit more from holding a job while for females only a small positive
effect is detectable.
41The second question is measured on a four-point scale from Poorly informed to Very well
informed.
42I standardize both dummy variables to adjust the interpretation of the estimated effects to the
former results.
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3.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
The model is extended by including family-fixed effects to examine the sensitivity
of the results to potential unobserved confounders that are constant within families.
Deleting 1,606 adolescents without sibling information and 695 adolescents living
in families in which all siblings have the same treatment status leads to a sample
of 561 teenagers. Because of the small sample size, each family-fixed regression is
estimated with a sample pooled across gender. Tables 3.18, 3.19 and 3.20 show
results of family-fixed effects regressions for locus of control, Big Five personality
traits, and reciprocity.43 For locus of control I find a stable result for the internal
locus of control. Considering the ATE, the treatment effect increases slightly from
16.4% to 23.4% of a standard deviation, see table 3.18. Therefore, the positive effect
of teenage employment on self-responsibility seems to be robust to family-specific
confounders. Treatment effects on Big Five personality traits, in contrast, are not
robust to including family-fixed effects. Either they become vanishingly small, their
magnitude increases or the effects reverse their direction. A similar pattern holds for
reciprocity. While estimated effects on negative reciprocity become more negative,
effects on positive reciprocity change signs and become negative.
Tables 3.21 and 3.22 illustrate how robust estimated effects on occupational choice
strategies and the level of information on one’s future occupation to including family-
fixed effects are. For occupational choice strategies, estimated effects on both passive
and parental-dominated strategies are robust to including family-fixed effects while
estimated effects on active strategies vanish, see table 3.21. For both levels of infor-
mation variables estimated treatment effects vanish, see table 3.22.
In sum, after controlling for family-fixed effects, teenage employment promotes ado-
lescents’ self-responsibility, i.e. the perception that events in their life can be con-
trolled by own efforts and actions. Further, it reduces the uncertainty about own
talents and interests and reduces the importance of parents’ advices for choosing a
future occupation.
43A shortcoming of this procedure is that I use results from a pooled sample to confirm gender-
specific effects. Thus, I implicitly assume that treatment effects are affected by including family-
fixed effects in the same way for male and female teenagers. Nonetheless, treatment effects can
be affected differently. I could manage this problem by including interactions between gender and
each family dummy to control for gender-varying family-fixed effects. This procedure, however,
leads to multicollinearity and is therefore not implemented.
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3.5 Concluding Remarks
Adolescence is a stage of life in which people start to take decisions independently
of their parents. While the influence of parents’ investments on the development of
human capital decreases, the amount of time adolescents invest in activities sepa-
rately from their parents grows in importance. Working part-time while attending
full-time schooling is often seen as a stepping stone toward independence and adult-
hood. It may promote responsibility, independence, and interpersonal skills at an
early stage of life. A frequently mentioned concern, however, is that a part-time job
may crowd out homework time and therefore may lead to worse grades and a lower
educational attainment.
The existing literature documents a positive effect of teenage employment on later
economic success, such as higher earnings and better job positions, that becomes
negative if the amount of time spent working exceeds a critical threshold. While
the reason for the negative relationship between working after school and economic
success in adult life is well explained by the limited amount of time and the con-
sequential reduction of time spend with academic learning, channels of the positive
influence have not been examined empirically. Explanations of the positive influ-
ence could be that working part-time supports the development of skills which are
important for later success in life such as promoting responsibility and time man-
agement skills, it may reduce uncertainties about own talents and interests, and
make adolescents familiar with the world of work. This chapter tests some of the
possible explanations by focusing on character skills as important determinants of
labor market outcomes and occupational choice strategies.
My main findings are as follows. First, I find a positive selection into teenage
employment. Adolescents who have worked part-time during full-time schooling have
on average higher-educated parents and live in financially well-endowed households.
Their parents were less non-employed and more likely to be self-employed in the
past in comparison to parents of adolescents who have never worked while attending
school. Teenagers with a migration background or who live in regions with high
unemployment rates are less likely to be employed. While supplementing pocket
money was the leading reason for taking the first job for both male and female
adolescents, young women were more likely to start their first job because the work
interested them. Comparing the type of job adolescents hold, between male and
female adolescents differences exist. About 60% of male adolescents hold a delivery
job. While young women also favor delivery jobs, in the female sample is a more
heterogeneous pattern. In addition to delivery jobs, service and care jobs are further
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frequently mentioned types of jobs female adolescents hold. Teenagers who work
differ in their time use from non-employed teenagers. Teenagers who work sleep
less, they spend less time with media use, and they invest more time with academic
learning, the latter especially on weekends. Focusing on the time use of employed
adolescents, employment reduces time spent with peer activities, academic learning,
relaxing, and media use.
Employing a flexible strategy combining propensity score matching and regression
techniques to account for self-selection, I find beneficial effects on the internal lo-
cus of control that measures the individual belief that events can be controlled by
personal decision and efforts. A concept that is related to self-esteem. In addi-
tion to promoting character skills, teenage employment improves the knowledge on
which skills and talents school students have and reduces the importance of par-
ents’ advice with respect to their future career. These results are robust to several
model specification and varying samples and robust to including family-fixed effects.
The estimated treatment effects on the Big Five personality traits, reciprocity and
the level of information on future occupation lose significance after controlling for
unobserved confounders that are constant within families.
Overall the robustness of the results to various additional tests and the inclusion
of variables which proxy the pre-treatment endowment of character skills support
the hypothesis that working part-time while attending full-time schooling affects the
locus of control and provides valuable insights for adolescents into their interests and
talents.
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3.7 Appendix
Tables
Table 3.1: Sample Size – SOEP
Men Women
Have Had a Job? Have Had a Job?
Yes No Yes No
1452 1489
566 886 562 927
(38.41%) (61.02%) (38.58%) (61.42%)
Source: SOEP V29. Note: Proportions calculated with SOEP sample weights.
Table 3.2: Information on First Part-Time Job – SOEP
Men Women Difference
(a) Age When Started First Part-Time Job
14.41 14.25 0.16∗
(1.53) (1.64) (0.09)
(b) Reasons for First Part-Time Job
Interest 0.118 0.157 −0.039∗
(0.323) (0.364) (0.022)
Supplement Allowance 0.847 0.803 0.044∗
(0.360) (0.398) (0.024)
Source: SOEP V29. Note: Calculations use the SOEP sample weights. Standard deviations and
standard errors (in column labeled“Difference”) are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance
at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
Table 3.3: Sample Size – TBS
Men Women
Have a Job? Have a Job?
Yes No Yes No
611 687
153 458 147 540
(25.00%) (75.00%) (21.40%) (78.60%)
Source: Time Budget Survey. Wave 2001/2002.
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Table 3.4: Additional Information on Employment – TBS
Men Women
Share Share
(a) Types of Jobs
1 Delivery Jobs 0.575 Delivery Jobs 0.211
2 Salesclerk 0.065 Other Service Jobs (Waitress) 0.156
3 Other Service Jobs (Waiter) 0.052 Care Jobs (Babysitter) 0.143
4 Tutors 0.046 Tutors 0.122
5 Agriculture and Forestry Jobs 0.039 Salesclerk 0.075
(b) Working Hours per Week
4.24 4.87
(4.37) (4.24)
Source: Time Budget Survey. Wave 2001/2001. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 3.5: Summary of Common Support and Balancing Tests on Variables Included
in the Propensity Score
Men Women
(a) Smith/Todd-Test
p-Value≤ 0.05 2 4
p-Value≤ 0.10 4 4
(b) Test of Equality of Means
Unmatched 17 21
ATT-Weights 0 0
ATU-Weights 0 0
(c) Total Number of Covariates
73 77
(d) Percent Within Common Support Region
Treated 99.5% 99.6%
Nontreated 99.4% 96.1%
(e) Percentage of Correctly Predicted
0.649 0.653
Source: SOEP V29. Panel (a) shows the number of covariates for which the null hypothesis of no
influence of the treatment status on a given covariate conditional on a polynomial of the propensity
score is rejected. The rows in panel (b) show the number of covariates with p-values ≤ 0.05 in a
t-test of equality of means in the treated and non-treated samples before and after matching. Panel
(c) shows the final number of covariates used for estimating the propensity score model. Panel
(d) shows the percentage of observations that are within the common support region separately
by treatment status. The common support region lays between the minimum propensity score
of a treated and the maximum propensity score of a non-treated individual. Panel (e) shows the
percentage of correctly predicted. All calculations use (in addition) SOEP sample weights.
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Table 3.6: Hotelling Balancing Tests
Men Women
Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched
ATT ATU ATT ATU
Parents 0.005 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Parents’ Character 0.146 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Parents-Youth 0.587 1.000 0.998 0.017 1.000 0.999
Youth 0.000 1.000 0.995 0.000 1.000 1.000
Location 0.000 1.000 0.999 0.004 1.000 1.000
Annual Dummies 0.118 1.000 1.000 0.019 0.999 0.991
Source: SOEP V29. Note: The table shows the p-values from Hotelling tests of equality of means
between the treated and comparison samples. Covariates of the propensity score models are sep-
arated into different categories. Category “Parents’ character” consists of a subgroup of variables
that measures parents’ character skills such as Big Five, Locus of Control and Trust. These vari-
ables are also included in category“Parents” in addition to parents’ earnings and education level. In
columns labeled “Unmatched” adolescents are weighted by survey weights provided by the SOEP.
In columns labeled “ATT” and “ATU” adolescents are weighted by matching weights calculated in
section 3.3.4.
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Table 3.7: Descriptive Statistics for Key Covariates – SOEP
Men Women
Have Held a Job? Have Held a Job?
Yes No p-Value Yes No p-Value
N 1,452 1,489
566 886 562 927
Parent with University 0.275 0.219 0.016 0.288 0.182 0.000
Entrance Qualification (0.447) (0.414) (0.453) (0.386)
Parent with Tertiary 0.376 0.338 0.183 0.389 0.301 0.002
Education (0.485) (0.473) (0.488) (0.459)
Parental Earnings 22.888 20.315 0.004 22.222 19.877 0.006
(1,000 e) (15.665) (16.581) (17.285) (14.783)
Father not Employed 0.060 0.103 0.000 0.054 0.081 0.015
(0.198) (0.237) (0.181) (0.214)
Father Self-Employed 0.074 0.088 0.310 0.095 0.093 0.855
(0.242) (0.258) (0.261) (0.269)
Mother not Employed 0.261 0.329 0.001 0.304 0.332 0.185
(0.353) (0.388) (0.373) (0.389)
Mother Self-Employed 0.083 0.048 0.001 0.079 0.054 0.031
(0.240) (0.170) (0.231) (0.194)
Father’s General Trust 0.097 -0.015 0.060 0.156 -0.139 0.000
(0.967) (0.956) (1.064) (1.010)
Father’s Past Trusting 0.070 -0.063 0.028 0.067 -0.018 0.177
Behavior (0.941) (1.005) (0.979) (1.040)
Mother’s General Trust 0.148 -0.061 0.000 0.096 -0.090 0.001
(1.079) (0.964) (1.028) (0.952)
Mother’s Past Trusting 0.067 -0.059 0.026 0.136 -0.066 0.000
Behavior (0.941) (1.028) (1.013) (0.989)
Academically Oriented 0.517 0.402 0.000 0.585 0.465 0.000
School Track (0.500) (0.491) (0.493) (0.499)
Academic School Track 0.533 0.382 0.000 0.590 0.441 0.000
Recommendation (0.499) (0.486) (0.492) (0.497)
Migration Background 0.186 0.299 0.000 0.238 0.318 0.001
(0.389) (0.458) (0.426) (0.466)
Sports on Daily Basis 0.306 0.252 0.031 0.170 0.122 0.012
(0.461) (0.435) (0.376) (0.327)
Formal Extracurricular 0.463 0.355 0.000 0.538 0.369 0.000
Activity at School (0.499) (0.479) (0.499) (0.483)
Less Formal Extracurr. 0.666 0.548 0.000 0.756 0.606 0.000
Activity at School (0.472) (0.498) (0.430) (0.489)
East Germany 0.176 0.219 0.048 0.158 0.227 0.001
(0.381) (0.414) (0.365) (0.419)
Grew Up in City 0.641 0.731 0.000 0.658 0.723 0.008
(0.480) (0.444) (0.475) (0.448)
Unemployment Rate 10.759 11.175 0.084 10.530 11.120 0.019
(4.211) (4.629) (4.494) (4.897)
Source: SOEP V29. Columns labeled ‘N’ show the number of observations with non-missing values
of the corresponding variable. Columns labeled ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ show the means and standard
deviations (in parentheses) of each variable. The column labeled ‘p-Value’ shows the p-value from
a t-test of equality of means. Calculations use the SOEP sample weights.
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Table 3.8: Descriptive Statistics for Key Covariates – TBS
Men Women
Hold a Job? Hold a Job?
Yes No p-Value Yes No p-Value
N 611 687
153 458 147 540
Parent with University 0.412 0.356 0.216 0.449 0.381 0.138
Entrance Qualification (0.494) (0.479) (0.499) (0.486)
Self Employed Parent 0.248 0.186 0.094 0.279 0.176 0.005
(0.433) (0.389) (0.450) (0.381)
Monthly Household Net Income
Less than e 1500 0.033 0.061 0.178 0.034 0.057 0.260
(0.178) (0.240) (0.182) (0.233)
e 1500 - e 3750 0.346 0.404 0.207 0.320 0.385 0.146
(0.477) (0.491) (0.468) (0.487)
More than e 3750 0.621 0.535 0.064 0.646 0.557 0.053
(0.487) (0.499) (0.480) (0.497)
Age 15.719 14.683 0.000 16.184 14.770 0.000
(1.583) (1.495) (1.490) (1.549)
Academically Oriented 0.660 0.526 0.004 0.748 0.581 0.000
School Track (0.475) (0.500) (0.435) (0.494)
East Germany 0.124 0.231 0.004 0.102 0.243 0.000
(0.331) (0.422) (0.304) (0.429)
Source: Time Budget Survey. The column labeled ‘p-Value’ shows the p-value from a t-test of
equality of means. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Definition of Activity Categories in Tables 3.9 to 3.12
The categories in Tables 3.9 to 3.12 are defined as follows. Category “Sleep” covers
sleep between 9pm and 8am. Category “Eating/Washing/Dressing” includes eating,
washing and dressing oneself. Category “Part-Time Job” denotes time that is spend
with job specific activities such as part-time employment, internship, breaks during
working time and job search. Category “School Attendance” shows the amount of
time spent in school while category “Learning Activities” covers activities such as
attending tutoring sessions and self-learning including internet based learning. Cat-
egory “Housework” includes preparing meal, cleaning the apartment/house, washing
clothes and shopping. Category “Technical & Related Activities” covers activities
such as model making, crafting, photographing and filming. Category “Volunteer-
ing” shows how much time is spent with volunteer activities at clubs and parties
while category “Neighborly Help” covers informal help for other households such as
child care and shopping. Category “Peer Activities” denotes time that is spend in
social activities with friends or in a clique such as going to cinema, sports events
or clubs. Category “Relaxing” shows the amount of time spent with relaxing while
category “Sports Activities” covers different types of athletic activities. Category
“Artistic Activities” captures time spent with playing music, singing, painting and
writing and category “Reading” includes activities such as reading magazines, news-
papers and books. Category “Media Use” includes activities such as watching TV
and video, playing pc games, chatting and surfing the internet. Category “Listening
to Music” shows time spent with listening to music. Category “Travelling” measures
time spent travelling, category “Time Diary” shows time spent filling in the time
diary and category “Transit Time” shows how much time they spent being on the
way by foot, bus and other means of travel.
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Table 3.9: Time Use on a Weekday – TBS
Men Women
Hold a Job? Hold a Job?
Yes No Diff Yes No Diff
N 300 892 285 1053
Sleep 473.3 496.3 −23.1∗∗∗ 457.2 497.6 −40.4∗∗∗
(98.7) (84.8) (5.9) (97.4) (77.4) (5.5)
Eating/Washing/Dressing 108.2 111.3 −3.1 135.3 127.2 8.1∗∗
(49.3) (48.5) (3.3) (67.6) (51.9) (3.7)
Part-Time Job 35.8 13.0 22.8∗∗∗ 26.5 7.1 19.4∗∗∗
(96.0) (67.4) (5.0) (81.2) (50.2) (3.9)
School Attendance 219.3 218.8 0.5 208.2 212.9 −4.7
(165.7) (157.0) (10.6) (158.0) (158.4) (10.6)
Learning Activities 48.5 45.1 3.3 62.8 56.4 6.5
(70.2) (59.8) (4.2) (83.8) (72.1) (5.0)
Housework 39.4 40.1 −0.7 73.6 66.0 7.6
(57.3) (62.4) (4.1) (83.3) (73.2) (5.0)
Technical & Related Act. 6.6 6.1 0.5 6.9 5.1 1.9
(25.2) (26.8) (1.8) (24.3) (21.9) (1.5)
Volunteering 13.5 7.8 5.7∗ 9.4 4.6 4.8∗∗
(67.8) (36.1) (3.1) (40.7) (24.7) (1.9)
Neighborly Help 2.1 1.6 0.5 2.5 2.2 0.4
(14.9) (15.4) (1.0) (17.2) (15.6) (1.1)
Peer Activities 93.2 86.7 6.5 110.2 101.5 8.8
(128.4) (123.2) (8.3) (130.5) (111.7) (7.7)
Relaxing 58.0 48.1 9.9 47.2 41.3 5.8
(103.1) (88.8) (6.2) (76.0) (71.2) (4.8)
Sports Activities 37.4 43.9 −6.5 32.3 33.2 −0.9
(69.2) (75.4) (4.9) (61.6) (64.3) (4.3)
Artistic Act. 8.2 5.4 2.8 9.1 10.5 −1.4
(31.4) (30.8) (2.1) (29.8) (36.2) (2.3)
Reading 15.0 17.8 −2.7 26.1 26.5 −0.3
(37.5) (36.1) (2.4) (42.6) (51.6) (3.3)
Media Use 170.0 191.3 −21.3∗∗ 111.4 136.1 −24.7∗∗∗
(133.8) (148.6) (9.7) (107.9) (112.9) (7.5)
Listening to Music 11.2 10.1 1.0 12.6 11.7 0.9
(29.0) (29.4) (2.0) (36.7) (28.9) (2.1)
Travelling 1.0 5.0 −4.1∗ 4.0 4.1 0.0
( 6.9) (39.4) (2.3) (43.4) (38.3) (2.6)
Time Diary 3.4 3.8 −0.4 3.5 4.6 −1.2
(11.0) (12.0) (0.8) (10.6) (15.2) (1.0)
Transit Time 94.6 84.5 10.1∗∗ 99.9 89.8 10.1∗∗
<continued on next page>
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Time Use on a Weekday – TBS
Men Women
Hold a Job? Hold a Job?
Yes No Diff Yes No Diff
(78.4) (61.8) (4.4) (71.0) (70.2) (4.7)
Total 1438.5 1436.7 1.7 1438.9 1438.3 0.6
Not Covered 1.5 3.3 1.1 1.7
Source: Time Budget Survey. Wave 2001/02. Time allocation in minutes. The table shows time
that is spend with main activities. Secondary activities are ignored.
Table 3.10: Time Use on a Weekend Day – TBS
Men Women
Hold a Job? Hold a Job?
Yes No Diff Yes No Diff
N 158 478 155 564
Sleep 538.2 564.2 −26.0∗∗∗ 519.0 569.5 −50.5∗∗∗
(117.6) (102.4) (9.8) (125.7) (101.9) (9.7)
Eating/Washing/Dressing 123.2 128.3 −5.1 146.4 151.3 −4.9
(68.3) (65.5) (6.1) (60.7) (66.9) (6.0)
Part-Time Job 32.9 8.3 24.6∗∗∗ 32.4 2.6 29.8∗∗∗
(82.3) (56.7) (5.9) (91.0) (27.2) (4.4)
School Attendance 4.4 7.1 −2.8 5.2 4.1 1.1
(28.9) (44.6) (3.8) (39.0) (33.8) (3.2)
Learning Activities 37.2 27.1 10.1∗ 38.6 28.5 10.2∗
(79.2) (58.9) (5.9) (68.5) (59.0) (5.5)
Housework 46.1 49.1 −3.0 94.1 74.4 19.7∗∗
(70.1) (65.2) (6.1) (100.5) (80.9) (7.8)
Technical Related Act. 6.4 10.8 −4.4 14.1 9.5 4.6
(34.0) (38.8) (3.5) (53.4) (39.7) (3.9)
Volunteering 9.4 11.9 −2.5 11.4 15.4 −3.9
(47.3) (52.9) (4.7) (39.1) (61.3) (5.2)
Neighborly Help 5.3 6.3 −1.0 1.1 7.6 −6.5∗
(31.2) (38.0) (3.3) ( 8.4) (44.0) (3.6)
Peer Activities 138.2 133.7 4.5 173.5 160.5 13.1
(150.8) (150.9) (13.8) (160.2) (148.7) (13.7)
Relaxing 85.3 70.0 15.2∗∗ 92.1 72.6 19.6∗∗
(84.9) (84.3) (7.7) (91.3) (82.9) (7.7)
Sports Activities 49.4 52.7 −3.3 21.4 42.7 −21.3∗∗∗
(93.2) (98.3) (8.9) (51.8) (85.9) (7.2)
<continued on next page>
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Time Use on a Weekend Day – TBS
Men Women
Hold a Job? Hold a Job?
Yes No Diff Yes No Diff
Artistic Act. 6.4 7.4 −1.1 13.5 10.9 2.7
(23.9) (33.9) (2.9) (59.6) (38.0) (4.0)
Reading 18.6 21.5 −2.9 30.9 35.1 −4.2
(43.0) (46.7) (4.2) (48.4) (59.2) (5.2)
Media Use 247.3 249.1 −1.8 157.7 159.7 −2.1
(166.3) (177.3) (16.0) (147.3) (131.6) (12.3)
Listening to Music 13.1 15.9 −2.8 11.7 19.8 −8.1∗
(33.4) (40.3) (3.6) (34.9) (50.3) (4.3)
Travelling 2.9 5.5 −2.6 3.3 4.8 −1.5
(29.0) (50.2) (4.2) (33.3) (41.1) (3.6)
Time Diary 3.4 3.8 −0.4 3.5 3.8 −0.3
(12.1) (15.2) (1.3) (10.5) (12.5) (1.1)
Transit Time 66.6 62.6 4.0 68.6 62.9 5.7
(76.9) (81.9) (7.4) (70.7) (72.2) (6.5)
Total 1434.3 1435.6 −1.3 1438.6 1435.5 3.1
Not Covered 5.7 4.4 1.4 4.5
Source: Time Budget Survey. Wave 2001/02. Time allocation in minutes. The table shows time
that is spend with main activities. Secondary activities are ignored.
Table 3.11: Time Use on a Working/Non-Working Weekday Based on the Subset of
Adolescents who Work, i.e. Column “Yes” in Table 3.9 – TBS
Men Women
Workday? Workday?
Yes No Diff Yes No Diff
N 66 234 41 244
Sleep 480.2 471.3 8.8 452.0 458.1 −6.1
(85.1) (102.3) (13.8) (84.2) (99.6) (16.5)
Eating/Washing/Dressing 110.0 107.6 2.4 136.3 135.1 1.2
(53.7) (48.1) (6.9) (56.2) (69.4) (11.4)
Part-Time Job 162.7 0.0 162.7∗∗∗ 184.4 0.0 184.4∗∗∗
(146.5) ( 0.0) (9.5) (130.1) ( 0.0) (8.3)
School Attendance 203.6 223.7 −20.0 195.9 210.3 −14.5
(156.6) (168.3) (23.1) (151.9) (159.3) (26.7)
Learning Activities 47.3 48.8 −1.5 39.8 66.7 −27.0∗
(61.3) (72.7) (9.8) (59.8) (86.7) (14.1)
<continued on next page>
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Time Use on a Working/Non-Working Weekday Based on the Subset of Adolescents
who Work, i.e. Column “Yes” in Table 3.9 – TBS
Men Women
Working Day? Working Day?
Yes No Diff Yes No Diff
Housework 35.9 40.3 −4.4 43.4 78.7 −35.3∗∗
(52.7) (58.6) (8.0) (48.0) (86.9) (13.9)
Technical Related Act. 9.8 5.7 4.2 5.9 7.1 −1.3
(36.2) (21.1) (3.5) (25.0) (24.2) (4.1)
Volunteering 7.7 15.2 −7.4 7.3 9.8 −2.4
(32.2) (74.8) (9.5) (33.0) (41.9) (6.9)
Neighborly Help 2.4 2.0 0.4 2.2 2.6 −0.4
(14.3) (15.1) (2.1) (14.1) (17.7) (2.9)
Peer Activities 65.3 101.0 −35.7∗∗ 83.4 114.8 −31.3
(89.1) (136.6) (17.8) (92.9) (135.4) (22.0)
Relaxing 26.1 67.0 −40.9∗∗∗ 29.8 50.1 −20.3
(45.1) (112.6) (14.2) (47.9) (79.5) (12.8)
Sports Activities 22.4 41.6 −19.2∗∗ 13.4 35.5 −22.0∗∗
(54.2) (72.4) (9.6) (39.9) (64.1) (10.3)
Artistic Act. 10.9 7.5 3.4 4.1 9.9 −5.8
(36.9) (29.7) (4.4) (18.3) (31.3) (5.0)
Reading 12.4 15.8 −3.3 19.0 27.3 −8.3
(36.2) (37.8) (5.2) (32.8) (44.0) (7.2)
Media Use 135.3 179.7 −44.4∗∗ 83.7 116.0 −32.4∗
(115.7) (137.1) (18.5) (70.8) (112.4) (18.1)
Listening to Music 5.8 12.7 −6.9∗ 16.1 12.0 4.1
(19.3) (31.1) (4.0) (57.0) (32.2) (6.2)
Travelling 0.3 1.2 −0.9 0.0 4.7 −4.7
( 2.5) ( 7.7) (1.0) ( 0.0) (46.9) (7.3)
Time Diary 3.9 3.2 0.7 3.2 3.5 −0.4
(13.0) (10.4) (1.5) ( 7.9) (11.0) (1.8)
Transit Time 97.6 93.8 3.8 120.2 96.5 23.7∗∗
(57.7) (83.4) (10.9) (59.7) (72.3) (11.9)
Total 1439.7 1438.1 1.6 1440.0 1438.7 1.3
Not Covered 0.3 1.9 0.0 1.3
Source: Time Budget Survey. Wave 2001/02. Time allocation in minutes. The table shows time
that is spend with main activities. Secondary activities are ignored.
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Table 3.12: Time Use on a Working/Non-Working Weekend Day Based on the
Subset of Adolescents who Work, i.e. Column “Yes” in Table 3.10 – TBS
Men Women
Working Day? Working Day?
Yes No Diff Yes No Diff
N 31 127 25 130
Sleep 505.5 546.2 −40.7∗ 450.4 532.2 −81.8∗∗∗
(117.3) (116.8) (23.4) (133.7) (120.2) (26.7)
Eating/Washing/Dressing 128.4 122.0 6.4 134.8 148.6 −13.8
(66.3) (68.9) (13.7) (41.2) (63.6) (13.2)
Part-Time Job 167.7 0.0 167.7∗∗∗ 200.8 0.0 200.8∗∗∗
(110.0) ( 0.0) (9.7) (133.8) ( 0.0) (11.6)
School Attendance 2.9 4.7 −1.8 0.0 6.2 −6.2
(16.2) (31.3) (5.8) ( 0.0) (42.5) (8.5)
Learning Activities 27.7 39.5 −11.8 32.0 39.9 −7.9
(53.9) (84.2) (15.9) (48.9) (71.7) (15.0)
Housework 47.4 45.7 1.7 75.2 97.8 −22.6
(89.9) (64.7) (14.1) (88.4) (102.6) (21.9)
Technical Related Act. 5.5 6.6 −1.1 9.2 15.0 −5.8
(16.1) (37.1) (6.8) (30.0) (56.8) (11.7)
Volunteering 20.6 6.6 14.0 23.2 9.2 14.0∗
(82.5) (33.6) (9.4) (73.6) (28.1) (8.5)
Neighborly Help 0.0 6.6 −6.6 3.6 0.6 3.0
( 0.0) (34.7) (6.3) (18.0) ( 4.8) (1.8)
Peer Activities 121.3 142.4 −21.1 176.0 173.1 2.9
(116.2) (158.2) (30.3) (186.5) (155.4) (35.1)
Relaxing 36.1 97.2 −61.1∗∗∗ 53.2 99.6 −46.4∗∗
(48.6) (87.7) (16.4) (65.6) (93.8) (19.6)
Sports Activities 30.0 54.2 −24.2 16.8 22.2 −5.4
(68.8) (97.9) (18.6) (56.0) (51.1) (11.3)
Artistic Act. 9.7 5.6 4.1 0.4 16.1 −15.7
(20.4) (24.7) (4.8) ( 2.0) (64.9) (13.0)
Reading 26.5 16.7 9.8 31.6 30.8 0.8
(54.0) (39.8) (8.6) (41.5) (49.7) (10.6)
Media Use 229.7 251.7 −22.0 138.8 161.3 −22.5
(170.6) (165.7) (33.4) (128.7) (150.7) (32.2)
Listening to Music 7.7 14.4 −6.7 20.4 10.1 10.3
(19.3) (36.0) (6.7) (50.5) (31.0) (7.6)
Travelling 0.0 3.6 −3.6 0.0 3.9 −3.9
( 0.0) (32.4) (5.8) ( 0.0) (36.3) (7.3)
Time Diary 4.2 3.1 1.0 4.4 3.3 1.1
(12.9) (11.9) (2.4) (12.9) (10.0) (2.3)
<continued on next page>
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Time Use on a Working/Non-Working Weekend Day Based on the Subset of Ado-
lescents who Work, i.e. Column “Yes” in Table 3.10 – TBS
Men Women
Working Day? Working Day?
Yes No Diff Yes No Diff
Transit Time 66.8 66.5 0.2 69.2 68.5 0.7
(70.9) (78.5) (15.4) (58.8) (73.0) (15.5)
Total 1437.7 1433.5 4.3 1440.0 1438.3 1.7
Not Covered 2.3 6.5 0.0 1.7
Source: Time Budget Survey. Wave 2001/02. Time allocation in minutes. The table shows time
that is spend with main activities. Secondary activities are ignored.
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Table 3.13: Locus of Control
N Mean Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE OLS
(a) External Locus of Control
Men 1268 −0.020 −0.218∗∗ −0.087 −0.088 −0.087 −0.085
(1.031) (0.090) (0.074) (0.075) (0.073) (0.074)
Women 1262 0.021 0.009 0.002 0.013 0.009 0.012
(0.967) (0.084) (0.076) (0.080) (0.072) (0.075)
(b) Internal Locus of Control
Men 1268 0.022 0.194∗ 0.180∗∗ 0.180∗∗ 0.180∗∗ 0.187∗∗
(1.029) (0.100) (0.078) (0.078) (0.080) (0.079)
Women 1262 −0.029 0.077 0.116 0.167∗∗ 0.147∗ 0.107
(0.955) (0.085) (0.075) (0.081) (0.075) (0.075)
Source: SOEP V29. Note: All outcome variables are standardized. Calculations use SOEP sample
weights. Standard deviations (mean) and standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors of
the treatment effects are bootstrapped with 500 replications and clustered at the family level. ∗,
∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
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Table 3.14: BIG Five Personality Traits
N Mean Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE OLS
(a) Extraversion
Men 1284 −0.059 0.206∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗
(1.030) (0.085) (0.080) (0.075) (0.072) (0.076)
Women 1270 0.066 0.188∗∗ 0.095 0.104 0.101 0.097
(0.958) (0.077) (0.069) (0.072) (0.067) (0.070)
(b) Conscientiousness
Men 1284 −0.140 −0.096 −0.120 −0.065 −0.086 −0.097
(0.988) (0.084) (0.079) (0.081) (0.077) (0.078)
Women 1270 0.143 0.127 0.070 0.059 0.063 0.073
(0.990) (0.086) (0.070) (0.073) (0.069) (0.071)
(c) Openness
Men 1284 −0.116 0.028 0.040 0.065 0.055 0.037
(1.010) (0.083) (0.077) (0.074) (0.071) (0.072)
Women 1270 0.120 0.219∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗ 0.134∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.154∗∗
(0.965) (0.078) (0.069) (0.072) (0.068) (0.069)
(d) Agreeableness
Men 1284 −0.130 −0.044 −0.113 −0.077 −0.091 −0.108
(0.993) (0.085) (0.080) (0.084) (0.080) (0.079)
Women 1270 0.121 0.167∗ 0.091 0.097 0.095 0.096
(0.994) (0.088) (0.067) (0.072) (0.070) (0.068)
(e) Neuroticism
Men 1284 −0.214 −0.097 −0.120 −0.164∗∗ −0.147∗∗ −0.110
(0.958) (0.081) (0.075) (0.071) (0.070) (0.073)
Women 1270 0.236 0.021 0.095 0.101 0.099 0.111
(0.985) (0.081) (0.074) (0.078) (0.076) (0.073)
Source: SOEP V29. Note: All outcome variables are standardized. Calculations use SOEP sample
weights. Standard deviations (mean) and standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors of
the treatment effects are bootstrapped with 500 replications and clustered at the family level. ∗,
∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
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Table 3.15: Reciprocity
N Mean Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE OLS
(a) Negative Reciprocity
Men 901 0.200 0.031 0.057 0.054 0.055 0.055
(0.986) (0.105) (0.097) (0.096) (0.099) (0.098)
Women 905 −0.194 −0.176 −0.071 −0.060 −0.064 −0.069
(0.973) (0.114) (0.083) (0.085) (0.081) (0.085)
(b) Positive Reciprocity
Men 901 −0.040 0.292∗∗∗ 0.124 0.130 0.128 0.125
(1.010) (0.101) (0.093) (0.093) (0.098) (0.094)
Women 905 0.028 0.142 0.059 0.057 0.058 0.056
(0.993) (0.112) (0.095) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096)
Source: SOEP V29. Note: All outcome variables are standardized. Calculations use SOEP sample
weights. Standard deviations (mean) and standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors of
the treatment effects are bootstrapped with 500 replications and clustered at the family level. ∗,
∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
Table 3.16: Occupational Choice Strategy
N Mean Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE OLS
(a) Passive Strategy
Men 1338 −0.019 −0.101 −0.096 −0.137∗ −0.121 −0.099
(1.019) (0.081) (0.076) (0.083) (0.075) (0.074)
Women 1347 0.031 −0.155∗∗ −0.158∗∗ −0.110 −0.129∗ −0.159∗∗
(0.973) (0.072) (0.074) (0.081) (0.078) (0.074)
(b) Active Strategy
Men 1338 −0.012 0.091 0.121 0.145∗ 0.135∗ 0.120
(1.000) (0.078) (0.074) (0.076) (0.075) (0.074)
Women 1347 0.014 0.137∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗
(0.995) (0.079) (0.071) (0.073) (0.069) (0.071)
(c) Parental-Dominated Strategy
Men 1338 0.085 −0.188∗∗ −0.112 −0.085 −0.096 −0.120
(1.027) (0.086) (0.079) (0.081) (0.081) (0.079)
Women 1347 −0.089 −0.240∗∗∗ −0.121∗ −0.104 −0.111∗ −0.126∗∗
(0.958) (0.071) (0.062) (0.067) (0.064) (0.063)
Source: SOEP V29. Note: All outcome variables are standardized. Calculations use SOEP sample
weights. Standard deviations (mean) and standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors of
the treatment effects are bootstrapped with 500 replications and clustered at the family level. ∗,
∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
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Table 3.17: Level of Information on Future Occupation
N Mean Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE OLS
(a) To Some Degree
Men 1427 0.002 0.088 0.155∗∗ 0.171∗∗ 0.165∗∗ 0.153∗∗
(1.000) (0.077) (0.067) (0.068) (0.065) (0.067)
Women 1431 −0.012 0.096 0.042 0.051 0.047 0.049
(0.999) (0.077) (0.069) (0.072) (0.069) (0.068)
(b) With Certainty
Men 1427 0.021 0.036 0.115∗ 0.134∗ 0.127∗ 0.111
(1.015) (0.078) (0.070) (0.073) (0.072) (0.069)
Women 1431 −0.031 −0.018 0.003 0.032 0.021 0.007
(0.978) (0.070) (0.071) (0.073) (0.069) (0.068)
Source: SOEP V29. Note: All outcome variables are standardized. Calculations use SOEP sample
weights. Standard deviations (mean) and standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors of
the treatment effects are bootstrapped with 500 replications and clustered at the family level. ∗,
∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
Table 3.18: Locus of Control - Fixed Effects
N Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE OLS
(a) External Locus of Control
Full Sample 2530 −0.110∗ −0.028 −0.027 −0.027 −0.016
(0.063) (0.053) (0.057) (0.054) (0.055)
Sibling Sample 515 −0.063 0.009 0.016 0.013 −0.040
(0.133) (0.111) (0.116) (0.107) (0.108)
Sibling Sample (FE) 0.128 0.148 0.138 0.109
(0.209) (0.212) (0.201) (0.201)
(b) Internal Locus of Control
Full Sample 2530 0.139∗∗ 0.133∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗
(0.067) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.057)
Sibling Sample 515 0.047 0.224∗ 0.238∗∗ 0.231∗∗ 0.166
(0.120) (0.115) (0.115) (0.109) (0.107)
Sibling Sample (FE) 0.223 0.244 0.234 0.188
(0.182) (0.184) (0.174) (0.179)
Source: SOEP V29. Note: All outcome variables are standardized. Calculations use SOEP sam-
ple weights. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors of the treatment effects are
bootstrapped with 500 replications and clustered at the family level. Rows labeled “Full Sam-
ple” show results estimated with a pooled sample and with all adolescents but without including
family dummy variables. Rows labeled “Sibling Sample” and “Sibling Sample (FE)” show results
estimated with the restricted sibling sample without and with dummy variables for each family in
the regression to control for unobserved confounders that are constant within families. ∗, ∗∗ and
∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
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Table 3.19: BIG Five Personality Traits - Fixed Effects
N Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE OLS
(a) Extraversion
Full Sample 2554 0.200∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗
(0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.054) (0.061)
Sibling Sample 520 0.200 0.123 0.170 0.148 0.156
(0.127) (0.127) (0.128) (0.124) (0.131)
Sibling Sample (FE) 0.010 0.042 0.027 0.033
(0.175) (0.169) (0.167) (0.170)
(b) Conscientiousness
Full Sample 2554 0.018 −0.014 −0.004 −0.008 0.000
(0.061) (0.056) (0.059) (0.056) (0.057)
Sibling Sample 520 0.065 −0.036 0.017 −0.009 0.015
(0.134) (0.098) (0.097) (0.094) (0.100)
Sibling Sample (FE) −0.071 −0.062 −0.067 −0.063
(0.154) (0.145) (0.145) (0.147)
(c) Openness
Full Sample 2554 0.125∗∗ 0.100∗ 0.108∗ 0.105∗∗ 0.094∗
(0.058) (0.054) (0.056) (0.053) (0.057)
Sibling Sample 520 0.055 −0.013 0.021 0.004 0.016
(0.140) (0.118) (0.119) (0.115) (0.120)
Sibling Sample (FE) 0.062 0.025 0.043 0.032
(0.169) (0.164) (0.162) (0.162)
(d) Agreeableness
Full Sample 2554 0.064 −0.002 0.016 0.009 0.017
(0.062) (0.056) (0.058) (0.055) (0.055)
Sibling Sample 520 0.085 0.007 0.029 0.018 0.029
(0.149) (0.112) (0.103) (0.104) (0.105)
Sibling Sample (FE) 0.121 0.102 0.111 0.094
(0.171) (0.159) (0.158) (0.163)
(e) Neuroticism
Full Sample 2554 −0.031 −0.017 −0.034 −0.027 0.010
(0.059) (0.056) (0.054) (0.052) (0.056)
Sibling Sample 520 −0.091 −0.022 −0.058 −0.041 −0.045
(0.145) (0.121) (0.119) (0.116) (0.117)
Sibling Sample (FE) 0.099 0.138 0.119 0.134
(0.205) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198)
Source: SOEP V29. Note: All outcome variables are standardized. Calculations use SOEP sam-
ple weights. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors of the treatment effects are
bootstrapped with 500 replications and clustered at the family level. Rows labeled “Full Sam-
ple” show results estimated with a pooled sample and with all adolescents but without including
family dummy variables. Rows labeled “Sibling Sample” and “Sibling Sample (FE)” show results
estimated with the restricted sibling sample without and with dummy variables for each family in
the regression to control for unobserved confounders that are constant within families. ∗, ∗∗ and
∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
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Table 3.20: Reciprocity - Fixed Effects
N Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE OLS
(a) Negative Reciprocity
Full Sample 1806 −0.085 −0.011 −0.003 −0.006 −0.013
(0.082) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.064)
Sibling Sample 394 −0.161 −0.186 −0.166 −0.176 −0.160
(0.166) (0.125) (0.119) (0.118) (0.115)
Sibling Sample (FE) −0.462∗ −0.399 −0.430∗ −0.411
(0.265) (0.257) (0.247) (0.259)
(b) Positive Reciprocity
Full Sample 1806 0.218∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.143∗∗ 0.141∗∗ 0.137∗∗
(0.075) (0.065) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064)
Sibling Sample 394 −0.003 0.092 0.083 0.088 0.084
(0.145) (0.135) (0.136) (0.131) (0.136)
Sibling Sample (FE) −0.120 −0.112 −0.116 −0.105
(0.377) (0.425) (0.376) (0.425)
Source: SOEP V29. Note: All outcome variables are standardized. Calculations use SOEP sam-
ple weights. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors of the treatment effects are
bootstrapped with 500 replications and clustered at the family level. Rows labeled “Full Sam-
ple” show results estimated with a pooled sample and with all adolescents but without including
family dummy variables. Rows labeled “Sibling Sample” and “Sibling Sample (FE)” show results
estimated with the restricted sibling sample without and with dummy variables for each family in
the regression to control for unobserved confounders that are constant within families. ∗, ∗∗ and
∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
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Table 3.21: Occupational Choice Strategy - Fixed Effects
N Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE OLS
(a) Passive Strategy
Full Sample 2685 −0.126∗∗ −0.124∗∗ −0.113∗ −0.117∗∗ −0.128∗∗
(0.055) (0.053) (0.062) (0.056) (0.054)
Sibling Sample 540 −0.034 −0.033 −0.029 −0.031 −0.059
(0.125) (0.110) (0.115) (0.110) (0.108)
Sibling Sample (FE) −0.118 −0.123 −0.121 −0.098
(0.178) (0.181) (0.176) (0.176)
(b) Active Strategy
Full Sample 2685 0.114∗∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗
(0.055) (0.053) (0.055) (0.052) (0.055)
Sibling Sample 540 −0.010 0.062 0.035 0.048 0.051
(0.127) (0.117) (0.124) (0.118) (0.118)
Sibling Sample (FE) −0.018 −0.011 −0.014 −0.013
(0.180) (0.178) (0.177) (0.171)
(c) Parental-Dominated Strategy
Full Sample 2685 −0.216∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗ −0.094 −0.105∗ −0.125∗∗
(0.056) (0.054) (0.059) (0.055) (0.056)
Sibling Sample 540 −0.053 −0.017 −0.058 −0.038 −0.065
(0.137) (0.111) (0.112) (0.108) (0.112)
Sibling Sample (FE) −0.057 −0.091 −0.074 −0.060
(0.161) (0.157) (0.155) (0.153)
Source: SOEP V29. Note: All outcome variables are standardized. Calculations use SOEP sam-
ple weights. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors of the treatment effects are
bootstrapped with 500 replications and clustered at the family level. Rows labeled “Full Sam-
ple” show results estimated with a pooled sample and with all adolescents but without including
family dummy variables. Rows labeled “Sibling Sample” and “Sibling Sample (FE)” show results
estimated with the restricted sibling sample without and with dummy variables for each family in
the regression to control for unobserved confounders that are constant within families. ∗, ∗∗ and
∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
173
Table 3.22: Level of Information on Future Occupation - Fixed Effects
N Raw Diff. ATT ATU ATE OLS
(a) To Some Degree
Full Sample 2858 0.092∗ 0.097∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.108∗∗
(0.055) (0.049) (0.050) (0.048) (0.051)
Sibling Sample 560 0.066 0.071 0.069 0.070 0.075
(0.126) (0.101) (0.100) (0.100) (0.103)
Sibling Sample (FE) 0.000 0.012 0.006 0.008
(0.145) (0.144) (0.144) (0.148)
(b) With Certainty
Full Sample 2858 0.009 0.069 0.081 0.077 0.073
(0.053) (0.048) (0.052) (0.048) (0.047)
Sibling Sample 560 −0.132 −0.098 −0.086 −0.092 −0.090
(0.127) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.107)
Sibling Sample (FE) −0.031 −0.012 −0.021 −0.024
(0.157) (0.159) (0.157) (0.163)
Source: SOEP V29. Note: All outcome variables are standardized. Calculations use SOEP sam-
ple weights. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors of the treatment effects are
bootstrapped with 500 replications and clustered at the family level. Rows labeled “Full Sam-
ple” show results estimated with a pooled sample and with all adolescents but without including
family dummy variables. Rows labeled “Sibling Sample” and “Sibling Sample (FE)” show results
estimated with the restricted sibling sample without and with dummy variables for each family in
the regression to control for unobserved confounders that are constant within families. ∗, ∗∗ and
∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
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Abstract:
The rental housing market in most countries shows a residency discount for sitting
tenants. Until the 1990s, Germany was characterized by fairly liberal rent laws.
In light of housing shortages and strong rent increases in the 1990s, there was a
change towards more regulation in order to protect sitting tenants, but there are
less restrictions on rent increases for new leases. Thus, one would expect an increase
of the residency discount in response to a reform limiting rent increases for sitting
tenants. Based on linked housing-tenant data from 1984 to 2011, this chapter es-
timates panel OLS and quantile regressions of rents within tenancies. We find a
significant annual residence discount which is stronger early in a tenancy and which
increases across the distribution. The tenancy reform act in 2001 shows a signifi-
cantly negative effect on rents altogether, and the negative effect becomes stronger
over the distribution. The annual residency discount during the first three years of
tenure increases significantly after the reform, but there is no further discount after
the fourth year of tenure. The evidence suggests that the reform was successful in
curtailing rent increases, especially for expensive apartments early in a tenancy, but
there is no evidence that rents for new leases increase disproportionately.
Keywords: linked housing-tenant data, rent regression, length of residency dis-
count, rent control, quantile regression
JEL: C 21, C 23, R 30
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4.1. INTRODUCTION
4.1 Introduction
In comparison to other European countries, a fairly large share of the population in
Germany lives in rental housing (Eurostat 2013). At the same time, the large pri-
vate rental housing market in Germany shows a higher level of regulation through
rent control and tenant protection against eviction than the OECD average (Jo-
hannsson 2011). In contrast to the current situation, Germany was characterized
until the 1990s by fairly liberal rent laws (Bo¨rsch-Supan 1994; Hubert 1998).1 In
light of housing shortages and strong rent increases in the 1990s, there was a change
towards more regulation in order to protect sitting tenants. In contrast, there are
less restrictions on rent increases for new leases. The rental housing market in most
countries shows a residency discount for sitting tenants. With stronger rent con-
trol for sitting tenants and tenant protection against eviction, one would expect a
stronger residency discount for sitting tenants if rents for new leases can adjust to
market conditions (Bo¨rsch-Supan 1994; Hubert 1995, 1998). Thus, rent control is
likely to protect sitting tenants more than tenants in new leases. Based on linked
housing-tenant data from 1984 to 2011, this chapter estimates OLS and panel quan-
tile regressions of rents within tenancies. Specifically, we analyze the impact of the
Tenancy Law Reform Act implemented in 2001 on the level of rents and on the
residency discount.
As an application of hedonic price models (Court 1939, Rosen 1974), a large body of
empirical research examines the relationship between characteristics of rental units
and average rents (see e.g. Barnett 1979, Follain and Malpezzi 1980, Guasch and
Marshal 1987 for the U.S. or Hoffmann and Kurz 2002 or Bischoff and Maennig
2011 for Germany). Rents are regressed on the characteristics of rental units and
the coefficients are interpreted as the marginal prices for these characteristics. In
a perfectly competitive rental market, the price effects reflect market conditions
which are the result of supply and demand. Not all price relevant characteristics
are observed in rent data and the distribution of unobserved characteristics may
change with observed characteristics. This motivates the estimation of quantile
regressions which go beyond the estimation of the effects on average rents. The
hedonic price regressions are often augmented by covariates which are not per se
characteristics of the rental units and which might may reflect frictions in the rental
1Currently (in 2015), the regulation of the private rental housing market in Germany is further
strengthened through stronger rent control (’Mietpreisbremse’) for new leases and through the
requirement that the person, who engages a real estate agent to find a tenant/an apartment, has
to pay for the service her-/himself. Thus, landlords cannot add the service fee for an agent they
engaged to the rents the tenants have to pay.
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market. Regulations such as rent control and tenant protection against eviction have
an impact on rents and the effects may differ by the level of rents. For instance,
one would expect that rent control should reduce the rents for expensive apartments
more strongly than for cheap apartments. Similarly, rent control for sitting tenants
should increase the length of residency discount when rents for new leases are less
regulated (as it is the case in Germany). This effect may be strongest for expensive
rental units, which further motivates the estimation of quantile regressions for rents.
The regulations of rental housing in Germany through local rent indices focus on the
span of rents between the one sixth (17%) and five sixth (83%) quantile of rents for
rental unit with given observed characteristics (see e.g. Hofmann and Kurz 2002).
For this reason, we estimate rent regression at these two quantiles in addition to
OLS and median rent regressions.
The rent control and the protection of tenants against eviction were strengthened in
light of the rent increases observed in West Germany during the 1990s. The Tenancy
Law Reform Act, implemented since September 1, 2001, covers all tenancies starting
on this date or later. Its most substantial changes involve a cap on the maximum
rent increases by landlords for sitting tenants and a reduction of the minimum notice
time until termination of a tenancy by the tenant to three months, while keeping the
protection of the tenant against eviction unchanged. Before the reform, landlords
could increase rents by 30% within three years. After the reform, the maximum is
reduced to 20%.2 Our empirical analysis investigates the impact of the reform on
rents. Specifically, we investigate the observed change in the length of residency
discount because the reform did not change regulations of the rents for new leases.
Our empirical analysis uses linked housing-tenant data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP) for the time period 1984 and 2011 that offer the unique
advantage of a large and representative panel data set of tenancies. The panel
structure allows us to control for unobservable time-invariant characteristics of a
tenancy. We restrict the analysis to West German households.
Our empirical results show a significant annual residence discount which decreases
in absolute value with tenure, which is stronger at the top than at the bottom of
the rent distribution, and which falls with elapsed tenure. The tenancy reform act
in 2001 shows a significantly negative effect on rents altogether and the negative
effect becomes stronger at higher quantiles. While the reform further increases the
2The actual upper limit of rent increases, however, was and still is given by the average local
rent index (published by local authorities) reflecting the average rent of comparable rental units in
the neighborhood (’ortsu¨bliche Vergleichsmiete’). Higher rent increases are possible to compensate
for modernization costs or for an increase in costs of utilities used by the tenant.
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annual residency discount for tenants during the first three years of a tenancy, the
discount for tenancies affected by the reform vanishes from the fourth year onwards.
Our results on the residency discounts are robust to including tenancy mean fixed
effects. The evidence suggests that the reform was successful in curtailing rent
increases especially for expensive apartments early in a tenancy but there is no
evidence that rents for new leases increase disproportionately in response. However,
this result must not be overinterpreted because, while real rents grew strongly during
the 1990s, the increase in real rents stopped in the 2000s even for those apartments
which were unaffected by the reform.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the back-
ground of the analysis and reviews the existing literature. Section 3 describes the
data used. Section 4 introduces the econometric approach. Section 5 provides de-
scriptive statistics and discusses the regression results. The final section involves
our concluding remarks.
4.2 Background
We first discuss economic and institutional aspects of private rental housing in Ger-
many. Then, we provide a selective literature review and develop some hypotheses
as the basis of our empirical analysis.
4.2.1 Private Rental Housing in Germany
Evidence provided by Eurostat (2013)3 shows that in 2013 about 47% of the German
population live in rental housing, which is a high share in international comparison.
Only in Switzerland, this share is even higher while especially in Eastern and South-
ern Europe owner-occupied housing is much more common. The causes for this
difference are manifold. Differences in attitudes towards home-ownership may play
a role. While in Germany home ownership is rather viewed as a long-term invest-
ment and rental housing seems better suited for temporary housing needs, it is more
common in Anglo-Saxon countries to buy and sell residential houses depending on
the own current economic situation and needs (Bo¨rsch-Supan 1994). In addition,
to differences in the flexibility to buy and sell residential houses, preferential tax
treatment may shape housing demand. In contrast to a number of other European
countries, there is no preferential tax treatment of owner-occupied housing in Ger-
3Online data code: ilc lvho02.
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many regarding the difference between the after-tax and the pre-tax interest rate
of mortgage loans, which is a likely reason for the high share of rental housing in
Germany (CESifo 2005).4
While Germany is characterized by rather liberal rental laws up to the early 1990s,
a shift takes place since then towards much more “tenant friendly” rental laws (Hu-
bert 1998, Bo¨rsch-Supan 1994). In comparison to other OECD countries, the private
rented housing sector in Germany is strongly regulated, curtailing the flexibility of
landlords. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 in the Appendix, as taken from Johansson (2011),
show that Germany as of 2010 shows a very high level of rent control and an above
average level of tenant protection in international comparison. Despite the tighter
regulations, rents increased strongly during the 1990s and 2000s in most parts of
Germany, especially in the metropolitan areas. Hubert (1998) views the rising
regulation in the 1990s as a response to an acute housing shortage after German
unification in order to avoid strong rent increases for incumbent tenants. Because
rent increases for new leases are less regulated (Bo¨rsch-Supan 1994), strong rent
control for sitting tenants is complemented by tenant protection against eviction by
the landlord motivated by the goal of increasing the rent (henceforth denoted as
economic eviction).
As a further policy response to protect tenants, the Tenancy Law Reform Act5 in
2001 reduces the maximum rent increases for sitting tenants from 30% to 20% over
the course of three years. The new cap applies only, if the planned increase in
rents does not exceed the average rent of comparable units in the neighborhood
(“ortsu¨bliche Vergleichsmiete”) as measured by the local rent index. Rent increases
due to modernization or growing extra costs included in rents are excluded.6 The
local rent index is intended to provide both tenants and landlords an indication of
market conditions and to allow tenants to identify particularly high rents. A local
rent index typically provides the average rent for comparable apartments and the
interval around, which covers two thirds (two-third span) of the rents observed and
which ranges from the one sixth (17%) quantile to the five sixth (83%) quantile.
The local rent index serves as a monitoring instrument for rent control in Germany.
Furthermore, the reform involves a reduction of the minimum notice time until
4The current situation differs strongly from the rather favorable taxation of owner-occupied
housing during the 1970s and 1980s in West Germany, see Hubert (1998) and Bo¨rsch-Supan (1994).
5Gesetz zur Neugliederung, Vereinfachung und Reform des Mietrechts (Mietrechtsreform), see
Bundestag (2000) for a discussion of the objectives of the reform.
6See §558(3), §559, and §560 German Civil Code [BGB] for further details. Based on a sample
from the local rental market, the local rent index (Mietspiegel) reports the average rents and the
dispersion of rents for comparable apartments/housing units.
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termination of a tenancy by the tenant to three months, while it keeps the protection
of the tenant against eviction by the landlord unchanged. Before the reform, the
notice time depends upon the length of the tenancy, with a minimum of three and
a maximum of twelve months. The reform initially only applies to tenancies that
started on September 1, 2001 or later. As an extension of the reform in 2005,
the notice time of three months also applies to tenancies which has started before
September 1, 2001.7 One objective of this chapter is to estimate the statistical
association between the 2001 reform and the length of residency discount over the
distribution of rents.
4.2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses
There exists a sizeable literature in economics on the effect of rent control on the
rental market. Eekhoff (1981), Bo¨rsch-Supan (1986), and Schwager (1994) provide
a theoretical discussion of the welfare implications of a reform in Germany in 1975,
which strengthens the protection of tenants against economic eviction and which reg-
ulates maximum rent increases for sitting tenants.8 There is stronger rent control
for sitting tenants compared to new leases in order to protect sitting tenants. The
predicted welfare effects are ambiguous. On the one hand, there are negative welfare
effects because rent control reduces efficiency and flexibility in the rental market,
thus resulting in deviations from market equilibrium and from the law-of-one-price
for a good with the same characteristics. On the other hand, there could be pos-
itive welfare effects if landlords value the curtailment of their property rights less
than tenants value the benefits of a cap on rent increases in a dynamic perspective
(Bo¨rsch-Supan 1994, Hubert 1995). Furthermore, rent control for sitting tenants
is likely to imply a front loaded rent payment schedule, where landlords would ask
for higher rents at the beginning of a tenancy to compensate for the stronger rent
control during tenancy. This could result in rental payments that decrease with the
length of residency for sitting tenants relative to rents for new leases for comparable
apartments. Further implications of these considerations are that, for a given apart-
ment, rents increase stronger than market rents for comparable apartments where a
new lease starts and therefore landlords have an incentive to evict sitting tenants in
order to realize a rent increase with a new lease. Because of the latter incentive, a
stronger rent control for sitting tenants is typically complemented with a stronger
7See Klarstellungsgesetz 2005 and Art. 229 §3 Abs. 10 EGBGB - Einfu¨hrungsgesetz BGB - for
further information.
8“Law for the Protection of Tenants from Arbitrary Eviction” [Zweites Wohnraumku¨ndigungss-
chutzgesetz (2. WKSchG)] The law is a predecessor of the 2001 Tenancy Law Reform Act.
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protection of sitting tenants against economic eviction.
Before reviewing some empirical results on the length of residency discount, let
us discuss some pertinent theoretical aspects in a bit more detail. A large part
of the U.S. literature (e.g. Guasch and Marshall 1987) argues that the length of
residency discount can be explained by the survival of good matches of landlords
and tenants in the presence of turnover costs for both sides. Providing a somewhat
different perspective, Barker (2003) considers the relationship between turnover costs
and the level of price discrimination between new leases and long-term tenancies.
Landlords of apartments with low turnover costs are more likely to raise rents for
sitting tenants. Furthermore, tenants in new leases could obtain a discount because
of a lower demand elasticity of long-term tenants or because of the higher mobility
costs of the latter. Thus, it is an open empirical question as to whether a length of
residency discount exists.
Relating the length of residency discount to regulation, Hubert (1995) discusses a
possible justification for a regulation, which protects tenants against arbitrary evic-
tion, based on efficiency grounds. The argument relies on adverse selection operating
in the presence of asymmetric information about tenants. If tenants differ in the
’service costs’ to be paid for by the landlords and landlords offer rental contracts
with different lengths, then tenants with low service costs would select into shorter
tenancies because they can show after a while that they are good (≡ low service cost)
tenants. Furthermore, longer tenancies would rather involve tenants with high ser-
vice costs. Increasing tenant protection may overcome an inefficient segmentation
of good (bad) tenants in short-term (long-term) tenancies in market equilibrium.
Hubert (1995) discusses the combination of rent control and tenant protection to
prevent economic eviction. The analysis implies that the length of residency dis-
count increases with the strength of rent control. However, the lower the rent the
stronger is the incentive for economic eviction, possibly using one of the legal routes
(e.g. modernization of apartment). Altogether it is an open empirical question as
to whether tenancies with low rents are more likely to survive because of the higher
interest of tenants to keep a cheap apartment or less likely to survive because of the
higher interest of landlords in economic evictions. Furthermore, rent control may
be binding more for the rent increases for new leases of more expensive apartments.
Thus, it is an open empirical question as to how the length of residency discount
varies across the distribution of rents.
Hoffmann and Kurz (2002) find a length of residency discount for Germany which
could be a kind of compensation for the diminishing quality of an apartment over
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time. Schlicht (1983) interprets the discount as a landlord’s concession trying to keep
good tenants, especially when tenants’ preferences change over time and landlords
want to avoid turnover costs, e.g. forgone rents and search costs for new tenants.
The existing empirical literature for the U.S. mostly finds evidence for a length of
residency discount in average real rents for rental housing when regulation is lower
than in Germany, see e.g. Barnett (1979), Bo¨rsch-Supan (1994), Follain and Malpezzi
(1980), Noland (1979), Goodman and Kawai (1985), Basu and Emerson (2000), or
Guasch and Marshall (1987). Guasch and Marshall (1987) decompose the discount
into a pure sit discount and a length of residency discount. While the former discount
is offered by landlords when contracts are renegotiated, the latter discount is given
for each additional year tenants spend in the same rental unit. Using the Annual
Housing Survey (AHS) data from 1974 to 1977 they estimate multiple specifications
and find a sit discount between 6% and 13% and an annual residency discount be-
tween 0.2% and 0.8%.9 Using data of 102 apartment complexes in US-American
metropolitan areas, Barker (2003) finds that discounts for short-term tenants are
more common. Since rental payments rise faster than turnover costs, he predicts
that discounts for new leases become more frequent. Sims (2007) analyzes the effect
of rent control in various cities in Massachusetts that ended in 1995. The rent in-
crease was adjusted to a specific annual rate, condominium conversions were made
harder for landlords to avoid a reduction of the rental stock, and a prohibition
to evict tenants without permission was imposed. Altogether, only 20% of rental
housing was under active control because vacancy decontrol was possible. Based
on difference-in-differences estimates, Sims (2007) finds that rent control leads to
a significant rent decline. Furthermore, tenants’ mobility falls as measured by sig-
nificantly longer tenancies and the stock of rental housing declines because of the
reduced attractiveness of rental apartments as investments for landlords.
Summing up and providing an outlook on our empirical analysis, our reading of the
literature implies that the empirical studies so far have been restricted to an empiri-
cal analysis of how average rents vary by length of residency and other characteristics
of the apartment and the tenant. We provide an analysis of the change in rents for
new leases and of the effect of the length of residency (elapsed tenure) depending
on the level of rents using quantile regression. The theoretical considerations above
suggest that the length of residency discount depends upon tenants’ characteristics
9Guasch and Marshall (1987) also implement a selection correction for the termination of a
tenancy accounting for selection on unobservables. Correcting for selection on unobservables in
our quantile regression estimates is beyond the scope of this chapter for two reasons. First, how
to account for selection when estimating quantile regression is still subject of an intensive debate
(Huber and Melly 2012). Second, finding a credible instrument with sufficient bite is difficult.
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such that tenants with lower mobility costs experience a higher discount. The dis-
count should be larger when rents for new leases show a strong upward trend. It is
an open empirical question as to how the length of residence discount varies with the
level of rents because, on the one hand, tenants are more interested to keep a cheaper
apartment and rent control may be binding more for the rent increases for new leases
of more expensive apartments. On the other hand, landlords of cheaper apartments
have a higher incentive for economic evictions and there may be a stronger need for
a modernization of the apartment justifying a rent increase. Furthermore, the above
considerations imply that a reform strengthening the protection of sitting tenants
against eviction and against rent increase should increase the length of residency
discount. However, it is a priori unclear as to how the increase varies with the size
of the rent. Because the theoretical considerations suggest that the level of rents
and the length of residency discount depend upon both tenants’ characteristics and
characteristics of the apartment, we use a panel of linked housing-tenant data.
4.3 Data
The empirical analysis uses the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), a
representative annual household panel survey.10 Because of a lack of information
on East German rental units before German unification and the ongoing transition
process as well as the strong regulation of rents in East Germany during the 1990s,
our analysis is restricted to West Germany.
The SOEP offers detailed information on rental housing from the perspective of ten-
ants, thus providing linked housing-tenant data.11 Because these are panel data on
tenancies, we can study the length of residency discount within tenancies. The avail-
able variables include the size of an apartment (or house) in square meters (sqm),
its equipment like the existence of a basement, balcony or terrace, and a garden, the
type of building regarding the number of rental units and the year of construction,
information as to whether the apartment is subsidized by the government and as to
whether there is a private or a public landlord. We exclude outliers with a reported
apartment size of less than 20 sqm and more than 200 sqm as well as observations
with a reported monthly rent of less than 50 Euros (in current prices).
10We use the version of the data set for the time period 1984-2011, http://dx.doi.org/10.
5684/soep.v28.1 (see Wagner et al. (2007), Wagner et al. (2008) and Schupp (2009) for further
information).
11We coin this term in analogy to linked employer-employee data used in labor market research.
Up to our knowledge, the term linked housing-tenant data (or another term conveying the same
idea) has not been used so far in the literature.
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To account for variation in regional housing markets, we account for the state (“Bun-
desland”) and we use detailed information on the location available in the SOEP, such
as city size (number of inhabitants), region, type of residential area, and informa-
tion on amenities in the local neighborhood.12 In addition, one observes the length
of residence so far (tenure ≡ elapsed tenancy duration). Our panel data allow us
to control for unobserved time-invariant tenancy-specific characteristics, which can
account for biases induced by the selective termination of tenancies (Guasch and
Marshall 1987). Our dependent variable of interest is the monthly real gross rent
actually paid (without costs for heating) - henceforth referred to as rent. We deflate
rents to 2005 prices using the consumer price index.
The final data set consists of 13,694 households and 21,401 tenancies, which means
that we observe on average 1.6 tenancies per household. To account for the 2001
Tenancy Law Reform Act, we define a dummy variable that indicates whether the
tenancy started on September 1, 2001 or later.
4.4 Econometric Approach
4.4.1 Hedonic Price Model
We estimate a standard hedonic price regression which we augment with variables
observed for tenants. The estimated model decomposes the price of a product into
the prices for its characteristics, which are denoted as implicit prices because they
are not directly observed. Waugh (1929) and Court (1939) were the first to use this
approach. Court was the first to refer to these implicit prices as hedonic prices.
Griliches (1961 and 1971), Lancaster (1966 and 1971), and Rosen (1974) introduced
the hedonic price model to a wider audience of economists. Hedonic price models are
estimated for two reasons. First, for the construction of price indices to account for
changes in the quality of a product and, second, for the identification of consumer
demand for characteristics of heterogeneous products (Sheppard, 1999).
We specify the rent for a rental unit by
12The information on the amenities is available for the years 1986, 1994, 1999, 2004, and 2009. To
impute the values in between, we assume that within a tenancy the distance to amenities measured
by the time needed by foot to reach the amenity does not change over time.
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log(rent) = β0 +
k∑
j=1
βj ·Xj + ε(4.1)
with the log deflated rental payment log(rent) as dependent variable that is de-
composed in βj, the implicit price of the corresponding apartment characteristics
Xj for j = 1, . . . , k, and an idiosyncratic error term ε. Court (1941) notes that, in
competitive markets, implicit or hedonic prices can be interpreted as a consumer’s
marginal willingness to pay if he or she is able to choose between a sufficiently large
number of units that vary in their characteristics. However, based on the limited
set of characteristics of the apartment observed and because of likely frictions in the
rental housing market, prices for apartments with the same observed characteristics
vary. Consumers may differ in their willingness to pay and the limited mobility
of tenants may prevent relative prices to equal the willingness to pay for certain
characteristics. These issues motivate the estimation of quantile regressions.
Sirmans, Macpherson, and Zietz (2005) examine more than 125 hedonic price mod-
els for housing data. Their findings indicate that implicit prices of certain house
characteristics may vary strongly in magnitude and even in direction. They argue
that this variation cannot be explained solely by the fact that different samples or
different identification strategies are used. Zietz, Zietz, and Sirmans (2007) and Zi-
etz, Sirmans, and Smersh (2008) discuss this problem from a theoretical perspective
and conclude that due to a heterogeneous supply and demand structure housing
markets are divided into different segments where each segment can be identified
by its own supply and demand curve. This may result in segment-specific prices.
Decomposing the unconditional rental price distribution of advertised apartments
in Berlin, Thomschke (2015) finds that the increase in rental prices are due to a
changing demand structure regarding quality and quantity rather than a change in
apartment characteristics, especially in the high-price segment. In addition, it is
likely that the distribution of unobservables, as measured by the dispersion of prices
within cells defined by observed apartment characteristics, may differ across seg-
ments. These considerations further motivate the estimation of quantile regressions
which can account for segment-specific price differences.
4.4.2 Quantile Regression
While OLS regression estimates the effects of covariates on the conditional expec-
tation, a quantile regression estimates the effect on quantiles of the conditional
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distribution of the response variable. Quantile regressions allow for varying effects
across different positions on the entire conditional distribution and therefore provide
more details on the relationship between covariates and the dependent variable, see
Koenker and Hallock (2001) and Koenker (2005) for details. Thus, it is possible to
estimate how the market valuation of characteristics of apartments varies with the
level of rents across the conditional rent distribution. A further advantage is that
quantile regressions are more robust than OLS to outliers in the dependent variable.
Estimating quantile regressions at different quantiles for panel data on tenancies
can reveal the net effect of rent setting for new leases and sorting effects due to
termination of tenancies if the ranking of rents across tenancies does not change
over time. For instance, if the length of residency discount is generally higher (lower)
at the top of the rent distribution than at the bottom, then tenancies for cheaper
apartments may be more (less) likely to end early. Furthermore, if the discount
between the first and the second year of a tenancy is higher (lower) at the top of
the rent distribution than at the bottom, then rents for new leases grow more (less)
for more expensive apartments compared to less expensive apartments.
We estimate quantile regressions at the median, at the 17%- (one sixth) and at the
83%- (five sixth) quantile of the conditional rent distribution. This way we cover
the two-third span of conditional rents as it is customary for an official local rent
index in Germany. We obtain clustered standard errors for our estimated coeffi-
cients through bootstrapping based on 200 resamples. We resample entire tenancies
to account for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of the error term within a
tenancy. To identify the nonlinear effect of length of tenancy, we construct linear
splines. After a cross-validation of models with equally positioned but varying num-
ber of knots, the final specification has knots at the 3%, 34%, 66%, and 97% quantile
of the unconditional distribution of elapsed tenure within a tenancy. Because the
3% quantile is zero, only three knots enter the analysis. An interaction between the
reform dummy and length of tenancy splines are used to analyze how the reform
affects the length of residency discount.
As robustness check, we estimate panel regressions accounting for mean tenancy
fixed effects as suggested for quantile regression by Canay (2011). We first estimate
the fixed effects OLS regression and obtain the mean tenancy fixed effects. Then, to
implement the quantile regressions with fixed effect, we subtract the mean tenancy
fixed effects from the rents within a tenancy and estimate the panel quantile regres-
sions for these adjusted rents. This simple two-step approach does not suffer from
the incidental parameter problem because the estimated fixed effect is part of the
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dependent variable. However, the approach does not allow for fixed effects which
differ across quantiles.
4.5 Empirical Results
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1 shows means and standard deviations of apartment characteristics for
the full sample as well as for subsamples with tenancies starting before September
1, 2001, or afterwards [before and after the reform - here and henceforth, after
September 1, 2001 also includes tenancies that start on September 1, 2001]. 16%
(84%) of the tenancies are observed to have started after (before) September 1, 2001.
The column labeled “Difference” displays results of t-tests of equality of means for
each variable in both subsamples. The average rent for tenancies starting after the
reform is e 461 and the average rent for tenancies starting before the reform is
e 399.
Both subsamples differ significantly in further apartment characteristics which ex-
plains the higher average rent observed for the after-reform subsample. Tenancies
starting after the reform are on average 2.6 sqm larger, can rather be found in more
recently built tenancy-occupied houses (especially in houses built after 1990), and are
on average better equipped (more likely to include a balcony, a terrace or a garden,
and central heating). Mechanically, the elapsed tenure in tenancies starting after the
reform is 9.8 years shorter. In addition to differences in apartment characteristics,
the households in the two subsamples value (assess) their rental payment and apart-
ment size in a different way.13 Tenants in the after-reform subsample tend to be less
satisfied with both the rent level and the apartment size. While for tenancies starting
before the reform, 37.6% of the tenants think that their apartments are inexpensive,
after the reform only 28.7% agree with this statement. Correspondingly, 22.4% of
the tenants affected by the reform and 18.6% of the tenants in tenancies starting
before the reform think that their apartments are expensive. These subjective as-
sessments can be rationalized by comparing the tenant household’s rent-to-income
ratio.14 The rent-to-income ratio is 25.6% for tenancies starting before the reform
and 29% for tenancies starting after the reform. Furthermore, tenants in the after-
13The variables displayed in Table 4.1 under “Further Characteristics” are only used for descrip-
tive comparisons. They are not part of the specification of the final regressions.
14The rent-to-income ratio is calculated as the share of the household net income that is spent
on the gross rent without heating.
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reform subsample are on average less satisfied with the apartment size. After the
reform, 23.3% of the tenants (and therefore 2.9%-points more than for tenancies
starting before the reform) say that their apartments are too small. However, after
the reform the apartment size in sqm per person is 1.1 sqm higher (45.9 sqm against
44.8 sqm per person) than before. Apparently, the demand for larger (and better
equipped) apartments is rising over time.
Table 4.2 shows mean differences in some key variables between rental apartments
in the first tertile (low-price segment) and the third tertile (high-price segment) of
the unconditional rent distribution. The average apartment size in the high-price
segment is 88.5 sqm, which is 30 sqm larger than in the low-price segment. Average
elapsed tenure is 8.3 years and significantly shorter than in low-price apartments,
whose average elapsed tenure is about 13 years. High-price apartments are rather
located in new residential areas, in recently built houses/buildings, in larger cities,
and in centers (evidence on the latter three variables is available upon request).
As to be expected, high-price apartments are on average better equipped. For
instance, in the high-price segment, 83.8% of the apartments are equipped with
a balcony or terrace, whereas the share is 33.9 percentage points lower in the low-
price segment. Also apartments in the high-price segment are rather located next
to stores, parks, sports complexes or public transport, and the apartment size per
person is larger (46.2 sqm per person in the high-price segment versus 43.6 sqm
per person in the low-price segment). Households in the high-price segment tend
to assess the rent as being too high and the size of the apartment as being too
large compared to the assessments in the low-price segment. Consistent with the
subjective assessments, there is a significantly higher rent-to-income ratio in the
high-price segment (30% in the high-price segment versus 21.9% in the low-price
segment). The evidence suggests that tenants in the high-price segment do indeed
demand higher quality apartments, but they tend to think that their apartments are
over-priced and possibly too well equipped relative to their needs. These findings
are consistent with the large rent increases during the 1990s and 2000s, and they
may explain the political momentum towards stronger rent control at the time. The
observed differences across the distribution of rents further motivate the estimation
of quantile regressions.
4.5.2 Estimation Results
Table 4.3 provides the estimation results for our baseline panel OLS and quantile
regressions. We estimate quantile regressions at the median (QR 50%), at the one
189
sixth (QR 17%), and at the five sixth (QR 83%) quantile. The column ‘83%-17%’
involves Wald test statistics for the significance of the difference of the coefficients
between QR 83% and QR 17%.
Quite uniformly, the covariates apartment size, city size, and central location show
the expected positive effects on rents. The differences across quantiles are mostly
not significant, but there are some notable exceptions. The average partial effect
of apartment size increases between the two quantiles by 3.2 log points, thus im-
plying a higher dispersion of rents for larger apartments. Regarding the type of
house, rents for nondetached houses and apartments in multiunit buildings are ce-
teris paribus higher than in detached houses. A priori, one would expect ceteris
paribus a higher rent for detached houses and our estimates should not be viewed as
being causal. Most likely, detached houses and multiunit buildings differ on average
in some unmeasured characteristics. Furthermore, in multiunit buildings, the rents
are less dispersed than in detached houses. It is likely that unobserved characteris-
tics among detached houses are more dispersed than in more standardized multiunit
buildings. Rents are higher in new residential areas compared to old residential ar-
eas, typically in apartments with more amenities in walking distance, and in better
equipped apartments. Rents are higher and more dispersed for private landlords and
for non-subsidized housing. A housing subsidy may imply a particular restriction on
rent increases for higher rents. Private landlords, who tend to focus more on higher
revenues, are more likely to raise rents compared to non-private landlords.
Let us now turn to our estimates of the length of residency discount. We estimate
flexible linear splines and our regressions report the slope (the annual discount) for
each linear segment of our splines. For the first three years of a tenancy, we find a
significant annual reduction of rents which amounts to 1.5 log points per year and
the decline is significantly stronger for higher rents. At the 83% quantile the annual
discount amounts to 2 log points while at the 17% quantile the annual discount
is only 0.8 log points. From the fourth year of a tenancy onwards, the residency
discounts become more uniform. While at the 17% quantile the annual discount
increases slightly to 1 log point, it falls to 0.9 log points at the 83% quantile. After
twelve years of a tenancy, the annual discount is much smaller and varies between
0.2 and 0.4 log points. However, the discount is still significant.
The baseline rent regressions further control for year dummies, states, and the year
of construction (the corresponding coefficients and further details are available upon
request). As to be expected, rents increase with the year of construction and the
increase is significantly stronger at the bottom of the rent distribution compared to
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the top. There are also significant differences in rents across states.
Let us now consider the time and the reform effects. The estimated time effects
reflect a uniform growth of average and median rents (deflated by the CPI) between
1984 and 2001 by 24 log points. The increase is five log points higher at the 17%
quantile compared to the 83% quantile (the difference is significant at the 5% level).
The stronger increase at the bottom of the distribution may explain the strong
political demands for further rent control in the 1990s and 2000s. Incidentally, rents
do not increase further after 2001 and rents at the 17% quantile (83% quantile)
are five (two) log points lower in 2011 compared to 2001. This suggests that rent
growth has stopped after 2001 but it has to be kept in mind that the regression also
includes a dummy variable ‘After Reform’ which corresponds to tenancies starting
after the reform in 2001. The average reform effect is -5.5 log points and the decline
is 2.5 log points stronger at the top of the distribution compared to the bottom.
One explanation could be that more expensive tenancies are less likely to survive
because tenants are more mobile. However, the difference across the distribution
is not significant (P -value = 12.4%). Altogether we find a general decline in rents
after 2001 and a further decline of rents for new tenancies after the reform. While
the general decline is stronger for lower rents the specific (partial) reform effect is
stronger for higher rents. Prima facie, our findings suggest that in times of generally
falling rents the reform did in fact result both in reducing rent growth for new leases
and in curtailing especially the rents of expensive new leases. The latter implies
that households living in expensive apartments tend to benefit more from the reform
than households living in cheaper apartments. Thus, one may be concerned that
the reform may not have been sufficiently targeted if the goal was to curtail rents
for low-income tenants who tend to pay lower rents.
Next, we investigate the impact of the reform on the length of residency discount.
As discussed above, one would expect that the reform increases the discount, and
the reduction should be particularly strong for higher rents. We interact the reform
dummy with the splines in elapsed tenure, and we account for the fact that we do
not observe long tenancies which started after the reform. After the reform, we
only estimate two linear spline segments up to an elapsed tenure of up to 11 years.
Table 4.4 provides the annual discounts estimated separately before and after the
reform (all other covariates are as in the baseline regressions reported in Table 4.3
and results for the other covariates are available upon request). The general pattern
of the annual discounts before the reform is quite similar to the results discussed
above. During the first three years of a tenancy, the annual discount is 1.7 log
points at the 83% quantile, being 1.3 log points (significantly) larger than at the
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17% quantile. From the fourth year onwards, the annual discount is more uniform
and lies between 0.9 and 1 log point until the eleventh year. After the reform, the
annual discount during the first three years of a tenancy amounts to 1.4 log points
at the 17% quantile and 3.4 log points at the 83% quantile. However, after the
fourth year there is no further length of residency discount after the reform. Thus,
the reform effect reverses its sign. While during the first three years of a tenancy
rents are reduced, the reform effect is significantly reduced afterwards, especially for
higher rents. This finding may be related to the fact that in general real rents are
falling after the reform and CPI inflation is generally low, thus restricting the scope
for rent increases at low tenure levels. Nevertheless, in accordance with our prior
expectations, the rent gap between new leases and sitting tenants over the first three
years of tenure increases with the reform because the reform curtails rent increases
for sitting tenants without putting additional restrictions on rent increases for new
leases. At the same time, however, rent increases fall in general after the reform,
thus limiting in particular the scope for rent increases for sitting tenants, which may
explain that the residency discount disappears after the third year of tenure.
4.5.3 Tenancy Fixed Effects
To examine the sensitivity of our results to potential unobserved confounders that
are constant within tenancies, we reestimate the models in Table 4.4 also accounting
for tenancy fixed effects. To do so, we first exclude 6,591 tenancies (7.1% of our full
sample) with only one observation and estimate the tenancy fixed effects regression
based on this restricted sample. Table 4.5 provides the fixed effects estimates for
the residency discount before and after the reform. The estimated annual discounts
are broadly similar to the results reported in Table 4.4, but there are some inter-
esting differences. Before the reform, the annual discount is 0.9 log points at the
17% quantile and 1.5 log points at the 83% quantile. While the discount at the
17% (83%) quantile is slightly stronger (weaker) than in the model without fixed
effects, the OLS estimate remains the same as before. After the fourth year, the
estimated discount becomes even significantly larger at the 17% quantile compared
to the 83% quantile. These results are compatible with sorting effects such that
high price tenancies are more likely to end early (before year 11), thus enhancing
the ‘observed’ discount at the top of the distribution as reported in Table 4.4. This
finding would be consistent with tenants in high-price rental units searching more
strongly for cheaper alternatives. In contrast, more expensive tenancies in the low
price segment tend to survive longer, thus reducing slightly the ‘observed’ discount
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at the bottom of the distribution as reported in Table 4.4. This finding would be
consistent with tenants in low-price rental units being more likely to experience eco-
nomic evictions or to search for better quality alternatives. Note, however, that
the small differences for the quantile regressions between Table 4.4 and 4.5 should
not be overinterpreted. Because the changes in the fixed effects estimates of the
discount across the distribution change in an almost balanced way, the OLS fixed
effects discount estimates remain unchanged.
For tenancies starting after the reform, we find larger annual discounts during the
first three years and smaller discounts afterwards compared to the results without
fixed effects. The direction of changes is the same for both OLS and quantile re-
gressions, and the results during the first three years are also compatible with more
expensive tenancies ending earlier during a tenancy. There are no apparent sorting
effects for less expensive tenancies.
Summing up, controlling for tenancy fixed effects does not affect the qualitative
nature of our results. If anything, sorting effects are only playing a minor role.
4.6 Conclusions
The large private rental housing market in Germany shows a higher level of regu-
lation through rent control and tenant protection against eviction than the OECD
average. In contrast to the current situation, Germany was characterized by fairly
liberal rent laws until the 1990s. In light of housing shortages and strong rent in-
creases in the 1990s, there was a change towards more regulation in order to protect
sitting tenants. For instance, the German government passed the Tenancy Law
Reform Act in 2001 to restrict rent increases and to strengthen the protection of
tenants against eviction. Based on linked housing-tenant data from the Socioeco-
nomic Panel, this chapter estimates panel OLS and quantile regressions of rents
within tenancies during the time period 1984 and 2011. Specifically, we analyze the
impact of the Tenancy Law Reform Act implemented in 2001 (the reform) on the
level of rents and on the residency discount.
Our main findings are as follows. Households whose tenancy started after the reform
rather live in newer and in better equipped rental units. The rent-to-income ratio
is significantly larger than for households living in tenancies that started before the
reform. Although the rental units are 1.14 sqm per person larger after the reform,
the share of tenants, who assess the size of their rental unit as being too small,
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increases after the reform. This suggests that demand for better equipped housing
increases over time.
Our empirical results show a significant annual residence discount which decreases
in absolute value with tenure, which is stronger at the top than at the bottom of the
rent distribution, which is stronger early in a tenancy, and which falls with elapsed
tenure. The reform shows a significantly negative effect on rents altogether and
the negative effect becomes stronger over the distribution. At the 83% quantile the
reduction amounts to 5.7 log points and it is 3.2 log points at the 17% quantile. Thus,
households living in expensive apartments tend to benefit more from the reform than
households living in cheaper apartments.
Furthermore, we find significant annual residency discounts. During the first three
years of a tenancy the discounts are higher at the top compared to the bottom
of the conditional rent distribution. From the fourth year onwards, however, the
annual discounts are smaller and become more similar across the rent distribution.
The reform further increases the annual residency discount for tenants during the
first three years of a tenancy, but from the fourth year onwards the annual residency
discount vanishes after the reform. Our results on the residency discounts are robust
to including tenancy mean fixed effects. The evidence suggests that the reform was
successful in curtailing rent increases especially for expensive apartments early in a
tenancy but there is no evidence that rents for new leases increase disproportionately
in response. However, this result must not be overinterpreted because, while real
rents grew strongly during the 1990s, the increase in real rents stopped in the 2000s
even for those apartments which were unaffected by the reform.
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4.8 Appendix
Figures
Figure 4.1: Rent Control in the Private Rental Market,1 2009
Figure 4.2: Tenant-Landlord Regulations in the Private Rental Market,2 2009
1. Scale 0-6: Increasing in degree of control. This indicator is a composite indicator of the ex-
tent of controls of rents, how increases in rents are determined and the permitted cost pass-
through onto rents in each country. Control of rent levels includes information on whether
rent levels can be freely negotiated between the landlord and the tenant, coverage of controls
on rent levels and the criteria for setting rent levels (market based, utility/cost based, nego-
tiation based or income based). Controls of rent increases includes information on whether
rent increases can be freely agreed by the landlord/tenant, whether rent increases are reg-
ularly indexed to some cost/price index or if increases are capped or determined through
some other administrative procedure, including negotiation between tenant/landlord asso-
ciations. The pass-through of costs onto rents includes information on whether landlords
are allowed to pass on increases in costs onto rents (cost pass-through) and the extent of
such pass-through i.e. the types of cost that can be passed on.
2. Scale 0-6: Increasing in protection for tenants. The indicator measures the extent of tenant-
landlord regulation within a tenancy. It includes the ease of evicting a tenant, degree of
tenure security and deposit requirements.
Source: Johansson (2011)
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Tables
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Full Before Reform After Reform Difference
Rent (Deflated to 2005 e) 408.919 399.009 460.864 61.855∗∗∗
(195.404) (187.442) (225.720) (1.734)
Apartment Size (in m2) 72.136 71.716 74.338 2.622∗∗∗
(25.268) (24.756) (27.690) (0.226)
Elapsed Tenure (in Years) 10.922 12.489 2.705 −9.784∗∗∗
(11.973) (12.431) (2.060) (0.102)
Private Landlord 0.741 0.724 0.789 0.065∗∗∗
(0.438) (0.447) (0.408) (0.004)
Subsidized Housing 0.147 0.166 0.047 −0.119∗∗∗
(0.354) (0.372) (0.211) (0.003)
Year of Construction
Before 1918 0.110 0.112 0.096 −0.017∗∗∗
(0.313) (0.316) (0.294) (0.003)
1918 to 1948 0.168 0.170 0.154 −0.016∗∗∗
(0.374) (0.376) (0.361) (0.003)
1949 to 1971 0.436 0.452 0.345 −0.107∗∗∗
(0.496) (0.498) (0.475) (0.005)
1972 to 1980 0.168 0.169 0.164 −0.005
(0.374) (0.375) (0.370) (0.003)
1981 to 1990 0.055 0.050 0.078 0.027∗∗∗
(0.227) (0.219) (0.268) (0.002)
Since 1991 0.064 0.046 0.163 0.117∗∗∗
(0.245) (0.210) (0.370) (0.002)
City Size (Number of Inhabitants, k =ˆ 1000 inhabitants)
≥ 500k (Center) 0.417 0.431 0.342 −0.089∗∗∗
(0.493) (0.495) (0.474) (0.004)
≥ 500k (Suburb) 0.095 0.099 0.076 −0.022∗∗∗
(0.293) (0.298) (0.266) (0.003)
100k to 500k (Center) 0.150 0.138 0.211 0.073∗∗∗
(0.357) (0.345) (0.408) (0.003)
100k to 500k (Suburb) 0.064 0.054 0.113 0.059∗∗∗
(0.244) (0.227) (0.317) (0.002)
50k to 100k (Center) 0.029 0.030 0.025 −0.005∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.171) (0.155) (0.002)
50k to 100k (Suburb) 0.024 0.020 0.048 0.028∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.140) (0.213) (0.001)
20k to 50k 0.074 0.071 0.089 0.018∗∗∗
(0.262) (0.257) (0.284) (0.002)
5k to 20k 0.093 0.097 0.067 −0.031∗∗∗
<continued on next page>
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Descriptive Statistics <continued>
Variable Full Before Reform After Reform Difference
(0.290) (0.297) (0.250) (0.003)
< 5k 0.054 0.059 0.029 −0.030∗∗∗
(0.227) (0.236) (0.169) (0.002)
Type of House
Detached House 0.131 0.127 0.152 0.025∗∗∗
(1-2 Family) (0.337) (0.332) (0.359) (0.003)
Nondetached House 0.081 0.082 0.079 −0.002
(1-2 Family) (0.273) (0.274) (0.270) (0.002)
Apt. in 3-4 Units Bldg. 0.180 0.176 0.201 0.025∗∗∗
(0.384) (0.381) (0.401) (0.003)
Apt. in 5-8 Units Bldg. 0.363 0.369 0.334 −0.034∗∗∗
(0.481) (0.482) (0.472) (0.004)
Apt. in 9+ Units Bldg. 0.211 0.215 0.192 −0.023∗∗∗
(0.408) (0.411) (0.394) (0.004)
High-Rise Apt. Bldg. 0.020 0.020 0.022 0.002∗
(0.141) (0.140) (0.147) (0.001)
Other Bldg. 0.013 0.012 0.019 0.006∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.110) (0.136) (0.001)
Residential Area
Old Residential Area 0.287 0.272 0.368 0.095∗∗∗
(0.453) (0.445) (0.482) (0.004)
New Residential Area 0.372 0.387 0.293 −0.094∗∗∗
(0.483) (0.487) (0.455) (0.004)
Mixed Area 0.313 0.314 0.305 −0.009∗∗
(0.464) (0.464) (0.460) (0.004)
Other Areas 0.021 0.022 0.017 −0.006∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.147) (0.127) (0.001)
Equipment
Central Heating 0.899 0.887 0.963 0.076∗∗∗
(0.302) (0.317) (0.190) (0.003)
Balcony or Terrace 0.678 0.669 0.725 0.056∗∗∗
(0.467) (0.471) (0.446) (0.004)
Basement 0.934 0.937 0.919 −0.018∗∗∗
(0.248) (0.242) (0.273) (0.002)
Garden 0.323 0.316 0.360 0.044∗∗∗
(0.468) (0.465) (0.480) (0.004)
Amenities in 10 Minutes Walking Distance
Stores 0.643 0.644 0.635 −0.010∗
(0.479) (0.479) (0.482) (0.005)
<continued on next page>
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Variable Full Before Reform After Reform Difference
Park 0.537 0.530 0.582 0.052∗∗∗
(0.499) (0.499) (0.493) (0.005)
Sports Complex 0.362 0.355 0.408 0.053∗∗∗
(0.481) (0.478) (0.491) (0.005)
Public Transport 0.860 0.859 0.861 0.001
(0.347) (0.348) (0.346) (0.004)
Further Characteristics
Rent-to-Income Ratio 0.262 0.256 0.290 0.034∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.202) (0.155) (0.002)
Apt. Size per 45.003 44.820 45.957 1.137∗∗∗
Person (sqm/Person) (21.325) (21.282) (21.520) (0.190)
Rent Inexpensive 0.363 0.376 0.287 −0.090∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.481) (0.484) (0.452) (0.005)
Rent Reasonable 0.445 0.438 0.490 0.052∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.497) (0.496) (0.500) (0.005)
Rent Expensive 0.192 0.186 0.224 0.037∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.394) (0.389) (0.417) (0.004)
Apt. Size Too Small 0.208 0.204 0.233 0.029∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.406) (0.403) (0.423) (0.004)
Apt. Size Appropriate 0.726 0.730 0.707 −0.023∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.446) (0.444) (0.455) (0.004)
Apt. Size Too Large 0.065 0.066 0.060 −0.006∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.247) (0.248) (0.238) (0.002)
Apt. Condition Good 0.606 0.600 0.637 0.037∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.489) (0.490) (0.481) (0.004)
Share of Observations 100% 84% 16% −
Note: Calculations use the SOEP sample weights. The table reports means and standard de-
viations/standard errors in parentheses. The column labeled “Full” refers to the full sample.
The columns labeled “Before Reform” and “After Reform” refer to the subsamples with tenan-
cies starting before and after September 1, 2001, respectively. The column labeled“Difference”
reports the mean difference between the two subsamples and its standard error. “Apt.” de-
notes apartment, “Bldg.” building, *,** and *** significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level,
respectively. For sets of dummy variables the reference category is printed in bold. Variables
reported under “Further Characteristics” are not used for the final regressions. Source: SOEP
V28.1 and authors’ calculations.
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Table 4.2: Further Descriptive Statistics by Tertiles of Rents
Variable Overall 1st Tertile 3rd Tertile Difference
Rent (Deflated to 2005 e) 408.919 236.537 616.985 380.448∗∗∗
(195.404) (52.544) (189.963) (1.113)
Apartment Size (in sqm) 72.136 58.270 88.456 30.186∗∗∗
(25.268) (20.484) (25.456) (0.184)
Elapsed Tenure (in Years) 10.922 12.991 8.340 −4.651∗∗∗
(11.973) (13.412) (9.684) (0.093)
Private Landlord 0.741 0.665 0.832 0.168∗∗∗
(0.438) (0.472) (0.373) (0.004)
Subsidized Housing 0.147 0.210 0.082 −0.128∗∗∗
(0.354) (0.407) (0.275) (0.003)
Tenancy Starting 0.160 0.112 0.205 0.093∗∗∗
After Reform (0.367) (0.315) (0.404) (0.003)
Type of House
Detached House 0.131 0.135 0.139 0.004
(1-2 Family) (0.337) (0.342) (0.346) (0.003)
Nondetached House 0.081 0.077 0.106 0.030∗∗∗
(1-2 Family) (0.273) (0.266) (0.308) (0.002)
Apt. in 3-4 Units Bldg. 0.180 0.177 0.176 0.000
(0.384) (0.381) (0.381) (0.003)
Apt. in 5-8 Units Bldg. 0.363 0.373 0.326 −0.048∗∗∗
(0.481) (0.484) (0.469) (0.004)
Apt. in 9+ Units Bldg. 0.211 0.204 0.219 0.015∗∗∗
(0.408) (0.403) (0.414) (0.003)
High-Rise Apt. Bldg. 0.020 0.017 0.024 0.007∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.128) (0.153) (0.001)
Other Bldg. 0.013 0.017 0.010 −0.008∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.130) (0.098) (0.001)
Residential Area
Old Residential Area 0.287 0.337 0.235 −0.101∗∗∗
(0.453) (0.473) (0.424) (0.004)
New Residential Area 0.372 0.323 0.425 0.102∗∗∗
(0.483) (0.467) (0.494) (0.004)
Mixed Area 0.313 0.315 0.308 −0.007∗∗
(0.464) (0.465) (0.462) (0.004)
Other Areas 0.021 0.022 0.025 0.003∗∗
(0.144) (0.145) (0.155) (0.001)
Equipment
Central Heating 0.899 0.789 0.971 0.181∗∗∗
(0.302) (0.408) (0.169) (0.003)
Balcony or Terrace 0.678 0.498 0.838 0.339∗∗∗
<continued on next page>
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Further Descriptive Statistics by Tertiles <continued>
Variable Overall 1st Tertile 3rd Tertile Difference
(0.467) (0.500) (0.369) (0.004)
Basement 0.934 0.904 0.961 0.058∗∗∗
(0.248) (0.295) (0.193) (0.002)
Garden 0.323 0.303 0.372 0.068∗∗∗
(0.468) (0.460) (0.483) (0.004)
Amenities in 10 Minutes Walking Distance
Stores 0.643 0.635 0.658 0.023∗∗∗
(0.479) (0.481) (0.474) (0.004)
Park 0.537 0.505 0.583 0.078∗∗∗
(0.499) (0.500) (0.493) (0.004)
Sport Complex 0.362 0.344 0.394 0.051∗∗∗
(0.481) (0.475) (0.489) (0.004)
Public Transport 0.860 0.837 0.881 0.044∗∗∗
(0.347) (0.369) (0.324) (0.003)
Further Characteristics
Rent-to-Income Ratio 0.262 0.219 0.300 0.082∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.143) (0.185) (0.001)
Apt. Size per 45.003 43.614 46.218 2.604∗∗∗
Person (sqm/Person) (21.325) (19.270) (23.771) (0.173)
Rent Inexpensive 0.363 0.498 0.223 −0.275∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.481) (0.500) (0.416) (0.004)
Rent Reasonable 0.445 0.386 0.490 0.104∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.497) (0.487) (0.500) (0.004)
Rent Expensive 0.192 0.116 0.287 0.170∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.394) (0.320) (0.452) (0.003)
Apt. Size: Too Small 0.208 0.237 0.184 −0.053∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.406) (0.425) (0.387) (0.003)
Apt. Size: Appropriate 0.726 0.726 0.717 −0.009∗∗
(Assessment) (0.446) (0.446) (0.451) (0.004)
Apt. Size: Too Large 0.065 0.038 0.100 0.062∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.247) (0.190) (0.299) (0.002)
Good Apt. Condition 0.606 0.545 0.661 0.115∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.489) (0.498) (0.474) (0.004)
Note: Calculations use the SOEP sample weights. The table reports the overall mean, the
mean in the first tertile (one third quantile), the mean in the third tertile (two third quantile)
of the unconditional rent distribution, and the difference between the tertile-specific means.
See Table 4.1 for further details.
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Table 4.3: Baseline Rent Regressions
Variable QR 17% QR 50% QR 83% 83% - 17% OLS
Annual Residency Discount
0 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 3 −0.008∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗−0.020∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗−0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
4 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 11 −0.010∗∗∗−0.009∗∗∗−0.009∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
12 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 41 −0.002∗∗∗−0.003∗∗∗−0.004∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Elapsed Tenure ≥ 42 years 0.002 0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Reform Effect
After Reform −0.032∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗−0.057∗∗∗ −0.025 −0.055∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.009) (0.013) (0.016) (0.010)
Apartment Size
Ln(Size) 0.489∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.064 0.509∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.025) (0.028) (0.044) (0.027)
Ln(Size) × Balcony 0.086∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.021 0.109∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.019) (0.018) (0.028) (0.017)
Ln(Size) × Basement 0.219∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ −0.049 0.181∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.027) (0.030) (0.046) (0.026)
Ln (Size) (APE) 0.748∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.749∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011)
City Size by Population (Ref.cat.: < 5k)
≥ 500k (Central Location) 0.268∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.009 0.277∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.020) (0.018) (0.025) (0.017)
≥ 500k (Suburb) 0.223∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ −0.012 0.215∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.020) (0.019) (0.026) (0.018)
100k to 500k (Central Location) 0.171∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ −0.047∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.019) (0.018) (0.024) (0.017)
100k to 500k (Suburb) 0.112∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ −0.055∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.020) (0.020) (0.029) (0.018)
50k to 100k (Central Location) 0.107∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.001 0.091∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.025) (0.022) (0.034) (0.024)
50k to 100k (Suburb) 0.078∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ −0.023 0.084∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.023) (0.018) (0.033) (0.020)
20k to 50k 0.101∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗ −0.052∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.018)
5k to 20k 0.051∗ 0.038∗ 0.019 −0.031 0.027
(0.028) (0.021) (0.020) (0.027) (0.019)
Missing Dummy 0.315 0.346∗∗ 0.171 −0.144 0.232
<continued on next page>
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Baseline Rent Regressions <continued>
Variable QR 17% QR 50% QR 83% 83% - 17% OLS
(0.461) (0.169) (0.154) (0.482) (0.173)
Type of House (Ref.cat.: Detached House, 1-2 Family)
Other Bldg. −0.098 0.004 0.026 0.124∗ −0.009
(0.070) (0.042) (0.030) (0.065) (0.036)
Nondetached House (1-2 Family) 0.048∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.022 0.070∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.016) (0.016) (0.028) (0.016)
Apt. in 3-4 Units Bldg. 0.120∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013)
Apt. in 5-8 Units Bldg. 0.155∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.013) (0.012) (0.019) (0.013)
Apt. in 9+ Unit Bldg. 0.148∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.014) (0.015) (0.021) (0.014)
High-Rise Apt. Bldg. 0.176∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ −0.043 0.159∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.020) (0.027) (0.031) (0.021)
Missing Dummy 0.009 0.037 0.102∗∗∗ 0.093 0.050
(0.063) (0.036) (0.033) (0.066) (0.033)
Residential Area (Ref.cat.: Old residential area)
New Residential Area 0.020∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.001 0.019∗∗
(0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008)
Mixed Area 0.006 0.017∗∗ 0.016∗ 0.010 0.011
(0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008)
Other Areas −0.009 0.047 0.061∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.031
(0.032) (0.028) (0.023) (0.031) (0.025)
Missing Dummy −0.029 0.007 −0.034 −0.006 −0.016
(0.049) (0.027) (0.023) (0.051) (0.022)
Equipment
Central Heating 0.200∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.010)
Central Heating, Missing 0.067 0.148∗∗∗ 0.070 0.003 0.113∗∗
(0.068) (0.049) (0.091) (0.101) (0.048)
Balcony or Terrace (APE) 0.092∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008)
Balcony or Terrace, Missing 0.095∗∗ 0.000 −0.004 −0.099∗∗ 0.031
(0.040) (0.029) (0.030) (0.045) (0.025)
Basement (APE) 0.084∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.021 −0.064∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.012) (0.013) (0.023) (0.012)
Basement, Missing 0.092 0.110∗∗ 0.139 0.048 0.121∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.049) (0.086) (0.094) (0.045)
Garden −0.061∗∗∗−0.024∗∗∗−0.005 0.057∗∗∗−0.031∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007)
<continued on next page>
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Baseline Rent Regressions <continued>
Variable QR 17% QR 50% QR 83% 83% - 17% OLS
Garden, Missing −0.087 −0.034 −0.006 0.080 −0.050
(0.055) (0.033) (0.027) (0.052) (0.033)
Amenities in 10 Minutes Walking Distance
Stores 0.024∗∗ 0.010 0.004 −0.019 0.016∗
(0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008)
Park 0.017∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.005 0.029∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008)
Sports Complex −0.041∗∗∗−0.019∗∗ −0.001 0.040∗∗∗−0.027∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
Public Transportation 0.025∗ 0.021∗ 0.003 −0.022 0.016
(0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011)
Missing Dummy 0.042∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ −0.003 0.039∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.010)
Further Characteristics
Private Landlord 0.048∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007)
Private Landlord, Missing 0.046∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.014 0.047∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.011) (0.014) (0.020) (0.011)
Subsidized Housing −0.065∗∗∗−0.088∗∗∗−0.105∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗−0.088∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007)
Subsidized Housing, Missing −0.069 −0.007 0.027 0.095∗∗ −0.016
(0.045) (0.027) (0.029) (0.043) (0.027)
Year of Construction x x x x
Year Dummies (Observation) x x x x
State x x x x
Note: QR 17%, 50%, 83% denote quantile regressions at the three quantiles. 83% - 17% denotes
the difference between the two quantiles 83% and 17%. Ref.cat. denotes the reference category.
Calculations use the SOEP sample weights. Standard errors are in parentheses estimated by
bootstrap with 200 replications, clustered at tenancy level. *,** and *** denote significance at the
10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively. Average partial effects (APE) are partial effects at the mean
of the covariates used for the interactions. Source: SOEP V28.1 and authors’ calculations.
207
Table 4.4: Annual Residency Discount Before and After Reform
QR 17% QR 50% QR 83% 83% - 17% OLS
(a) Before Reform
0 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 3 −0.004 −0.013∗∗∗−0.017∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗−0.011∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
4 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 11 −0.010∗∗∗−0.009∗∗∗−0.009∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
12 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 41 −0.002∗∗∗−0.003∗∗∗−0.003∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Elapsed Tenure ≥ 42 Years 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
(b) After Reform
0 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 3 −0.014∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗−0.034∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗−0.028∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
4 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 11 0.005 0.002 0.009∗ 0.004 0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
(c) Difference (After minus Before)
0 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 3 −0.010 −0.013∗∗∗−0.017∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.018∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
4 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 11 0.014∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.003 0.017∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Note: Pooled panel OLS and quantile regressions. Calculations use the SOEP sample
weights. Standard errors are in parentheses and bootstrapped with 200 replications,
clustered at tenancy level. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-
level, respectively. Panel (a) shows annual discounts for tenancies where the old legal
situation apply while panel (b) provides information on annual discounts for tenancies
affected by the reform in 2001. Panel (c) shows the difference. Source: SOEP V28.1 and
authors’ calculations.
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Table 4.5: Annual Residency Discount Before and After Reform (Tenancy Fixed
Effects)
QR 17% QR 50% QR 83% 83% - 17% OLS
(a) Before Reform
0 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 3 −0.009∗∗∗−0.012∗∗∗−0.015∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗−0.011∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
4 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 11 −0.011∗∗∗−0.009∗∗∗−0.006∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗−0.009∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
12 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 41 −0.004∗∗∗−0.004∗∗∗−0.003∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Elapsed Tenure ≥ 42 years 0.001 0.002 0.003∗ 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
(b) After Reform
0 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 3 −0.017∗∗∗−0.022∗∗∗−0.025∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗−0.020∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
4 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 11 −0.001 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
(c) Difference (After minus Before)
0 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 3 −0.008∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗−0.010∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.009∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
4 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 11 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ −0.001 0.010∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Note: Panel OLS and quantile regressions. The estimates account for tenancy mean fixed
effects. Calculations use the SOEP sample weights. Standard errors are in parentheses
and bootstrapped with 200 replications, clustered at tenancy level. *,** and *** denote
significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively. Panel (a) shows annual discounts
for tenancies where the old legal situation apply while panel (b) provides information
on annual discounts for tenancies affected by the reform in 2001. Panel (c) shows the
difference. Source: SOEP V28.1 and authors’ calculations.
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Chapter 5
General Conclusion
This thesis provides a differentiated picture of two interventions and one policy
reform to alleviate economic inequality. Chapter 2 and 3 analyze the underlying
mechanisms of how out-of-school activities affect educational attainment and labor
market outcomes. In both chapters this question is addressed by examining whether
out-of-school activities affect behavioral outcomes reflecting character, social and
executive function skills.
Technological change and globalization have led to a growth in high- and low-skilled
jobs on the labor market of the Western world, while middle-skilled jobs have been
more and more displaced by machines or outsourced to low-wage countries. In
response to a labor market that is characterized by job polarization with increasing
earnings of high-skilled and decreasing earnings of low-skilled workers, the formation
of socially productive skills and the increase of skills of unskilled workers should be
at the center of attention.
In chapter 2 we analyze the effect of performing sports on a regular basis on the
formation of character skills. We find beneficial effects of athletic involvement on a
broad range of character skills, especially for youths on the vocational school track
the effects are sizeable. For youths from less advantaged family backgrounds, sports
constitutes often the only quality pastime they engage in while for youths from more
advantaged family backgrounds sports is only one possible quality pastime besides
playing music, singing or being technically active. Considering the engagement in
other structured leisure activities in the analysis it turns out that the beneficial
effects are largely driven by the sizeable effect among youths who do not engage
in any other structured activity. The treatment effect estimates can therefore be
interpreted as estimates of the broader effect of having access to an enriched social
environment rather than the pure effect of physical exercise. The effects are robust
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to including family fixed effects.
Chapter 3 analyzes the effect of working part-time while attending full-time sec-
ondary schooling on the formation of character skills and occupational choice strate-
gies. The results suggest a positive selection into teenage employment. Adolescents
who have held a job during full-time schooling are more likely to have high-educated
parents and live in financially well-endowed households. Further, parents’ employ-
ment history is a good predictor for the early work experience of school-aged chil-
dren. For male teenagers, delivery jobs are the most popular type of jobs. Female
teenagers, however, are more likely to hold service jobs such as waitressing, care
jobs such as baby-sitting, and tutoring besides delivery jobs. The effect of working
part-time after school on time invested in other activities is ambivalent. It reduces
time spent with academic learning, an activity assumed to be academically produc-
tive, especially for young women on weekdays, and it reduces significantly screen
time, an activity assumed to be academically unproductive. The estimation results
imply that holding a paid job while still in school reduces the uncertainty about
own interests and talents and reduces the dependency on parents. Further, it has
beneficial effects on the internal locus of control, a character skill that is correlated
with self-esteem. The effects are robust to including family fixed effects.
In sum, the results in both chapters are consistent with the hypothesis that experi-
ences and informal learning activities during adolescence influence the development
of nonacademic skills.
Chapter 4 evaluates a policy which targets to protect especially low-income house-
holds against rent increase. Germany is one of the European countries with the
smallest percentage of the population who lives in owner-occupied houses or apart-
ments. In 2013 about 53% of the German population lived in an owner-occupied
home. A predominant percentage of the German population therefore satisfies one of
their basic needs by living in a tenancy instead by home-ownership. This illustrates
the importance of a functioning tenancy law, socially and economically. Until the
1990s, Germany was characterized by fairly liberal rent laws. Because of housing
shortages and a strong rent increase in the 1990s, there was a change towards more
regulation in order to protect sitting tenants. Since then the legal framework has
been adjusted several times in favor of sitting tenants. In this chapter we analyze
the impact of the Tenancy Law Reform Act in 2001 on the level of rents as well as on
the residency discount. A residency discount signalizes a front loaded rent payment
schedule where landlords ask for higher rents at the beginning of a tenancy to com-
pensate for the stronger rent control during tenancy. The two substantial changes
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were first, the reduction of the maximum rent increases for sitting tenants from 30%
to 20% over the course of three years and second, the reduction of the minimum
notice period until the termination of a tenancy by the tenant to three months while
the protection of the tenant against eviction by the landlord remained unchanged.
While the second modification accounts for the higher mobility of workers, the first
modification targets the protection against rent increases which happened especially
in metropolitan areas leading to undue hardship for low-income families. The results
show a significant annual residence discount which decreases with tenure, which is
stronger at the top than at the bottom of the rent distribution, and which falls with
elapsed tenure. The tenancy reform act in 2001 shows a negative effect on rents that
becomes stronger at higher quantiles. During the first three years of a tenancy, the
reform further increases the annual residency discount for tenants. However, from
the fourth year onwards, the discount for tenancies affected by the reform vanishes.
The results suggest that the reform was successful in curtailing rent increases es-
pecially for expensive apartments early in a tenancy but there is no evidence that
rents for new leases increase disproportionately in response. The results are robust
to including tenancy mean fixed effects.
This thesis provides evidence on how economic inequalities can be alleviated. On
the one side this thesis focuses on how out-of-school activities are able to promote
the formation of character skills in contrast to the tightly structured learning en-
vironment at school that rather focuses on the development of cognitive abilities
ignoring the importance of character skills. Representing valuable assets, charac-
ter skills are helpful in bringing especially unskilled people into employment and
to better paid jobs and thus, beneficial to reduce the wage gap between high- and
low-skilled workers by lifting the skill level of unskilled people. As discussed in
the general introduction, several early childhood interventions between the 1960s
and 1980s were beneficial in promoting valuable character skills. They reduced sig-
nificantly the probability of being involved in criminal activities in adulthood and
were successful in integrating people with a disadvantaged social background in
the mainstream society. In two chapters, this thesis documents beneficial effects of
out-of-school activities on character skills supporting the hypothesis that structured
leisure activities positively affect the development of nonacademic skills. On the
other side, this thesis focuses on a tenancy law reform that aimed to protect low-
income households against rent increases. In international comparison a high share
of the German population lives in rental housing. Thus, the tenancy law plays an
essential role in an economic and social view. The evidence suggests that the reform
was successful in curtailing rent increases especially for expensive apartments early
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in a tenancy. Thus, one may be concerned that the reform may not have been suffi-
ciently targeted. As a consequence, the inequality between low-income tenants who
tend to pay lower rents and high-income tenants who are able to live in expensive
apartments increases.
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